The “Zhang Shunyou Incident”: A Typical Case for the “Practice of Cultivating Models”

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Abstract

As one among many model incidents swept up by political campaigns, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” was not particularly special per se. However, its appearance in the final stages of the “Three Anti” campaign and the subsequent ripples it caused were beyond the expectations of key figures involved in its creation. This unlikely model case also resulted in distinct responses in various regional contexts. Multiple actors influenced the creation and dissemination of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident”: the Party Center, omnipresent but absent from the coverage of the incident in the People’s Daily; the cadres of the North China Bureau (NCB) actively working in the foreground; and the three provinces which were forced to reflect on their performance, as well as other provinces and cities, all with their own concerns and goals. The participants of the event together outline the range of people from all walks of life who were caught up in a political campaign: from the NCB’s discovery of Zhang Shunyou to its abandonment of him, the incident not only represents a typical case of the “practice of cultivating models” but it also provides an effective angle by which to examine Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda practices.
Translators' Introduction

The historian Carlo Ginzburg once wrote that his particular approach to narrating the past in great detail was inspired by Leo Tolstoy’s “conviction that a historical phenomenon can become comprehensible only by reconstructing the activities of all the persons who participated in it.”¹ In a similar way Liu Yajuan, in a new postscript written at the occasion of the present translation of her article, acknowledges that, while common people may have only little direct impact on big historical events, it was them who actually lived day-by-day through the periods we are researching. And so, Liu’s article narrates the ups-and-downs in the life of a smalltown worker in the early People’s Republic of China (PRC)—while, at the same time, also presenting a detailed case-study of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda work in the 1950s, in particular during the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” campaigns of 1951-52. By retelling how one rural worker’s attempt to denounce his former boss for counterrevolutionary crimes is met with indifference on the part of local bureaucrats, and by showing how the repeated setbacks resulted in his story getting picked up by regional and even national propaganda apparatuses, Liu urges the reader to think about the ways common life and grand politics intertwine. Moreover, by burrowing into a dozen regional and local newspapers from across the country, Liu draws on media sociology’s attention to the historical process in order to shed new light on the machinations behind the production of political role models in the PRC.

Liu Yajuan is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at East China Normal University (华东师范大学; ECNU) in Shanghai and—as also noted by Matthew Galway in the introduction to his and Liu’s translation of another text of Liu’s featured in Revisiting the Revolution no. 1 (October 10, 2022)—² she is a prolific scholar researching intersections between state propaganda, workers and their lives, and contemporary Chinese political history. She belongs to a generation of Chinese historians who are not fully satisfied by the earlier emphasis on Foucauldian discursive power in historical media studies; neither are they convinced by the exaggerated supremacy of central control found in previous studies of CCP propaganda. Contrary to the cliché that regional propaganda organs strictly complied with the voice and view of the Party Center, with this article Liu shows that regional Party organs could (and did) adjust the content, style and intensity of their communication not only to fit provincial circumstances, but—and perhaps more importantly—also to evade repercussions of
ongoing campaigns against themselves. Dominant discourses of propaganda, in other words, did not take shape precisely according to the compositions of the Center, but reached the masses through the interpretation, reproduction, and dissemination at the level of regional Party organs.

Reading between the lines of official narratives, the article also revisits often overlooked sources (such as local media outlets or comic strips) to inspect the relation between the individual and the collective in political campaigns. Liu demonstrates how people were chosen and re-created as models to be emulated within propaganda—and how ad hoc such choices tended to be. She also touches upon the lived reality of an individual in such a process, and shows what could happen once the focus of the party propaganda moved elsewhere. For, within the span of the “Three Anti” campaign, Party propaganda departments took up Zhang Shunyou’s story and, almost overnight, the mass media remade him into a national model of opposing bureaucratism from the bottom-up. However, as the campaign came to an end and propaganda work turned to other themes, Zhang’s endeavors quickly fell into obscurity. As Liu narrates in the final parts of her article, while the currents of national (and regional) politics moved farther and farther away, Zhang continued trying to reprise his role as the model “Zhang Shunyou” throughout his life, but never again managed to catch the political hightide.

James Farley and Matthew D. Johnson, among others, have recently urged us to view propaganda foremost as a type of bureaucratic system. Liu contributes to such enquiry by revealing the bureaucratic tensions between the Party Center and the provincial organs in propaganda, as well as those between mobilization and bureaucracy. Indeed, the tensions highlighted in Liu’s article demonstrates how, after 1949, the CCP was short of hands in addressing a larger and more diverse audience, and in connecting the Party’s general objectives with local needs and problems. As the importance of engaging with local circumstances increased, propaganda began to embrace new forms and contents, a trend accompanied by the development of mass media such as local and regional newspapers. The article captures the adjustments and adaptations to the new needs and challenges in propaganda work with a close examination of one exemplary propaganda practice, namely that of ‘cultivating models’ (shu dianxing 树典型). Existing literature often traces the origins of this practice to the promotion of Stakhanovite model workers in the Yan’an era, or, treating it foremost as a literary or artistic technique, follows the intertwined and long-reaching consequences of Mao’s
advocacy voiced in his famous “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” in May 1942. Liu Yajuan’s focus in the following articles lies elsewhere: she sets out to explore what happened when the emerging mass media and state propaganda apparatuses used the practice of cultivating models to transform actual people and their lived experiences into idealized poster-personalities.

Underlining the differences in discourse and practice between such interrelated concepts like ‘truth’ (zhengli 真理), ‘facts’ (zhenxiang 真相) and ‘reality’ (zhenshi 真实), Liu’s article draws a fascinating picture of the re-creation of an individual as a figure on the map of state propaganda. This, finally, broadens the scope of what we actually talk about when we talk about ‘propaganda’: dissemination (of news), publicity (work), (political) communication, media (coverage), but also manipulation (of texts) or even censorship, all these can be extracted from the contextual use of the overarching term xuanchuan (宣传). In the translation, we tried our best to select the word(s) that, in our reading, most closely relate the given intended meaning. Another key term in the article is ‘bureaucratism’ (guanliao zhuyi 官僚主义). In the Chinese translation of Lenin’s works, guanliao zhuyi renders the Russian byurokratiya; and academic works in English sometimes translate it back as ‘bureaucracy.’ We opted for ‘bureaucratism’ to distinguish it from ‘bureaucracy’ as in contemporary usage, and to highlight the sense of criticism against the misuse of power by officials who were similarly part between the neutral party-state cadres and the pejorative ‘people advancing bureaucratism’ (guanliao zhuyi fenzi 官僚主义分子, lit. ‘bureaucratist elements’). Informed readers will also notice that the described events take place in provinces which do not exist anymore, and with involvement of party-state organs that subsequently ceased to function since then to exist; upon first mention in the text, we provide short explanations of these. In addition, we have compiled a short glossary at the end of the text listing the various types of political models and related propaganda practices mentioned in the article.
Introduction

*Brothers, clear the land ahead;*
*Sisters, break up the soil with strength;*
*Keeping up with hero Wu Manyou;*
*Our toil produces all that we need!*

This short folk song was a popular tune throughout the 1940s in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-controlled northwestern Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area. The “hero” Wu Manyou 吴满有 (1893-1959) was a common peasant from Hengshan County in Shaanxi Province. On April 30, 1942, in accordance with the propaganda needs of the Great Production Movement, the Yan’an Liberation Daily published a special front page feature describing Wu’s astonishing achievements. Rather than luck or accident, the discovery of Wu Manyou was the result of an authorized and comprehensive investigation conducted by the reporter Mo Ai 莫艾 (1917-2003). Mo selected key materials and wrote several reports related to Wu, all resulting in this originally “very modest peasant who refused to talk about his laborious work” becoming active in the political arena as an exemplar on multiple fronts. The Liberation Daily organized numerous other Party newspapers in a focused and continuous reporting campaign on Wu that lasted more than a year. This drive was also accompanied by literature and art. The masses were mobilized to learn and study from Wu, who in propaganda work thereupon became “a panacea for settling all problems” in each county of the border area. In the rise of Wu Manyou lies the origin of CCP’s model reportage. Moreover, the whole experience—from the discovery of the model Wu to the lessons from the experiences of propaganda work—also laid the basic framework for the practice of cultivating models.

From here on, the CCP frequently cultivated various models in accordance with its changing needs. With time, their forms diversified and the methods of cultivation became more sophisticated. The scope of propaganda expanded to include model incidents, collective models and even negative models. All of these contributed to a continuous operational workflow of “selecting—processing—disseminating—studying—summarizing.” Cultivating models, due to its low operating costs and quick effects, suited the propaganda strategy of the CCP and therefore became a crucial and effective tool for propaganda during the revolutionary period.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CCP was confronted with a new relationship between central and local authorities, and with related challenges to its propaganda work. As a propaganda method, the practice of cultivating models was in need of an urgent update. The CCP, as a hitherto “regional party” (地方党), was used to setting up regional models (地方典型) which followed the actual needs of local work. The process of their propagation was hence relatively straightforward. After the founding of the PRC, national political campaigns were frequently launched and the Party Center sought to establish national models (全国性典型), the origins of which remained at the regional level. However, once a regional prototype (原型) crossed local borders, the production workflows, such as the selection and processing of the original subjects, needed to be adapted for general use at the national level. In addition, their dissemination also demanded a more extensive integration within the propaganda organization across all levels of the administration. In sum, the crucial question for cultivating models after 1949 was whether they could be successfully produced from below, and whether they could then be smoothly disseminated from above back down to the bottom of the organizational hierarchy.

Existing sociological studies concentrate on the mechanics behind the creation of models. Journalism studies, on the other hand, due to a general consensus on the authenticity of news models (新闻典型), is more interested in the processes of their reportage and dissemination. Researchers of different academic backgrounds naturally pursue different questions, yet this means subject matter that actually requires an all-inclusive treatment is artificially broken up. The sociology of news production attempts to theoretically bridge the interdisciplinary gap by considering the process of news-making as the outcome of various interactions among political, economic, cultural, and news-related forces. Denis McQuail further called on scholars to take into full account the role of audiences as producers in the dissemination of news content. However, both the sociology of news production and the patterns of analyses of audiences are based on contemporary news media in the West. There is thus a spatio-temporal mismatch between such research and the paper-based media that played a major role for the CCP after the founding of the PRC. Further, emphasizing the diversity of factors that contribute to news production would also not be in accordance with the reality of the centralized CCP power structure and the resulting political control over the news. The above-mentioned studies of models have provided important observations, and yet the particularities of CCP propaganda remain under-
explored and empirical research based on this foundation has yet to be carried out.\textsuperscript{13}

In the past few years, researchers have made increasing use of case studies. These have been focused on the careful analysis and reconstruction of some well-known models (知名典型) cultivated by the CCP.\textsuperscript{14} Among these, especially interesting are Liu Yigao’s research into the story and context behind the “Pauper’s Co-op” (穷棒子社); as well as Yue Qianhou’s and Huang Xin’s discussion of the “Guo Sike Incident” (郭四颗事件). Both papers note the conflicting information in various texts produced in the process of creating and propagating a model case, and although they do not go into much detail, they provide unique insights.\textsuperscript{15} The case study method has further challenged the previous assumption of the facticity of model cases. It also offers additional empirical material for the development of theoretical frameworks. However, the existing literature remains comparatively narrow and its discoveries limited. It was in this context that the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” (张顺有事件) caught my interest.

The so-called “Zhang Shunyou Incident” refers to the case of the cart-driver Zhang Shunyou (张顺有 1932-2011) from Guo County in Shanxi Province, who, in order to report to the authorities on a counterrevolutionary named Song Yude (宋郁德), visited 27 different institutions in the provinces of Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Chahar,\textsuperscript{16} but at each station faced obstruction from Party cadres and state administration. The case was finally resolved only after an intervention by the North China Bureau (NCB).\textsuperscript{17} On May 30, 1952, the third page of the \textit{People’s Daily} featured a first mention of the incident. Thereafter, with the help of official news reports, propaganda publications, and the transmission of documents down the Party hierarchy, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” became recorded in history as a model case of anti-bureaucratism (反官僚主义).

As one of a great many models used in political campaigns, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” has not attracted particular scholarly interest. Where the incident is mentioned, it is done so either briefly or inaccurately. Existing research on the “Three-Anti” campaign often takes the Zhang Shunyou incident as just another case within the official line of anti-bureaucratism.\textsuperscript{18} Some of the scholarship on petitions treats the incident in this light, and Zhang’s eventual success in seeking an audience with higher-ups is used as evidence that the CCP attached great importance to petitioning, as well as indication of the CCP’s implementation of the mass line.\textsuperscript{19} This paper, using a more complete set of sources, reconstructs the chain of events behind the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” It looks at the case through the interplay between Party Center and regional governments. At first glance, the sequence of production and dissemination
of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” did not diverge from common patterns and workflows of the practice of cultivating models. However, inconsistencies across different accounts of the incident, as well as the variations on the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” at the local level, do not entirely conform to the CCP’s news regulation policies. Nor is it possible to reconcile this case with the conclusion of journalism scholars that coverage of model cases involved hierarchical coordination to ensure a unified message. Since the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” exhibits both general and particular features, I approach it as a single and yet typical case. In addition, that the incident and its associated propaganda work occurred in the final phase of the “Three Anti” campaign, raises another key question: How was a political campaign brought to a close through propaganda? Answering this question would be beneficial for our understanding of how CCP political campaigns functioned.

Crafting the “Zhang Shunyou Incident”

The North China Bureau “Discovers” Zhang Shunyou

On December 1, 1951, the Party Center issued a “Decision Concerning Refining Troops and Streamlining Administration, Increasing Production and Frugality, and Opposing Corruption, Waste, and Bureaucracy,” which initiated the “Three Anti” campaign. In Mao Zedong’s initial conception, the “Three Anti” campaign was to be based on Party and workstyle rectification, and could be carried out in about a month. The core mission of the campaign at its start was only to refine the army, streamline administration, increase production, and practice frugality; however, after it started, its focus shifted to the launching of overt anti-corruption struggles. The fight against bureaucratism, one of the initial three social evils to be struggled against, was not launched immediately. In January 1952, the NCB submitted a report to the Party Center regarding the end of the “Three Anti” campaign. The report made known that although the campaign was about to terminate in each agency supervised by the NCB on January 15, given that only two of the “antis” had in fact been acted on while anti-bureaucratism had not been, it had been decided to first propagate this third “anti” and only after that declare the campaign successfully concluded. While Mao expressed his support and approved that this report be forwarded to each department, his understanding was that anti-bureaucratism would be carried out as part of the
struggle against waste and corruption, and thus did not give it a high priority. The whole country was soon ushered into the high tide of “fighting tigers”, i.e., corrupt elements, and the battle line repeatedly expanded. Therefore, the NCB’s plan to make up for the missing element of the campaign—anti-bureaucratism—was never actually carried out on a large scale.

On March 11, 1952, the Frugality Inspection Committee at the Party Center announced that “throughout the country, the struggles of the ‘Three Anti’ campaign are nearing completion in all state organs above the level of prefecture and all army units above the level of regiment.” Thus, it announced that “every work unit which had basically completed these struggles must shift its attention to the constructive phase of the ‘Three Anti’ campaign.” The “Three Anti” campaign was indeed nearing its end across the country, but the fight against bureaucratism had not yet been addressed by the campaign. The Party Center had not fully grasped this issue with the implementation of anti-bureaucratism. Instead, it optimistically believed that bureaucratism has already been disposed of in the process of the “Three Anti” campaign:

A great majority of leading cadres at all levels have already, in both thought and work, a deep understanding of the serious harm caused by the error of bureaucratism to the national cause. Because of this, in the process of the ‘Three Anti’ campaign, the excellent style of a close cooperation and collaboration between leaders and the masses is rapidly and universally developing.

It was against such a background that the petitioning of the cart-driver Zhang Shunyou became of special significance. Before reaching Beijing, Zhang had traveled from Shanxi’s Guo County, across the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Shanxi in order to inform on Song Yude. The whole endeavor lasted more than half a year, as Zhang suffered repeated setbacks. However, when Zhang reported the case to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the situation changed. Upon receiving a letter denouncing Song from his fellow Shanxi native Zhang, Lai Ruoyu 赖若愚 (1910-1958)—the acting chairman and secretary-general of the ACFTU at the time—attached considerable importance to the matter and immediately sent it over to the NCB. At that time, presiding over the daily work activities of the NCB was the third secretary Liu Lantao 刘澜涛 (1910-1997), who was Lai’s former superior. And so, the two leading cadres dealing with the case—Lai of the ACFTU and Liu of the NCB—had a history of working together.

After reading about Zhang Shunyou’s experiences in the three provinces, Liu ime-
diately phoned the relevant work units and, after receiving confirmation that Zhang's statement was “basically true,” he linked the matter with the ongoing “Three Anti” campaign. Liu, an experienced CCP cadre, long engaged in propaganda, was eager to define the nature of the incident before detailed investigations were launched. On the one hand, Liu confirmed that Zhang’s “hatred of counterrevolutionaries and spirit of dogged righteousness were worthy of praise.” On the other hand, he believed that the circumstances of Zhang's situation “exposed an intolerable degree of bureaucratist style of work among government offices in Chahar, Shanxi and other regions.” Thus, his intention was as follows:

After all the relevant departments in each province and city have examined the situation thoroughly, Party members at various organs that were responsible for dealing with the case will be summoned to the NCB. The results of the subsequent examination, as well as Zhang Shunyou’s oral testimony, are then to be published, and those implicated criticized, so as to educate cadres and the masses.29

On April 12, 1952, at the request of the NCB, the Organization Department of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee ordered the cadres in charge of the relevant departments to conduct a preliminary self-criticism concerning how they handled the matter. The provincial government organized personnel to explain the circumstances of the incident, and dispatched staff to Guo County to collect local material. The Shanxi Provincial Government’s explanation of the events, alongside the report of the investigation on the ground in Guo County, revealed a more complete image of the Zhang Shunyou story. Zhang's journey to the three provinces and 27 organs was, in fact, roughly in line with Zhang's account. However, here is where a discrepancy between Zhang-the-person and Zhang-the-model first comes into light: there are notable differences between the actual person Zhang Shunyou and “Zhang Shunyou” the combatant of counterrevolutionaries and upholder of justice. The collected materials showed that Zhang “once took part in a Japanese puppet regime youth training class” and successively served as a Japanese puppet regime police officer and a squad leader of the puppet regime self-defense regiment. Zhang joined the army five or six months after the CCP entered Guo County in 1945, but he then “ran away” to Datong which at that time was still under Guomindang (KMT) control. There, he joined the Provisional 38th Division under warlord Yan Xishan 閻錫山 (1883-1960), but returned home after three months. Afterward, Zhang became a cart-driver selling wheat and first got to know Song Yude.30 31
Zhang’s motivations for reporting on Song were also rather ambiguous. Initially, he reported on Song because Zhang knew it was illegal to cover up for a counterrevolutionary (i.e., Song), and “was afraid of getting implicated through that connection.” Yet, after handing in the anonymous report, “he again feared to have offended Song,” “was going every day to deliver food for Song to the prison” and continued to have a sort of boss-employee relationship with Song. The Public Security Branch of the Second District of Guo County found no actual evidence that Song was a counterrevolutionary, and so, after detaining him for several days, released him on parole. Zhang then proactively hurried to collect the bail for Song and, after Song’s release, Zhang continued to drive the cart for him and maintain close relations.

The deterioration of the relationship between Zhang and Song was not related to what the CCP referred to as class hatred (阶级仇恨), but by disputes of interest (利益纠纷): “Song once promised to marry off his daughter to Zhang and provide him co-ownership of his cart as dowry, yet soon after he went back on it.” He was also behind in payments of Zhang’s salary. Zhang then repeatedly reported on Song over the next half year. Besides seeking reimbursement for his travel expenses, Zhang also had interest in a “reward for informing against counterrevolutionaries.”

The results of the bottom-up investigation revealed flaws in Zhang’s personal character and demonstrated that his motivations for reporting against counterrevolutionaries were also less than pure. Nonetheless, the NCB did not discard this flawed prototype. According to Wang Congwu (1910-2001), secretary of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the NCB, “Zhang Shunyou had a bad history,” “his reporting on counterrevolutionaries was based on personal interests,” and “his motivations were not pure”—yet, despite these observations, it remained a fact that Zhang did report against a counterrevolutionary and was fighting against bureaucratism. In other words, Zhang’s personal image did not at all impact the meaningful anti-bureaucratism embodied in the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” The customary method of editing and restructuring in the practice of cultivating models separated the person Zhang Shunyou from the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” which made it possible to ensure the accuracy of some key aspects of the model and to allay any concern on the part of the NCB.

The “Zhang Shunyou Incident” Is Announced: Publicity and Behind the Scenes
Before becoming the official news organ of the Party Center, the People’s Daily was
for a short time actually the official newspaper of the North China Bureau. After the *People’s Daily* was upgraded on August 1, 1949, the NCB became the only regional bureau of the CCP without an affiliated newspaper. According to existing procedures, for local news reports to appear in the *People’s Daily*, they had to be nominated by the Central Propaganda Department and reviewed by the person in charge. They were then issued by the regional Xinhua Agency upon approval from the Central Xinhua Agency. But, in terms of layout arrangements, both the Central Propaganda Department and the *People’s Daily* were favorably inclined towards the NCB, which lacked its own newspaper. Further, since the dissolution of the North China People's Government in 1951, the Central People's Government had full jurisdiction over all provinces and cities formerly under the NCB. Due to the directly subordinated relationship between the Central People's Government and the provinces of Shanxi, Chahar and Suiyuan, the *People’s Daily* naturally became the platform for propagating the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.”

On May 30, 1952, the third page of the *People’s Daily*, ran the story, “I Encountered Repeated Obstacles When Informing Against a Counterrevolutionary.” This story featured the oral testimony of Zhang Shunyou, as recorded by Li Hengying 李恒英 of the NCB’s Commission for Discipline Inspection. However, when compared with the investigation report obtained by the NCB, the oral testimony reveals extensive processing. In the *People’s Daily* story, Zhang appeared a victim of a bureaucratist work style. Little was said about his background, other than that he had “joined a trade union and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, received revolutionary education, and gradually improved his consciousness.” It also underlined his correct standpoint of being “very supportive towards the CCP and the People’s Government.” As for Zhang's motives for reporting Song, they were described as “a response to the call of the People’s Government to actively report counterrevolutionaries.” In the pages of the *People’s Daily*, Zhang’s testimony highlighted his tortuous experiences of encountering obstruction by Party and state administration in all regions. It downplayed his purpose of seeking financial compensation: the text describes vividly the bureaucratist style of work of the cadres, with no mention of the complicated relationship between Zhang and Song, nor their financial disputes. In addition to this story, there also appeared a reprint of a letter from Liu Lantao to Lai Ruoyu, dated April 9, stating that “the total travel expenses of Zhang Shunyou amounted to 2.4 million yuan, which were temporarily advanced by the NCB and given to Zhang who carried an official letter [allowing him
to obtain food and lodging] on his way home.”

The original versions of both Zhang’s testimony and Liu’s letter were written relatively early on in the chain of events, and both touch upon much information which they relate quite vaguely, so these texts did not themselves provide clear guidance about how to interpret the incident. Rather than mechanically quote the two texts, the *People’s Daily* selectively chose information to present the incident in a way that provided the “only correct” interpretation. In this publicized interpretation, Liu’s hastily formed positive evaluation of Zhang is played down, while “anti-bureaucratism” becomes the main focus of the narrative. The newspaper added another hint of the shift in an “editor’s note” preceding Zhang’s self-report. In this note, the “bureaucratist style of work” was explicitly noted and attacked. Adjacent to this, the “Brief Comment on Political and Legal Work” further raised the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” to national significance by pointing out the profound educational importance behind it:

This incident shows that in our political organs and within the people’s organizations there are indeed some individuals who really manifest a very severe degree of bureaucratism. The severity of their bureaucratist style of work is far worse than we could have imagined. … This incident shows that the ways in which our many political organs and the people’s organizations handle reports informing on offenses, denunciations and related cases still lack a coherent system. And where there is a system, it is utterly chaotic. … This incident also shows that a certain number of our leading organs and responsible cadres have not conducted policy education towards lower-level staff.

Finally, the editors indicated the direction for subsequent propaganda: “Bureaucratism must be eliminated.”

Although the first appearance of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” in the *People’s Daily* was creative, the story did not appear in the form of an editorial on the front page. This shows that the incident was not considered a priority for propaganda at that time. According to instructions sent out by the Central Propaganda Department in March, during the establishing phase of the “Three Anti” campaign:

The space occupied on each printed page in the newspapers ought to gradually reduce in size when it comes to reports focused on unmasking (揭露性) and progressively increase in size when it comes to propagating the rise of economic production, production competitions, spring plowing and preparation for drought and other natural disasters, and other constructive activities.

Since the incident itself involved an unmasking and, in addition, the main points
of propaganda work in the next stage had already been transmitted down a while ago, the *People’s Daily* was especially cautious in its initial propaganda of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.”

After some of the materials related to the case were released on May 30, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” subsequently disappeared from the pages of the *People’s Daily*. From June 6 onward, the three provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Shanxi dealt in succession with the individuals involved, but the *People’s Daily* neither paid attention to this nor provided focused reports on the developments in various regions, as was usual practice. On June 15, the Party Center issued the “Instructions on Certain Issues in Striving for Successfully Concluding the ‘Three Anti’ Campaign,” and the following day the “Instructions on Dealing with Issues of Party Discipline in the ‘Three Anti’ and Party Rectification Campaigns” where it was laid out that “while being both earnest and cautious...we must not recklessly punish Party members.”

Clearly, during the construction stage of the “Three Anti” campaign the Party Center had taken a more lenient attitude towards those cadres who had violated discipline. On June 17, the *People’s Daily* carried the front page story, “Through the Zhang Shunyou Incident, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan and Other Provinces Carry Out a Thorough Self-Examination of the Bureaucratic Style of Work,” and published related letters from readers accumulated over the last weeks. These letters reprimanded those advancing bureaucratism and pledged the authors’ determination to lead by example.

On June 20, the *People’s Daily* reprinted details of a June 14 meeting of the NCB, alongside summaries of the speeches by Liu Lantao and by Wang Congwu. Toward the end of the meeting, Zhang Shunyou personally appeared to give his testimony. Although the *People’s Daily* did not reprint much of his speech, the fragments which did make it to print are full of meaning:

This great assembly allowed me to deepen my understanding of the CCP and the People’s Government, and to see that the CCP and the People’s Government are genuinely serving the people. That I had the courage to inform against counterrevolutionaries is all thanks to the fact of having received positive encouragement from the CCP and People’s Government. I detest the KMT and counterrevolutionaries.” “Formerly, in the old society, someone like me wouldn’t be able to even see a county magistrate, not to mention traveling up to Beijing to file a complaint.

Unlike the “public” summary of the meeting presented in the *People’s Daily*, a report submitted by the NCB to the Party Center after the June meeting reveals details on their
own internal considerations and gives us another valuable piece of evidence. In this report, the NCB stated that their handling of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” received full support from Party and non-Party cadres as well as the masses, who were quoted saying: “The NCB’s handling of the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident’ was wise and correct.” It further stated that the earnest handling of this matter “generally caused cadres to be highly vigilant against bureaucratist errors. ... Cadres all believed that in the late stage of construction of the ‘Three Anti’ campaign, it was necessary to launch an anti-bureaucratism campaign across the region.” The aim of the report by the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the NCB was to illustrate how the model example of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” was discovered and handled, and concluded that “the anti-bureaucratic actions conducted with great fanfare were correct and well-timed,” and, at the same time, “we have decided to continue launching anti-bureaucratism campaigns across the region.”

The Party Center affirmed this opinion, agreeing that the suggestion of the NCB was “correct.” The Center also recognized that “it is highly beneficial that the NCB and its Disciplinary Inspection Committee efficiently dealt with model cases like the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident’.” However, the Party Center considered the main benefits to be that, “after publicly handling the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident’, the number of people reporting, accusing, and appealing to the NCB either by letter or in person has reached five or six cases a day.” As such, the Party Center seemed to prioritize working toward “an even higher prestige of the Party and a closer relationship between the Party and the masses.” Regarding the NCB’s enthusiasm for the continued elimination of bureaucratism, the Center suggested, “further exposing such behaviors in the future.”

Imbued with an ethos of “anti-bureaucratism” as it was, the timing of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” relative to the “Three-Anti” campaign was of great consequence. For, if the People’s Daily, acting as voice of the Party Center, had chosen to widely propagate this negative model (here of cadre behavior) during the campaign, giving the impression that the “Three Anti” campaign was to continue and acting as a call to intensify the struggle throughout the country, this would undoubtedly have caused panic among cadres. Moreover, if the masses were to start imitating Zhang Shunyou in writing letters or personally going to the Party Center to report, accuse, or petition, it would disrupt the pace of the Party and state in restoring normal operations towards the end of the “Three Anti” campaign. This was exactly the situation that the Party Center was worried about. That the initial dissemination of the “Zhang Shunyou
Incident” in the *People’s Daily* tended to be conservative, and the time gap between the first report and the large-scale propaganda, both confirm this reasoning.

With July nearing, various regions one after the other submitted work reports on the conclusion of the “Three Anti” campaign. Only at this moment did the *People’s Daily* begin to carry self-criticisms of leading cadres involved in the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” and revealed a succession of similar incidents. The propaganda wave initiated by the *People’s Daily* soon spread to local areas and, driven by the expectations of both the NCB and the Party Center, it expanded nationwide.

**Disseminating the “Zhang Shunyou Incident”**

*Shanxi’s Propaganda Tries to Keep Up*

The provinces of Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Chahar, as the three regions implicated in the incident, were in the center of the storm; and, as the primary area of Zhang Shunyou’s activities, Shanxi bore the brunt of the ongoing wave of anti-bureaucratism. Zhang’s story, as it returned to Shanxi in the form of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” was not only unexpected by the provincial government, but also caught the *Shanxi Daily* off-guard. In the course of Zhang’s attempts to seek an audience with government officials, he had requested the *Shanxi Daily* to run a story on his case. At the time, however, the editors did not give it due attention. It was not until the North China Bureau appointed a cadre to investigate the matter that “the comrades from the department of readers’ letters were able to suddenly recall the matter, and even their team leader Li Yuzhi 李蔚芝 had not noticed it until then.”

In fact, starting in March, the *Shanxi Daily* had already started preparations to wrap up the “Three Anti” campaign. It strongly advocated for a change of direction of the campaign by running the headline “‘Three Anti’ and Production Work Must Not Interrupt One Another.” Starting in April, the paper began to propagate the victorious end of the “Three Anti” campaign and a related new political climate.

The Shanxi Provincial Party Committee did not participate in the development of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” and was initially not aware of the situation. It was not until April 12 that the Organization Department of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee, under the instructions of the NCB, convened the heads of relevant departments to conduct a preliminary inspection. The *Shanxi Daily* simultaneously submitted a
written self-criticism to the provincial Party committee, and waited for the Party Center to determine the nature of the incident. On May 30, when the People’s Daily published materials related to the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” and pointed out the case’s anti-bureaucratist implications, the Shanxi Daily started to adjust its direction. On June 6, the Shanxi Daily ran on its front page a reprint of Zhang Shunyou’s oral testimony, Liu Lantao’s letter to Lai Ruoyu, and a brief comment on the case penned by the editors of the People’s Daily. At the same time, the Shanxi Daily published the commentary, “Treat the People and the Masses with a Correct Attitude, Thoroughly Overcome Bureaucratist Errors,” in an effort to maintain consistency with the People’s Daily.

Starting from June 11, the second page of the Shanxi Daily opened with a special section, entitled “Learn the Lesson of the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident,’ Resolutely Overcome Bureaucratist Mistakes” and featuring cadres’ and staff members’ written self-criticisms. The introduction of this new section generated significant public interest. On June 21, the newspaper published, a summary of the incoming letters, stating that 43 readers had written over 30 letters, all of which severely criticized bureaucratist errors. Not only that, but the Shanxi Daily also responded to the Party Center’s call to proactively expose and propagate similar model incidents. On June 24, the newspaper carried Liao Zhongyi’s testimony titled “How I Was Framed by Corrupt Elements.” It told the story of how Liao, a salesperson at the Shanxi Branch of China Coal Construction Equipment Company, was framed by corrupt cadres at his company who he initially informed against and how he was eventually rescued from these false allegations during the “Three Anti” campaign. Liao’s narrative copied the style of Zhang’s testimony. Moreover, this “Liao Zongyi Incident” soon also became yet another model for the Shanxi propaganda apparatus, following the example of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” The Shanxi Daily also published the short commentary, “Carry Out In-Depth Discussions of the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident’ in Connection with Actual Circumstances, Thoroughly Overcome Bureaucratist Errors.”

Up until that moment, the Shanxi Daily had closely followed the People’s Daily in both the manner and direction of propaganda. From start to end, the propaganda work around the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” revolved around the theme of anti-bureaucratism and as such it performed its duties commendably. However, the outwardly cooperative Shanxi Daily had an entirely different attitude behind the scenes. Ever since the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” had been exposed, the newspaper was under
considerable pressure: it was very hard to get rid of the impression that, were it not for Shanxi's bureaucratist style of work, the whole incident might not have happened in the first place. The more extensively the incident was publicized, the harder it was to break away from that negative image. In order to reverse this passive and disadvantageous position, the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee attempted to achieve internal consensus on how to interpret this matter. Before the NCB's request that relevant personnel go to Beijing to participate in a special meeting concerning the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee once again convened a meeting with relevant cadres. The head of the Provincial Party Committee Organizational Department and the secretary of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee, Wei Heng 卫恒 (1915-1967), issued important directives: he “thoroughly praised Zhang Shunyou’s hatred of counterrevolutionaries and his spirit of upholding justice, and moreover commended Zhang’s awareness that people are the masters of the country.” This personal evaluation of Zhang represented the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee’s completely new interpretation of this matter. It also provided the Shanxi Daily with guidance for a renewed propaganda effort around the incident.

On June 20, the NCB announced the victorious end to the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” campaigns in the whole region. Liu Lantao further indicated the following:

Currently, the whole Party and all levels of the people’s government are facing a primary mission that is overwhelming everything else: building on the success of the great ‘Three Anti’ and the ‘Five Anti’ campaigns, we must with all our strength develop industrial and agricultural production, extensively promote urban-rural exchange work, and thus strengthen economic construction.

And so, according to the propaganda and education work guidelines previously transmitted down by the NCB, “1952 was to be the last year for the preparation of large-scale economic construction.” As for propaganda and education work in the three months of May, June and July, it was to involve, following the victory of the “Three-Antis” and “Five Antis”:

A continued period of study [in which] Party propaganda towards the masses must stress patriotic education within industrial and agricultural production movements, and fight against the tendency to disregard politics in production work.

The instructions sent out by the NCB clearly indicated that the focus of the next stage of propaganda work would shift to the Patriotic Production Campaign. However, the circumstances facing the Shanxi Daily at the time were even more complicated. On
June 20, Yuan Jin 袁靳, head of the Press and Publications Department Office of the Propaganda Department of the NCB, together with Wang Dingkun 王定坤, editor of the People's Daily and the director of the North China Branch of Xinhua News Agency, wrote a letter to He Jing 何静, the chief of the Cultural Affairs Administration Bureau of Shanxi Province. In this letter, the two authors made detailed suggestions regarding the kind of propaganda work that Shanxi province ought to advance at the time. They pointed out that:

...throughout the region, both the ‘Three Anti’ and the ‘Five Anti’ campaigns have already been victoriously concluded by the NCB. Strengthening the leadership over industrial and agricultural production campaigns and further facilitating urban-rural supply exchanges—these will be the two overriding primary tasks of the entire North China region henceforth. ... The essence of these campaigns is not only limited to reforming production, they are also great movements of political and ideological reform. ... Whether before, during, or at the end of the campaigns, anti-bureaucratist and anti-waste struggles must continue throughout. Newspapers must continue to propagate the new atmosphere brought about by the ‘Three Anti’ and ‘Five Anti’ campaigns, promote the various tasks undertaken during the construction phase of the ‘Three Anti’ campaign, and correctly interpret the profound meaning behind both campaigns.\textsuperscript{58}

It was necessary to persevere with propaganda around the ‘Three Anti’ campaign, but at the same time to also spare no effort mobilizing people across the province to participate in the patriotic production movement and competition. These were the requirements for propaganda sent down to Shanxi province at this stage, both from the Party Center and the NCB. Faced with this twin burden, what would the Shanxi Daily do?

Remodeling “Zhang Shunyou”: The North China Bureau Acquiesces, the Three Provinces Join Forces

As a norm, the CCP’s practice of political campaigns was to carry out one primary and overriding task for a set period of time. However, “destroying the old” (破旧) and “establishing the new” (立新) frequently went hand in hand—especially at the beginning and end of a campaign—and from this background a situation of entangled composite campaign goals would emerge. As the official news-organ of the Shanxi Provincial Committee, the Shanxi Daily had to publicize the local situation and help the provincial committee in its routine work. But, once a nationwide political campaign was underway, the newspaper was expected to join the national struggle as quickly
as possible. In order to ensure a smooth transition into one and out of another campaign, and to combine the national propaganda tasks with local propaganda work, local Party newspapers gradually developed some useful experience. An especially favored approach was to “twist” the campaigns together with a main storyline. The *Shanxi Daily* also took this approach.

The fourth page of the *Shanxi Daily* on June 24 carried a commentary that signaled a shift in the focus of propaganda. The article explicitly put forward the slogan “Learn from Zhang Shunyou, Be a Good Master of the Country” emphasizing that “all of us people must learn from Zhang Shunyou, learn from his hatred of counterrevolutionaries, from his fearlessness in face of difficulties and reprisals, from his spirit of struggle to persist in truth to the end—[learn] to truly become good masters of the Country.” The text then extensively praised Zhang's abilities and commended his high political awareness and that he “recognized that the world today is our people’s world, and the government is our people’s government. ... He loathes counterrevolutionaries and believes that the people and the government speak the truth.”

In addition to their call to “learn from Zhang Shunyou,” the *Shanxi Daily* also recollected and organized some of Zhang’s personal information. In the media coverage of the story, Zhang’s disclosures about the authorities were no longer central and the so-called anti-bureaucratist aspect of the campaign also became secondary. Instead, it was now Zhang himself, as well as the social environment that had led to his rise, that became the core of propaganda. On July 5, the newspaper published a letter of Zhang’s as written down for him by a staff reporter. In this letter to Liu Lantao, Zhang highly praised the Party’s and government’s dedication in following the spirit of serving the people with their heart, stating that he “felt more and more that Chairman Mao, the Communist Party, and the People’s Government were really concentrating their thoughts and efforts on working for the people.” Not only that, Zhang extended forgiveness to the errant cadres in his letter, stating that “they were infected with some bad habits from the old society” and that he was “convinced that they would resolutely correct such habits.” Such statements emphasized Zhang’s confidence and aspiration as “new master of his country (新国家主人翁).” He also wrote a letter to the ACFTU, stating that “his personal experiences showed him firsthand that trade unions truly were the organizations of the workers,” and that there was no need anymore to repeat his previous critical remarks against the municipal trade unions, published in the *People’s Daily.*
When compared with the propaganda of the *People’s Daily*, the *Shanxi Daily* was evidently more circumspect in molding (塑造) a model character (典型人物). The local newspaper attempted to reverse its disadvantageous position in the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” By setting up a positive model (正面典型) in order to ignite a trend of learning from Zhang Shunyou in the province, it aimed to free itself and the Shanxi provincial government from the negative effects of the exposure in the *People’s Daily*. Although *Shanxi Daily* was not the initial creator of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” it both discovered and propagated the positive model character (正面典型人物) known as “Zhang Shunyou.”

As the propaganda and reporting in the *Shanxi Daily* intensified, a “Zhang Shunyou” the all-rounder (全能的人) was gradually constructed and the content for a national study campaign became richer. In August 1952, the *Shanxi Daily* issued an appeal that “correspondents become social activists,” stating:

> Recently, in addition to paying attention to newspaper reading and propaganda work, Zhang has personally come to the editorial office of this newspaper, he has become a social activist. ... He already personifies the noble qualities of the people of New China. ... He is not afraid of difficulties and has the courage to persevere with truth. ... In all kinds of work, he plays an exemplary leading role.”

If the features of Zhang Shunyou were indistinct in the *People’s Daily* because of limited coverage, his image in the *Shanxi Daily* became very clear. From a victim of, and whistleblower on, bureaucratism, he gradually transformed into an outstanding worker representative who bravely fought against counterrevolutionaries, and who loved his country and Party. He supported New China and the CCP, and not just in name, but also in reality was an exemplary “master of his country.”

There was no space in the *People’s Daily* to report all the things Zhang Shunyou did after returning to his hometown. However, for the *Shanxi Daily* the story was only just beginning. The local newspaper ran the comic strip (连环画) “Resolutely Overcome the Bureaucratist Style of Work — The Experiences of Zhang Shunyou’s Reporting on Counterrevolutionaries,” which adjusted and modified Zhang’s words and actions, as well as the details of his reporting on counterrevolutionaries. When compared with the original publicity work in the *People’s Daily*, there were two main changes.

First, the *Shanxi Daily* comic strip went one step further in glorifying Zhang. The *People’s Daily* had pointed out Zhang’s worker status and class consciousness only
very briefly. By contrast, in the Shanxi Daily, Zhang’s considerations of self-interest completely disappear and the motives for his denunciations are rendered pure. He remains unmoved in the face of Sun Youde’s enticements and sophistry; instead, Zhang always keeps in mind the trade union’s teaching that: “the working class must, at all times, draw a clear division between classes ... and become a model for the implementation of policy.” (See Figure 1, Image 1.)

The “Zhang Shunyou” of the Shanxi Daily comic strip is removed, to a still further degree, from the person of Zhang Shunyou. Zhang Shunyou, the strip suggests, always kept in mind that he was a member of the working class. In the strip, as he began to report against counterrevolutionaries, he provided testimony to the People’s Government of Datong County as a trade union member. The ACFTU was also his first stop on the way to Beijing to lodge a complaint. Zhang was deeply grateful to the people’s government for its leniency in dealing with his past, and was determined to fight against counterrevolutionaries. (See Figure 1, Image 2.) Further, attempting to investigate the facts of Song Yude’s crimes and to collect evidence of his counterrevolutionary acts, in panel three of the comic Zhang sells his clothes to cover travel expenses. The strip then shows how Zhang went to the house of Sun Linyu孙林雨, who had been killed by Song, and comforted his mother, saying with full confidence in the government and the Party: “Now that we have the people’s government, we will certainly be able to take revenge on our enemies.” (See Figure 1, Image 3.) Despite being confronted with numerous setbacks, Zhang did not give up. In panel four, we see Zhang persevering with his study and pursuit of the truth. (See Figure 1, Image 4.) This comic-version of Zhang, despite the negative remarks and pessimism of others, persisted in his own views. He disregarded the objections of family and village members, and maintained unwavering trust in the Party and the government, spreading the truth among the people around him. (See Figure 1, Image 5.) The second difference between Shanxi Daily and People’s Daily reportage of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” was the former’s self-serving propaganda (利己的宣传). The comic strip modified and processed all of Zhang Shunyou’s experiences, as well as the attitudes of related departments. As a result, the reporting on Zhang’s criticism of bureaucratism within various organs of the Shanxi Province administration was strictly limited in scope to each department’s internal self-examination only. The wording was conservative and not elaborated upon in any way. There were also certain differences in detailed descriptions when compared to Zhang Shunyou’s oral testimony as printed in the People’s Daily under
the title “I Have Reported on a Counterrevolutionary and Faced Layer upon Layer of Obstacles.”

In the Shanxi Daily comic, the various organs of the Shanxi administration, which
had been denounced by Zhang Shunyou for their rigid attitude and which had led to his repetitive but fruitless journey from department to department, were also rendered benign and even helpful. According to this version, Zhang Shunyou was “very well” received by the Shanxi People’s Procuratorate and the Provincial People’s Government upon his arrival in Taiyuan. Although neither of the two departments provided his travel expenses, they assured him that his action of reporting [on Song] was “very good.” (See Figure 2, Image 6.) As for the newspaper’s indifference, the Shanxi Daily also took the opportunity to mount a self-defense, implying that it had only limited capacities and was unable to help however much they would have liked to. (See Figure 2, Image 7.) Clearly, as the mouthpiece (喉舌) of the Shanxi Provincial Committee, Shanxi Daily gave provincial-level agencies the best possible image in its comic strip.

In stark contrast, however, while the comic strip spared no ink in polishing the image of the provincial authorities, it showed no restraint in exposing the situations in Suiyuan and Chahar. For example, it repeatedly depicted scenes in which the various provincial and municipal organs in Suiyan “didn’t even let him in,” and the image of a cadre at the Yanggao County Public Security Bureau slapping the table to drive Zhang away was also very vivid. (See Figure 2, Image 8.)

Interestingly, the comic strip, so full of elements designed to portray the Shanxi authorities in a positive light, nevertheless appeared on September 12 in the Suiyuan Daily without any amendments to the narrative of what happened in Suiyuan. While the title had been changed to “The Zhang Shunyou Incident,” and details the description of Zhang Shunyou’s own motivations removed, the account of events in Suiyuan remained unchanged. Did the mechanical reproduction of the comic strip indicate that Suiyuan Province had no objections to, or even approved of, such portrayal of events? This was not the case. On August 11, the Suiyuan Daily published a self-examination on the incident by the Suiyan Provincial People’s Procuratorate, which included the chief procurator’s explanation:

When Zhang Shunyou requested our procuratorate to subsidize his travel expenses, comrade Wang Shude 王树德 replied: “Your action of reporting the offenses was good; you can compensate your losses from the property of the counterrevolutionary you have reported on.”

And as to why the Guisui Municipal Public Security Bureau did not solve the issue, Zhang himself was quoted as providing an explanation: “I need to have proof of the
travel expenses, but as I don’t have it right now, and they don’t trust me, I cannot be reimbursed.” Later, the procuratorate received Zhang once again, “but as to [the situation] of him not being let in, that is not consistent with the facts.”

This explanation was part of a self-criticism that was formulated after the case was publicized—the author had clearly read Zhang’s testimony and sought to refute the parts they considered inaccurate. In addition, as the text was published in the *Suiyan Daily*, it had to have some degree of credibility. However, the comic strip reprinted in the *Suiyuan Daily* shortly afterward still included the following:

Zhang Shunyou returned to Guisui and made many back-and-forth trips to various local provincial and municipal organs, but returned empty-handed. Later, when these same organs realized that it was Zhang Shunyou who was calling on them, they did
not even let him through the door. Once he saw that the matter could not be solved in Chahar nor Suiyan, he went to Taiyuan to solve it. (See Figure 3, Image 9.)

Although the procuratorate’s unusual self-criticism corrected Zhang’s initial narrative, the published text was still featured in a special column titled “Inspecting Bureaucratist Styles of Work.” It also had no influence on the fact that the Suiyuan Daily was following lock-step the propaganda of the Shanxi Daily.

As a work unit at the same level, why did the Suiyuan Daily follow without question the Shanxi Daily in its propaganda of the incident, rather than coming up with its own self-serving version? In fact, behind this ostensibly simple comic-strip lies a rich background, and its creators were quite influential. There were five creators of the comic: text editors Yu Tang 宇堂 and Zhao Yang 赵阳, and art editors Zhao Fengchuan 赵枫川, Gu Yizhou 古一舟 and Wu Jingbo 吴静波. Except for Zhao Yang, whose details are unknown, the biographical data of the others is as follows. Yu Tang, born as Wang Yutang 王玉堂, had joined the Beijing section of the League of the Left-Wing Writers, and successively served in the Shanxi Provincial Literary Association and the North China Literary Federation after 1949. Zhao Fengchuan was appointed vice-chairperson of the Shanxi Provincial Art Association in 1950, and was transferred to the North China Journal Press later in that same year, where he took the position of editor and head of the arts section. Wu Jingbo was the editor of the Shijiazhuang Daily and was appointed in 1951 to the post of deputy head of the Arts Section at the North China People’s Journal Press. Gu Yizhou, a native of Yuncheng in Shanxi, took part in the anti-Japanese war of resistance in his youth and served as editor-in-chief of the Ji’nan Pictorial.

It is worth noting that the creation of the comic strip about Zhang Shunyou was not the first collaboration between Zhao Fengchuan, Gu Yizhou, and Wu Jingbo; in 1951, the three of them jointly brought out a comic book titled “Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party,” which had a great impact on the whole country and was commended by the Propaganda Department of the NCB. Shortly before Zhao Fengchuan co-created the Zhang Shunyou comic strip, he had just created a set of comic books about Li Shunda 李顺达 (1915-1983)—a national model worker (劳动模范) for agriculture from Shanxi—that were reprinted in all major newspapers and periodicals in the country.

None of these four people were editors at the Shanxi Daily at the time. All had geographic and social connections with Shanxi, but exploiting such connections for the
creation of a comic strip was not something that the Shanxi Provincial Committee could easily accomplish on its own. The support and coordination arrangements of the NCB were absolutely essential. Indeed, the willingness to send capable backbone cadres to participate in the creation process shows how much importance the NCB attached to the propaganda work on this matter. Due to the hands-on participation of personnel from the NCB, the comic strip published in the \textit{Shanxi Daily} undoubtedly carried a certain degree of superior authority. This may also explain why the \textit{Suiyuan Daily} was willing to simply passively reprint it.

The three top organs implicated in the Zhang Shunyou case—the Party Committees of Shanxi, Chahar and Suiyuan provinces—all fell under the jurisdiction of the NCB. While all three had ostensibly pursued the same interests, in reality there were differences in terms of access to resources, status and their ability to exercise discursive power through the shaping of narrative. Moreover, the three provinces were all portrayed differently in the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” Taken together, these factors lead to divergent approaches in specific propaganda work. These ranged from active leadership, through relative autonomy, to passive following. There were also other related subtle differences in the content and direction of the propaganda. With antibureaucratism as the new core of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” the performance of various organs of Suiyuan and Shanxi was deemed as bureaucratist and, as a result, the two provinces needed to promote local variants of the model (典型变型). Compared to Suiyuan and Shanxi, the circumstances in Chahar were much more favorable, as the involved organs were not all deemed as acting in a bureaucratist manner. On
the contrary: the District Office of Yanggao County’s 4th District, and Song Zeng’ai 宋增爱, a cadre from East Shuidi Village in the same district, were even praised in name by Zhang Shunyou. Although the Chahar provincial authorities simultaneously combined the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” with the campaign to “Learn from Zhang Shunyou,” they were more lenient in exposing cases of bureaucratism compared to the other two provinces.

On June 6, 1952, the Chahar Daily and the Shanxi Daily simultaneously began their propaganda work on the matter. While reprinting material on Zhang Shunyou from the People’s Daily, they at the same time sang his praises. For example:

It was only thanks to Zhang Shunyou’s half year journey over 15,000 li across three provinces and 27 administrative organs before finally reaching the Party’s NCB that the issue has been solved: a counterrevolutionary was captured and people advancing bureaucratism (官僚主义分) reported.”

The newspapers called on the masses to “study Zhang Shunyou in exposing bureaucratism.” Soon after this, the two newspapers reported:

Between the 6th and the 9th, we received over twenty letters to the editors. All these readers felt a profound educational experience arising from the Zhang Shunyou Incident; they felt they ought to learn from his spirit of persevering in a righteous struggle [and] to wage a merciless battle against bureaucratism.”

Compared with Shanxi and Suiyuan, Chahar emphasized Zhang’s battle against bureaucratism: the narrative of Zhang encountering repeated obstacles in the course of his reporting counterrevolutionaries was altered into a story of Zhang’s informing against counterrevolutionaries while at the same time fighting bureaucratism. From a cart-driver without an understanding of what bureaucratism even was—as per the articles in the People’s Daily, Shanxi Daily, and Suiyuan Daily—Zhang Shunyou was now transformed into a highly-conscious workers’ representative following a clear-cut goal of anti-bureaucratism. The Chahar Daily also featured a different kind of readers’ feedback from the two other provincial newspapers. A certain reader, called Xu Dexian 徐德贤, interpreted the case as “an indication of how tenacious Zhang was in his struggles against people advancing bureaucratism.” Zhang Jiukuan 张久宽, of the Propaganda Branch of South Chahar’s Prefectural Party Committee, then called on all cadres, workers, and peasants from the whole province to collectively study the
spirit of Zhang Shunyou, to study his spirit of “never cowering in the face of either bureaucratism or adversity”, and to boldly expose bureaucratism. With the tacit approval and support of the NCB, the joint effort of the three provinces to remold Zhang Shunyou was thus complete: the three [local] newspapers successfully transformed a negative exemplary incident (负面典型事件) into a positive model character (正面典型人物), and smoothly transitioned the focus of propaganda around the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” The “Zhang Shunyou” that emerged out of this process became an all-round exemplary person (全能模范) who persevered in denouncing counterrevolutionaries and bureaucratism and embraced the Party and the people’s government.

Processing the “Zhang Shunyou Incident”: Other Provinces and Cities with Their Own Considerations

Although the binding of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” with anti-bureaucratism was carried out as a national propaganda task, the incident did not spark a nationwide wave of anti-bureaucratism beyond the coverage in People’s Daily. The pace of reaction and value attached to the matter differed between various regions, and local propaganda efforts were not always coordinated or consistent. For example, Hebei Province, which belonged to the same administrative North China region as the three other key provinces, had made a comparatively early start in the Patriotic Production Campaign. Thus, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” was met with relatively low levels of interest. Still, Hebei Daily, on June 2, 1952, did reprint relevant material from the People’s Daily on page three. On June 19, it reprinted another People’s Daily article on its front page, entitled “Through the Zhang Shunyou Incident, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyan, Pingyuan Conduct a Thorough Examination in Each Department on Their Bureaucratist Work Styles.” At the same time, the Hebei Daily ran the short commentary, “Accepting the Lessons from the Zhang Shunyou Incident, Continuing a Thorough Examination of Bureaucratist Work Styles” that stated that the main goal was “smoothly launching the Patriotic Production Campaign in both industry and agriculture and to prepare for the large-scale economic construction in the country.”

At this time, Pingyuan Province was busy with discussions over how to “correctly launch ideological struggle and oppose factionalism and liberalism,” and continued the criticism of factionalism within the Jiyuan County Committee. Not long afterward, the province launched the propaganda campaign to criticize “Yang Peiyao 杨
“thought”, which overshadowed the effect of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” On June 7, the Provincial Propaganda Department convened a meeting to arrange the criticism campaign against “Yang Peiyao thought.” The Provincial Party Committee further organized four criticism sessions jointly chaired by the Party Secretary of the Provincial Committee and the Head of the Propaganda Department, and the *Pingyuan Daily* featured discussion pieces at the same time. Faced with the top-down “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” which clearly was the priority of its propaganda tasks, the Provincial Propaganda Department nevertheless specifically criticized the “demand to stop the criticism of Yang Peiyao thought because of anti-bureaucratism,” and demanded that the criticism of Yang Peiyao thought be combined with the “Zhang Shunyu Incident” and that “the criticism of Yang Peiyao thought be organically linked with anti-bureaucratism, opposing liberalism and other issues.”

The *Pingyuan Daily* barely launched any publicity of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” and only handled it as one stage of the campaign to criticize “Yang Peiyao thought.” In early July, during another meeting of the Provincial Propaganda Department’s Small Group on Criticizing “Yang Peiyao Thought,” the section head Zhang Chengxian 张承先 called on all regions to bring the campaign to an end in a planned manner. He also pointed out anew that “the criticism of ‘Yang Peiyao thought’ must be closely linked to the current struggle against bureaucratism.” The *Pingyuan Daily’s* propaganda on anti-bureaucratism had just started. However, judging from the newspaper’s propaganda, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” still had not received favorable attention from the Pingyuan Provincial Party Committee. On July 7, the *Pingyuan Daily* published investigation material related to how Wang Gaosheng 王高升, a former head of the Wen County People’s Court, and others had corrupted the law for their own gain. Soon after, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” was defined as a model incident in Shanxi Province, and thus parallels were established with Wang Gaosheng’s case of illegal conduct, proving that “bureaucratist mistakes are by no means the problem of individual organs or individual leaders, nor are they an occasional phenomenon.” Hereafter, the attention of the *Pingyuan Daily* concentrated on the Wang Gaosheng case.

On June 21, 1952, the *Inner Mongolia Daily* published a directive from the Inner Mongolia Branch of the Central Committee on carrying out self-criticism in connection with bureaucratism and separation from the masses. It requested that Party committees at all levels accept the lessons from the Zhang Shunyou incident; earnestly investigate its facts and substance; promote democracy; launch criticism and self-criticism;
and thoroughly examine attitudes toward and the handling of accusations, denunciations, criticisms and suggestions from the masses, in every organ, work unit and department. At the same time, excerpts from the reports of Liu Lantao and Wang Congwu were also published with short commentaries. Starting on the same day, the newspaper also introduced a special column on its third page and published Zhang Shunyou’s testimony, Liu Lantao’s letter, the “Brief Comment on Political and Legal Work” from the People’s Daily, as well as self-criticism by some of those involved. The newspaper later took the “Case of the Counterrevolutionary Conspiracy of Lu Zhenduo 卢振铎 and Others in the Horqin Left-Middle Banner” as a local model (本地典型) and organized reader discussions for several months to broaden the anti-bureaucratism campaign.

The above-mentioned Party newspapers generally adopted the propaganda pattern of reprinting what had been published elsewhere while cultivating their own models. And although the degree of importance they attached to the Zhang Shunyou incident was lower than in the three provinces of Chahar, Shanxi and Suiyan, all provinces basically acknowledged and responded to the significance of the case. The Tianjin Daily, on the other hand, carried out its task by reprinting without additional commentary what had been written elsewhere: on its June 19 front page, it published “Provinces Such as Chahar Conduct a Thorough Examination of Bureaucratist Work Styles Through the Zhang Shunyou Incident,” along with Zhang’s testimony and Liu’s letter; the following day, it reprinted excerpts of the speeches made by Liu Lantao and Wang Congwu at the NCB work conference. Thereafter, there was no further attention paid to the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” or the anti-bureaucratism campaign.

The propaganda coverage of the official newspapers of other regional bureaus of the Party Center can be divided in roughly three groups. First, the Central-South Bureau’s Changjiang Daily and the North-West Bureau’s Qunzhong Daily chose not to promote the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” Instead, they simply reprinted relevant materials from the People’s Daily on June 2 and June 6 without providing any commentary or follow-up reports. Second, the East Bureau’s Liberation Daily and the South Bureau’s Southern Daily adopted a strategy of promotion with limited dissemination. They reprinted the basic materials of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” but refrained from extensive propaganda, allowing readers to interpret the incident in multiple ways. Third, the North-East Bureaus’ Northeast Daily, due to the fact of its immersion in propaganda related to the basic construction work, did not reprint, publicize or
even mention in passing the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” The front page on June 9 ran the short commentary, “We Cannot Permit Bureaucratist Attitudes Towards the Task of Basic Construction” in which anti-bureaucratism was combined with the propaganda of “Strengthen the Leadership, Strive to Improve Basic Construction Work!” At the same time, the newspaper exposed the bureaucratic attitudes towards basic construction of Ren Sun 任荪, a director of a Harbin Linen Factory and published a further commentary on this matter.

Without exception, however, each newspaper’s propaganda work surrounding the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” began with reprints from the People’s Daily. As the only official version and source of information, the People’s Daily played a crucial role in this regard. The People’s Daily, which was often called “the newspaper of newspapers” (报纸的报纸) due to its role as the sole official newspaper of the Party Center and the People’s Government:

was to publish all announcements and news of the Central People’s Government as well as all its affiliated organs alongside the Xinhua News Agency, and in the case of inconsistencies in the articles published by the various newspapers and periodicals, the version that has been published by Xinhua and the People’s Daily was to serve as standard.

From a national point of view, only the three provinces directly involved in the matter had genuinely accomplished vigorous propaganda on the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” while the party newspapers of other regional bureaus of the Party Center typically reprinted articles from elsewhere as part of their routine duties. Except for the areas under the jurisdiction of the NCB, the newspapers of other regional bureaus separated the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” from anti-bureaucratism, and carried out anti-bureaucratism in connection with local work. The propaganda work of these regions in relation to anti-bureaucratism did not strengthen the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” the most extreme case being the Northeast China Bureau, which adopted an indifferent attitude of not even mentioning it. Although the anti-bureaucratism campaign caused ripples across the country, the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” failed to receive all-around popularization and ultimately got lost in the ongoing propaganda work of the various regions as well as amongst other regional models.

On February 1, 1953, the People’s Daily evaluated the performance of various newspapers in propagating the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” Its view was that “since the on-
set of the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident’ ... and a related launch of criticism and struggle, some newspapers carried out propaganda work well, some comparatively well, and some not well or not very well.” Amongst these, “those that have carried it out well include Shanghai’s Liberation Daily, the Northeast China Daily, the New Hainan Daily, the Zhejiang Daily and others” on the grounds that they “generally bravely put forward criticism and mobilized the masses to participate.” The evaluation then continued:

Amongst the newspapers that carried out criticism comparatively well were Xi’an’s Qunzhong Daily, the Heilongjiang Daily, and the Liaoxi Daily, and others. These newspapers exposed some model incidents of bureaucratism and violations of law and discipline and combined these model examples (典型事例) with preliminary discussions carried out in the newspapers [that] mobilized the masses. ... Those newspapers that launched the criticism not well or not very well include the Southern Daily, the Anhui Daily, the Hebei Daily, and others. Some of these newspapers also exposed certain examples of bureaucratism or violations of law and discipline, but all were publicized as individual cases after they had been dealt with; once publicized, there was no initiative to mobilize the masses to launch struggles ... and they did not or only poorly carried out criticism and bottom-up criticism on their pages.93

Compared with the Liberation Daily and the Northeast China Daily—which ignored the propaganda around the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” but still received praise—the Shanxi Daily (which successfully discovered and gave publicity to the “Liao Zhongyi Incident”), as well as the Chahar Daily and the Suiyuan Daily (which both performed equally and exceptionally proactively), although not specifically criticized, were nonetheless all absent from the honorary list of titles. The People’s Daily commentary clearly showed once again that criticizing bureaucratism was the main theme for local party newspapers to address. Although the three newspapers’ propaganda surrounding the person of Zhang himself did not go against the overall orientation of the People’s Daily, they failed to stick closely to the key theme, naturally leading to a poor result on this assigned subject.

Epilogue: The End of the Campaign and the Abandonment of Zhang Shunyou

On October 25, 1952, the Party Center approved and transmitted a report by An Ziwen安子文 (1909-1980) on ending the “Three Anti” campaign and dealing with unresolved
issues. For the many CCP cadres who had been exhausted and scarred by the “Three Anti” campaign, the report was a timely relief. The report focused on “striking big tigers” and made no mention of “anti-bureaucratism,” indicating that—at least from the point of view of the Center—the “Three Antis” was really about “Two Antis,” something that had not fundamentally changed due to the appearance of a “Zhang Shunyou Incident.”

On November 26, 1952, the counterrevolutionary Song Yude was executed by firing squad. As for the cadres who had committed bureaucratist mistakes during the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” the North China Bureau adopted an attitude of “serious treatment and passionate education”: except for certain cadres who faced severe punishment as they were found guilty of corruption or violations of law and discipline, disciplinary measures primarily involved public admonition within the Party. Party newspapers and archival material also indicate that Zhang Shunyou had in fact benefited from the anti-bureaucratism campaign: the issue of his travel expenses was settled and soon after returning to his village he “built a house and found a wife.” The county government invited him to serve as a special delegate to the County All-People’s Congress, and the deputy secretary of the County Committee also explicitly requested that “the Party branch and the village government both increase their assistance to Zhang Shunyou and cultivate him to become a model leader (模范带头人物).”

On January 5, 1953, the Party Center issued instructions related to opposing bureaucratism, commandism (命令主义) and violations of law and discipline, in which it called for the following:

All model examples of bureaucratism, commandism and violations of law and discipline are to be widely exposed in the newspapers. ... But, when the launch of a wide-ranging struggle against bad people and bad deeds has reached an appropriate stage, models of admirable people and outstanding deeds (典型的好人好事) should be investigated, analyzed and praised, so that the whole Party seeks to emulate these good models, and we develop a righteous spirit and overpower harmful influences.”

In this “New Three Anti” campaign, which also involved anti-bureaucratism, Mao Zedong gave up on the approach of mobilizing the masses to concentrate their energy on the campaign, and instead wanted the campaign to proceed on the basis of practical work, and on the foundation of Party rectification. The “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” characterized as it was by reporting offenses and continuous petitioning by the masses, was thus unable to regain the appreciation of the Party media at various levels. When
Zhang Shunyou’s story reappeared in the newspapers, it had been condensed into a simple symbol, with “anti-bureaucratism” as its entire content. Hereafter, “Zhang Shunyou” faded from history. What happened to the man behind the story?

After the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” Zhang’s life changed considerably. The handling of the incident by the NCB, as well as the publicity given to his person in the *Shanxi Daily*, made him very enthusiastic about raising his political consciousness and participating in political activities. He went from being a rough and illiterate person to someone who insisted on reading the *People’s Daily*, the *Shanxi Daily* and other easily available political texts every day. He pursued self-education, gained knowledge, and learned new vocabulary from any literate person he met until, finally, he overcame the obstacles in his daily reading, and became proficient in writing too.100

Zhang’s rise from cart driver to a moral exemplar (道德模范) caused this humble individual from the lowest rungs of society to be overwhelmed with gratitude for the CCP and the government. As he wrote:

> The government has chosen me to be a People’s Representative and a correspondent for the *Shanxi Daily*. Failing to carry out my responsibility to denounce special agents and counterrevolutionaries—to shield rather than denounce counterrevolution—would make me as guilty as the counterrevolutionaries themselves. It would mean forgetting that the CCP digs the wells from which we drink and is the dearest to all the people. It would mean that my heart has turned evil, and that I’m less valuable than pigs and dogs in what I contribute to the country.101

And so, in autumn 1952, just after the curtain had dropped on the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” Zhang Shunyou denounced a second counterrevolutionary, during a general assembly of delegates at the County Cultural Center, in front of the chief justice of the Guo County Court and the secretary of the County Party Committee. Also surnamed Zhang 张, Zhang Shunyou described him as a “lieutenant colonel, political instructor and team leader on special assignment with the 1st Regiment of the Provisional 38th Division under the warlord Yan Xishan in Datong, and a counterrevolutionary with blood debts.”102 After his public denunciation, Zhang Shunyou proceeded to go back and forth between the County Committee, the Court, and the Procuratorate, and his accusations expanded from the alleged counterrevolutionary lieutenant Zhang to also include other cadres such as the chief justice of the County Court. Although the denunciations did not receive support from county level cadres, Zhang Shunyou did not lose hope. He was continuously encouraged by his experience of the “Zhang Shunyou...
Incident,” which showed that “the success of any undertaking arises from a process of arduous struggle; no matter how beautiful the dream, nothing can be achieved without arduous struggle.” The fact that he successfully reported Song Yude, and the numerous cadres who had obstructed him along the way, to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, also reinforced his belief in the “truth” that “anyone who violates the law will be punished by the law.”

According to Zhang’s own account, on September 29, 1958, the chief justice of the Guo County Court had him arrested and jailed for two years, without a trial, on charges of adultery and concealment of production. After being released in 1960, Zhang lost all political status and his job as a cart-driver. Upon learning that the counterrevolutionary lieutenant Zhang had become a teacher at a local middle school, Zhang Shunyou retraced his previous steps: he petitioned all the way from Shanxi to Beijing, reporting against lieutenant Zhang and denouncing officials at each level.

In 1968, at the start of the Cleansing the Class Ranks campaign, Zhang Shunyou’s accusations finally received a positive response. The Military Control Committee of the Xin County Public Security Bureau responded with a letter expressing support, and a case investigation team concluded that lieutenant Zhang “was indeed a historical counterrevolutionary with major crimes” and formally accepted to hear the case. The mass-work team at the Shanxi Daily also wrote back to express its “firm support” and praised Zhang Shunyou for his “great concern about national affairs.” However, before long, Zhang received devastating news: the provincial public security, procuratorate, and judiciary decided to “treat lieutenant Zhang as an insurgent (起义人员),” and thus not only was he acquitted, but was also promoted to the position of group leader of the Educational Reform Group. Zhang Shunyou then studied the insurgency policy and found out that only “those who completed group training and obtained an insurgent card (起义证) … can be treated as insurgents.” He went to the County Procuratorate and requested to look at lieutenant Zhang’s insurgent card, but he was brushed off with the answer that “although lieutenant Zhang does not possess an insurgent card, he was vouched for by two people and thus is also considered to be an insurgent.” Despite Zhang Shunyou’s continuous questioning, no response was forthcoming.

After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Shunyou drifted from place to place, petitioning and writing letters to various authorities, requesting that he be cleared of the two criminal charges of adultery and concealment of production. For, in Zhang’s
view, the charge of adultery “was fabricated by those unfamiliar with the actual facts at the time and would not stand up to scrutiny under law,” while the charge of concealing production outputs was even more baseless. In 1958, my village was in fact a model for selling surplus grain, and, on the behalf of the village committee, I was awarded a Big Red Banner (大红奖旗) by the People’s Government of Guo County and various rewards such as a sprayer. How then could there be any evidence of me concealing production?\footnote{109}

Zhang’s petitioning spanned several governments, but he never received a reply. In November 2010, on his deathbed, Zhang wrote his final letter in trembling handwriting. In this last plea, he did not denounce lieutenant Zhang again, he did not level accusations against any cadres of any level, nor did he request his own rehabilitation. Instead, he simply stated: “To this day, I haven’t received a single reply to any of my letters. I only ask for a return letter with some explanations. This would make me perfectly satisfied and joyous; it would be an act of unforgettable kindness.”\footnote{110}

Zhang Shunyou was born a peasant and later worked as a cart driver. In the CCP’s blueprint for a “new society,” both peasants and workers were naturally suited to be raw originals (原型) for labor models.\footnote{111} However, from the outset, Zhang had the image of a disruptor and “revolutionary”, and he was of course not as morally pure in reality as the CCP’s construct of the New Man. Compared with other labor models, there were fewer uses for this model. The combative nature that Zhang displayed in the process of informing against Song Yude was not applicable to every political movement, and since its endorsement by the authorities was not founded upon “the truth,” it naturally could not come to constitute any kind of universal truth. Since he was a model character, the success of Zhang’s acts of denunciation was dependent on the political situation, with the launch of political campaigns being the key moment. At the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Zhang again sent his letters, but received very little attention. It was only during the Cleansing the Class Ranks campaign, which had as one of its objectives the reporting of counterrevolutionaries, that Zhang’s reports gained traction and received brief official support. With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the decline of revolutionary discourse, no one paid any attention to Zhang’s accusations anymore. Thus, in Zhang’s own words, although “the two counterrevolutionary cases [i.e of Song Yude and Lieutenant Zhang] were entirely identical,” under “the same policy” the cases resulted in “two very different worlds.”\footnote{112}

The launch and ending of political campaigns by the CCP was invariably accompa-
nied by a number of models being first established and then toppled. Zhang Shunyou, as someone who enjoyed the limelight for a brief period but then disappeared, was not an isolated case. His tragedy certainly reflects his personal character and the peculiarities of his rural grassroots community.\textsuperscript{113} Yet, his ultimate abandonment was basically a “typical fate” (典型命运) of a great majority of positive model characters during the Mao era. Thus, Zhang’s abandonment becomes a symptom of political campaigns of the CCP. Due to the Party’s implementation of an information classification system (资讯分级制度), the information obtained by individuals in political campaigns was severely asymmetric. The people who became mass models (群众典型), originating from lower and middle social strata, were powerless not only to obtain information and thus ascertain the many aspects of a given situation; it was also very difficult for them to respond objectively to and deal with abrupt changes in political favors and “status upgrades” within the Party’s ranks. Most of them were thus phased out due to their inability to adapt to changes in the campaigns, and drifted into historical obscurity. Worse still, if they became carried away and drunk with power during one political campaign, they would often find themselves unmasked and exposed in the next campaign, and rendered targets of its crackdown. As for the other types of posthumous models (死人典型) favored by the CCP, although they were able to break away from such fate of rapid fluctuations, they were nonetheless “utterly unknown during their lives, yet worshiped as gods after their deaths”—a situation that, for the persons involved, could also be called tragic.

To the broader masses, political campaigns not only cemented the instrumental nature of models (典型的工具), but also nurtured their pragmatic tendencies. The value of both the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” and “Zhang Shunyou” the character lay in their ability to vividly convey to the masses officially-approved correct behavior through the form of a relatable narrative, and to suggest that if one believed this narrative and followed the example of its protagonist, one would receive the Party’s affirmation and obtain advantages the way “Zhang Shunyou” did. Underlying questions concerning the truth about the incident, whether Zhang Shunyou was as perfect as in the propaganda, or whether he would continue to be affirmed by the CCP, were all irrelevant both to the government’s propaganda objectives and to the actual benefits obtained by the masses. As a result, it was natural that no one cared about them. When frequent political campaigns became part of daily life, the downfall of model people (典型们) was easily forgotten, turning into just another aspect of everyday life. Seen from this
point of view, the ups and downs of Zhang Shunyou’s life are also a microcosm of the fate of the individual in the history of the People’s Republic.

Conclusion

The CCP launched large-scale political campaigns that required rapid implementation within a short period of time. The mere direct transmission of documents from above was not sufficient to guarantee mass mobilization and response, especially in a rapidly changing political climate. Cultivating models turned out to be an effective method in popularizing the campaigns and realizing political socialization. This paper, through a case study of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident,” reconstructed the key steps in the process of CCP model cultivation in the period just after establishing political power. The analysis presented here, which provides a comprehensive summary of the incident, not only helps to connect the dots, but also makes it possible to propose now some more general conclusions.

A model arises from the processing of a raw original. An ideal raw original (理想的原型) involves the right person appearing in the right place at the right time, but in practice, models usually emerged in a more complex and less perfect way. The “Zhang Shunyou Incident” was the product of an interaction between the right person and the right place, but not quite at the right time. The Party Center had other considerations about the timing of the propaganda efforts around the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” and thus tended to act conservatively in terms of the extent and intensity of their involvement. The North China Bureau, however, was proactive and made use of the People’s Daily as its main platform, and thanks to advantageous location and personnel, was able to successfully produce a national model. From this, we can clearly see the contingent nature of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” Previous studies explain the emergence of models in terms of the CCP’s political needs or authoritarian aspirations. But, while it is admittedly true that political power was key, when examining the production process more closely from the perspective of the interactions between the different levels of the hierarchy, it becomes clear that the source of that power and the attitudes of all involved parties were all very complex and cannot be oversimplified.

There is already agreement among scholars that the concept of a model in itself implies a degree of fiction. However, the substantial effectiveness of any model lies in how that which in the researchers’ eye seems like mere “fiction” (虚构) is transformed
into something that the masses see and accept as “reality” (真实). At the same time, this process is also where the difficulty of explaining CCP propaganda lies. This paper provides three possible solutions from the perspective of the practice of cultivating models.

The first overall conclusion is that the essence of cultivating models lies in the chain-reaction-like realization of the sequence “the Center creates templates (模版)—the regions replicate—the masses imitate.” What the masses directly face is not the documents issued by the Party Center or the templates found in the People’s Daily. Rather, it is their regional replicas (地方复制) and re-propaganda (再宣传). In the past, scholars used to summarize the news policy and practice of the CCP post-1949 as “highly centralized and controlled.” And while this is basically correct, the internal logic of that system is more complex. A high degree of centralization and control is mainly observed from the side that exerts power. This was manifested by a top-down distribution of information, with the People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency as its only authoritative source, assisted by the monopoly of Party media at all levels, and a graded pattern of information classification to ensure that propaganda contexts comprehensively covered people’s lives. The essence of propaganda, however, lies not in a one-sided transmission of information akin to indoctrination, but in the outcome of the interaction between the propagandist and the audience. When we begin to consider those who are subject to, rather than those who exert, power in this process, at least two further variables arise.

The first of these variables lies in the possibility of modifications in the process of reproduction by Party media at different levels, as these media enacted the double role of receiving as well as exerting influence. In our particular case, the process of cultivating changeable models (树变型运动) initiated in the three provinces of Shanxi, Chahar and Suiyuan, and the processing of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” in other provinces and cities, both demonstrate that a kind of interpretive space existed between central templates (模版) and regional replicas (地方复制). The second variable occurs as the proletarian masses—acting as the “receiving end” of the practice of cultivating models—also had their own interpretations (or misinterpretations) of official propaganda. For example: Zhang Shunyou did not really know to what the “anti-bureaucratism” advanced by the People’s Daily constituted; and he evidently also did not understand the particular intentions of the Shanxi Daily. Nonetheless, he combined the two sets of propaganda in the central and regional Party newspapers,
interpreting them together as an encouragement of his own denunciations. Summarizing the experiences and lessons from this event, he spent the rest of his life attempting to recreate, from his own understanding, another “Zhang Shunyou Incident.” The first kind of variable, in which regional Party organs modified the templates of the Center, can easily be obscured by CCP propaganda slogans like: “To Enter Deeply Into People’s Hearts,” “Popularization,” or “Combining A National Perspective with Local Realities,” all of which suggest that the process from central template to local propaganda was free from the interference of external influence. The second type of variable, which included the interpretive space between propaganda messaging and individual interpretation, has not been subject to academic analysis owing to the lack of available sources.

Both of these spaces contributed, in varying degrees, to a scattering of the Centre’s unified propaganda, but they also helped prevent it from losing its vitality as a result of excessive control, and enabled the adjustment of central templates to local realities as those templates moved down the Party hierarchy. The oversight of the Party over the media, in the form of a direct control by Party committees at all levels, exerting a restraining force, also achieved a multitude of voices unified in a common effort. Of course, more research is needed to determine whether the above-described variables and interpretive spaces underwent challenging transformations or actually disappeared with an ongoing intensification of political pressure.

The second overall conclusion to this paper is that the CCP attached great importance to revolutionary education, and placed the objective of turning over hearts (翻心) above that of turning over bodies (翻身) [i.e. from the material conditions of oppression]. Propaganda and education work was characterized by emotional education and psychological mobilization, which is precisely why it was often referred to as of “doing thought work.” In our case, Zhang Shunyou in his later years blamed the Party’s propaganda for his tragedy, saying:

I think that, without the encouragement and approval of my actions that the People’s Daily published in 1952, I would have never ended up in the miserable situation of going to jail in 1958 and having my life destitute and ruined. Because I would not fail to live up to the Party’s and government’s earnest expectations.116

Zhang’s line of reasoning here is not without merit. In the process of cultivating models, the CCP made use of a certain stage effect (舞台效应) in which the model character was placed in the focal point of attention to receive praise (or disdain) from the
masses. It was for this reason that positive models set up by the Party mostly came from amongst ordinary people, while negative models were instead generally chosen from the ranks of the political heavyweight. Such a selection mechanism sought to capitalize on the psychological effect of the reversal of social statuses. Having gone through a campaign to cultivate a model, Zhang Shunyou—who, initially, deviated from the model version of him—actually transformed into “Zhang Shunyou,” and, in doing so, also changed from someone who had been a deserter of the new political regime to its loyal supporter. This process of “gratitude — support — repayment of gratitude” is where the formidable power of the CCP in mobilizing the masses was located. This case also inspires us to further attempt to explain the Party’s propaganda from the point of view of psychology of the target audiences.

The third and final observation of this paper is that the effectiveness of CCP propaganda was not only manifested as myths that the masses believed to be true, but can also be understood as a successful tool for their guidance and regulatory instruction. The reason why rewards and punishments associated with models really existed was because the large Party apparatus was the sole legitimate authority not only for the distribution of resources, but also for the implementation of punishments. Frequent political campaigns brought forth a high-pressure atmosphere and objectively ensured that the masses did not fall behind, strengthening their tendencies towards advantages and against harm. Mao was deeply convinced of the theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the CCP adopted a campaign-based approach to governance. Revolution and campaigns ran counter to the necessity of a nascent regime to uphold social order while constructing an orderly governance and as quickly as possible establishing a modern nation-state. This natural contradiction between “construction” and “destruction” continued to cause complications for the CCP’s political power. Through the creation of class enemies, and by following a logic of creation-by-destruction (破坏求建设)—that is, seeking to construct the new by destroying the old—the CCP attempted to blur the lines between these two modes and was indeed largely successful in this. However, class struggle only intensified the destructiveness of campaigns, as these were necessarily launched and terminated in a rapid and alternating manner with accompanying constructive campaigns. The many slogans from late-stage campaigns calling for revolution and production to go hand-in-hand are an indication of this phenomenon. The pragmatic nature of political campaigns and Party propaganda was key to the fact that models took on an instru-
mental character. Authoritative approval could at any time construct the “truth” (真相), while objective reality (真实) became a vague and useless concept. Springing-up alongside the launch and end of campaigns, models also demonstrated certain traits of replacing the old with the new: besides some specific all-round models that could be renewed and reused again and again, most faded away in the course of campaigns which rose one after the other. Thus, the centralized system of the CCP and the mobilizing capability of propaganda depended on each other, and cultivating models and political campaigns were actually carried out in conjunction.

With the end of the Cultural Revolution, large-scale political campaigns were gradually abandoned and, along with the Reform and Opening Up, the information monopoly was also gradually dismantled. However, the authority over distributing resources and imposing punishments still remained in the grasp of the Party apparatus. The old pattern of cultivating models continued to exist as a means for the CCP to carry out propaganda and advance education work. However, their function of political socialization kept getting weaker, and new media such as the Internet or wireless mobile have accelerated the fate of CCP models being deconstructed almost immediately after their establishment. Even more often, popular and official narratives have been completely at odds with each other, with the story behind the model becoming a mere source of entertainment and gossip.

**Author’s Postscript**

Whenever I am asked why I study the history of the People’s Republic, I tend to recall a particular day ten years ago when I took my luggage to a northern village with the aim of finding out more about Zhang Shunyou. I also recall that this journey did not go well at first, as I had a high fever for several days. It was not until I contacted Zhang Shunyou’s daughter, Zhang Li, that things changed for the better. She cordially received me, told me to take fever-reducing remedies, and then handed me a box with belongings left behind by her father. The box contained hundreds of handwritten notes, most of which were his accusation letters reporting counter-revolutionaries and drafts thereof. He had marked all of them with the time of mailing (and some even had registered letter receipts sticked onto them); some had headings while others did not; and most letters had traces of editing and words crossed-out. A small part of the materials were also newspaper clippings that her father cut out daily, as well
as copies and transcriptions of official policies and other texts written by him over the years. As discussed in the article, initially Zhang Shunyou could neither read nor write, but once he was “cultivated into a model” he obtained education and had been reading the daily papers ever since. He liked to express his thoughts and impressions about life, mostly in the concise form of one-or-two-sentence-short aphorisms. These he left scattered on cigarette packs, drug instructions, covers or backs of used exercise books, and other small pieces of paper.

All these writings show that Zhang Shunyou spent the better parts of his life obsessed with reporting against the other counterrevolutionary, lieutenant Zhang. These materials also demonstrate that while the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” changed the first half of his life, reporting against lieutenant Zhang influenced the second. Having read-through and arranged the materials obtained from Zhang Li, I have used them as the base for a sequel to this article. Titled “The Model Man: The Double ‘Reality’ of Life and Propaganda Contexts” (典型人:生活情境与宣传情境的二重“真实”), this follow-up shows that although Zhang Shunyou rapidly disappeared from the pages of History, he continued to emulate the role of the model character “Zhang Shunyou” in real life by grafting the propaganda contexts with his life contexts in such a way as to make both seem ‘real.’ Although the second paper was never published, I finally drew a conclusion to Zhang’s story, feeling as if I had accomplished a major life event. It also points the way for my future research.

The intimate feelings and the inner worlds of ordinary people may have little to do with the grand mission of historical research. And yet, exploring the intricacies and details of real people who were living through the Mao era brings greater fulfillment than publishing papers and striving for professional promotions. I thank Liu Chang and Damian Mandzunowski for their great work on the translation of this article, as well as the entire Freiburg Lab of the Revisiting the Revolution project for their valuable suggestions and corrections—and for making Zhang Shunyou’s story available to more people. As Zhang Li once said to me: “I think that letting people know about my late father’s story will surely bring comfort to his soul.”

I also believe that.

Liu Yajuan
October 6, 2022
Glossary of Selected Terms Related to Models in the PRC

(practice of) cultivating models
(process of) cultivating changeable models
all-round exemplary person
all-round model
all-rounder
CCP model
Central template
collective model
exemplar on multiple fronts
imperfect raw original
local model
mass model
model
model / example / exemplar
model benefits and punishments
model case
model character
model example
model incident
model leader
model reportage / reporting
model variants
model worker
models / model people
models of admirable people and outstanding deeds
moral exemplar
national model
negative exemplary incident
negative model
news model
perfect raw original
positive exemplary incident
positive model
positive model character
posthumous model
raw original / original subject
regional model
typical fate
well-known model

Endnotes

4 Wu Manyou was a very popular labor hero from the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and a model in the Great Production Campaign. Official CCP historiography tells a story of how Wu, after being captured by the KMT, was expelled from the Party due to his defecting to the enemy. However, this story is controversial and disputed in academic circles. Journalism studies regard the propaganda of Wu in the Liberation Daily as the start of CCP’s model reportage (典型报导).
5 See, the editorial “边区农民向吴满有看齐!” [Peasants of the Border Region Follow the Example of Wu Manyou], and the special reports “模范农村劳动英雄吴满有连年开荒收获特多 影响群众积极春耕” [The Model Agrarian Work Hero Wu Manyou Has Produced Particularly Much Grain after Opening up the Land for Years, which Encourages the Masses to Join in Spring Farming], and “不但是种庄稼模范还是一个模范公民” [Not only a Model Crop Grower but a Model Citizen], in 解放日报 [Liberation Daily] (April 30, 1942): 1.
6 Mo Ai, formerly known as Dai Houming 杜厚明. During his time working as a reporter for the Liberation Daily in Yan’an, he was well-known in the border region for his coverage of labor models such as Wu Manyou, Ma Xing’er 马杏儿, Liu Jianzhang 刘建章 and others. He later served as vice president and president of the Northwest Branch of Xinhua News Agency, president of the Tianjin Branch, president of the Beijing Branch, president of the Yunnan Branch, first deputy director of the domestic department of the Xinhua News Agency, and chief of the Guangming Daily. See Li Yunhui 李蕴辉, “莫艾传略” [Brief Biography of Mo Ai], in Qi Zhiwen 齐志文, ed., 记者莫艾 [Reporter Mo Ai] (Beijing: 光明日报出版社 [Guangming Daily Publishing House], 2010): 3-11.
7 Mo Ai 莫艾, “模范英雄吴满有是怎样发现的” [How the Model Hero Wu Manyou was Discovered], 解放日报 [Liberation Daily] (April 30, 1942): 2.
8 “吴满有运动宣传的经验总结 (1943 年 6 月)” [Summary of the Lessons Learned in the Propaganda


The three theories are commonly used to study new media such as digital television, the Internet, or Weibo, but few studies have applied them to conduct research on model reporting. Only some scholars with interdisciplinary backgrounds have made initial attempts, including Zhou Haiyan 周海燕’s recent research. Zhou’s work, however, focuses on the Yan’an Production Campaign and remains focused on the news production processes. See, Zhou Haiyan 周海燕, “话语即权力——大生产运动典型报道中的新闻生产—政治动员” [Discourse as Power: ‘News Production and Political Mobilization’ in Typical Reports of the Great Production Movement], 新闻与传播研究 [Journalism and Communication Studies] 3, no. 3 (2021): 29-31; Zhou Haiyan 周海燕, “「赵占魁运动」: 新闻生产中工人模范的社会记忆重构” [‘The Zhao Zhankui Campaign’: Reconstructing Social Memory of the Model Worker in the process of News Production], 新闻记者 [Journalism Review] 1 (2012): 78-84; Zhou Haiyan 周海燕, “吴满有: 从记忆到遗忘——《解放日报》首个「典型报导」的新闻生


Trans.: The central part of today’s Inner Mongolia AR.

Trans.: The early-PRC administrative unit in charge of today’s provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, middle part of Inner Mongolia AR, as well as of Beijing and Tianjin.

For example, Yang Kuisong notes that the phenomenon of not suppressible illegal activities among cadres in the “Three-Anti” laid the groundwork for the following “New Three-Anti”. He then briefly outlines the process of Zhang Shunyou case. See, Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, “新中国「三反」运动的来龙去脉 (下)” [The Ins and Outs of the ‘Three Anti Campaign’ of the New China (Part II)], 江淮文史 [Jianghuai Literature and History], no.5 (2011): 48-75. Chang Libing uses the People’s Daily and the Shanxi Daily to reconstruct the events, focusing on how an ordinary peasant connected his interests to the state’s governance strategy. See, Chang Libing 常利兵, “「三反」运动中的张顺有事件研究” [About the Zhang Shunyu Incident in the ‘Three Anti’ Movement], 安徽史学 [Anhui Historical Studies], no. 2 (2011): 95-100.

The petitioning process refers to the people’s efforts to solve specific problems by writing letters or making visits to government offices to reflect or give suggestions. For related studies, see Li Hongbo 李宏勃, 法制现代化进程中的人民信访 [People’s Letters and Visits in the Process of Legal Modernization] (Beijing: 清华大学出版社 [Tsinghua University Press], 2007): 43; Chen Xiaojun 陈小君 et al., 涉农信访与社会稳定研究 [Research on Petitions Involving Agricultural Problems and Social Stability] (Beijing: 中国政法大学出版社 [China University of Political Science and Law Press], 2011): 15-16. [Trans.: Compare here also with a similar albeit different reading of both the role of petitioning process in the early PRC and the Zhang Shunyou Incident at large in Aminda Smith, “Long Live the Mass Line! Errant Cadres and Post-Disillusionment PRC History,” Positions: Asia Critique 29, no. 4 (November 2021): 783–807.]


23 “中央转发华北局关于机关三反运动补课情况报告的批语 (1952年1月22日)” [Party Center Transmits the Approval of the North China Bureau’s Report on the ‘Make-up Sessions’ for Running the Three Anti Campaign within the Party Apparatus (January 22, 1952)], in 中共中央文献研究室 [Literature Research Center of the Central Committee], eds., 建国以来毛泽东文稿 [Mao Zedong’s Documents since the Founding of the People’s Republic], vol. 3 (Beijing: 中央文献出版社, Central Literature Publishing House, 1989): 82.

24 On January 22, 1952, Mao Zedong 毛泽东 first used the term “old tiger” to refer to corrupt officials/elements in a telegram related to the “Three Anti” Campaign. The subsequently popular terms “catching tigers” and “fighting tigers” refer to the crackdown and treatment of corrupt officials in the campaign. See, Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “关于全军必须以全力进行三反然后整编的电报” [The Entire Army Must Carry Out the Three Anti Campaign with all their Might and then Reorganize], in 中共中央文献研究室 [Literature Research Center of the Central Committee], eds., 建国以来毛泽东文稿 [Mao Zedong’s Documents since the Founding of the People’s Republic], vol. 3 (Beijing: 中央文献出版社, Central Literature Publishing House, 1989): 78.

25 Trans.: This was the subcommittee in charge of advancing the goals of the “Three Anti” campaign.

26 “中央节约检查委员会关于处理贪污、浪费及克服官僚主义错误的若干规定 (1952年3月11日)” [Some Provisions of the Central Economical Inspection Commission on Dealing with Corruption, Waste and Overcoming Bureaucratic Errors (March 11, 1952)], in 中共中央文献研究室 [Literature Research Center of the Central Committee], eds., 建国以来重要文献选编 [Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the People’s Republic], vol. 3 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 中央文献出版社, 1992): 107, 113, 114.

27 Lai Ruoyu 是一个来自 Wutai, Shanxi 的人。他先后担任中国共产党 Jincheng 中央纪律委员会秘书, Jincheng 区纪律委员会秘书, 以及 Taihang 区纪律委员会秘书, 也就是纪律委员会的不同职位。After 1949, he served as secretary of the Taiyuan Municipal Committee of the CCP, secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the CCP, chairman of the Shanxi Provincial People’s Government, and Secretary General, seventh and eighth chairman of the National Federation of Trade Unions. See Wei Pingyi 魏屏易, et al., 共和国要人录 [Key Figures of the...


Regarding the name of this person, archives and Party newspapers keep various records, most of which agree with three forms. The Shanxi Provincial Archive and the Yuanping Municipal Archive mostly refer to him as “Song Yude 宋裕德” and “Song Yude 宋玉德,” while the People’s Daily uses “Song Yude 宋郁德”. For the sake of convenience, this article uses throughout “Song Yude 宋郁德”, except for reference to the original archive records that use “Song Yude 宋裕德.” See “关于崞县二区庄头村民张顺有控告阳高县反革命分子宋裕德的调查材料” [Investigation Materials on the Allegation Made by Zhang Shunyou, Villager of Zhuangtou, Guo County District 2, Against the Counterrevolutionary Song Yude of Yanggao County], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C55-1004-41.

“关于崞县二区庄头村民张顺有控告阳高县反革命分子宋裕德的调查材料” [Investigation Materials on the Allegation Made by Zhang Shunyou, Villager of Zhuangtou, Guo County District 2, Against the Counterrevolutionary Song Yude of Yanggao County], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C55-1004-41.

“关于崞县二区庄头村民张顺有控告阳高县反革命分子宋裕德的调查材料” [Investigation Materials on the Allegation Made by Zhang Shunyou, Villager of Zhuangtou, Guo County District 2, Against the Counterrevolutionary Song Yude of Yanggao County], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C55-1004-41.

“关于崞县二区庄头村民张顺有控告阳高县反革命分子宋裕德的调查材料” [Investigation Materials on the Allegation Made by Zhang Shunyou, Villager of Zhuangtou, Guo County District 2, Against the Counterrevolutionary Song Yude of Yanggao County], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C55-1004-41.


Wang Congwu was originally from Puyang County, Zhili Province (now Neihuang County,


38 On this point, Mu Qing, a well-known journalist who successfully discovered Jiao Yulu and other models, has explained in detail how he drew up another theme, reorganized the existing materials, and finally completed successfully a typical report. See Mu Qing, “《为了周总理的嘱托》发表前后” [Before and After the Publication of ‘For Premier Zhou’s Mandate’], 穆青论新闻 [Mu Qing On Journalism] (Beijing: 新华出版社 [Xinhua Publishing House], 2003): 255.

39 “华北局对公开发表党内文件向中央所作的检讨报告” [North China Bureau’s Self-Critical Report to the Party Center on its Publication of Intra-Party Documents], in 中共中央华北局建设编委会 [Construction Editorial Committee of the North China Bureau], eds., 建设 [Construction], no. 50 (November 1949): 3.


46 “中共中央华北局纪律检查委员会召开会议, 彻底处理赶车工人张顺有事件, 将继续在全区展开反官僚主义的斗争” [The Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau Held a Meeting
The “Zhang Shunyou Incident” did have such an impact. After the incident was disclosed, “the people concerned in Shanxi and Suiyuan provinces had a heavy burden on their minds” and were waiting to be “rectified”, see “处理工人张顺有控诉案, 有关人员检讨了官僚主义错误或受了处分” [In Dealing with the Appeal of the Worker Zhang Shunyou, the People Concerned Examine their Bureaucratic Mistakes or Face Discipline], 工人日报 [Workers’ Daily] (June 20, 1952): 1. The exposure and publicity of the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” gave considerable encouragement to the masses, which led to a wave of letters and petitions. As the editorial department of Shanxi Daily summarized in its work report, “In May, there were 1,021 letters and in June, there were 1,189 letters and an unprecedented increase in visits this month, with 109 cases and 132 people. In June, there were 109 interviews with readers, more than ever before (before May, there were usually about 30), and old women from remote areas such as Fanshi (affected by the Zhang Shunyu Incident) came from afar to the newspaper office to reveal problems”, see “山西日报编辑部关于张顺有事件以后读者来信来访工作的报告” [Report of the Editorial Department of Shanxi Daily on Readers’ Letters and Visits After the ‘Zhang Shunyou Incident’], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C119-1-81.

A blackboard column on the front page of Shanxi Daily on March 2, 1952, called on everyone to “fight the tigers to the end, and not to relax even a little on production.” On the same page, it announced that the steelmaking department of Taiyuan Iron and Steel Factory “won a great victory on both fronts by ‘fighting the tiger’ and producing at the same time”, while the Shanxi Provincial Native Products Company relaxed its daily business during the “Three Anti”, resulting in losses. Since then, the theme of “Holding up Both Production and Tiger-fighting” was followed up by a report combining positive and negative examples from Shanxi Province. On April 7, the front page of Shanxi Daily published a column entitled “Great Victory in the ‘Three Anti Struggle, New Weather Everywhere”, in which the editors wrote, “The ‘Three Anti’ struggle, which lasted for more than three months, has won a great victory, and a new weather has appeared everywhere: the political atmosphere in all government offices has been unprecedentedly strengthened, and the motivation and responsibility of the workers have been greatly in-
creased”. This column was used for several days to publish positive news from various government offices in Shanxi Province.

52 “[张盛有事件] 讨论初步展开读者纷纷来信揭露批判官僚主义错误” [Discussions on the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” have Begun, and Readers have Written in to Expose and Criticize Bureaucratic Mistakes], 山西日报 [Shanxi Daily] (June 21, 1952): 1.

53 See Liao Zhongyi’s oral account as written down by Chen Keng 陈铿 in “我是怎样被贪污分子陷害的?” [How I Was Framed by Corrupt Elements?], 山西日报 [Shanxi Daily] (June 24, 1952): 3. The article adopts a first-person oral narrative of the person concerned, focusing on exposing the persecution of Liao Zhongyi by various units. On the same page, the provincial chairman Pei Lisheng 裴丽生 instructed to form a working group for the “Liao Zhongyi Incident” and sent someone to console Liao. This article was later reprinted in the People’s Daily and included as a typical incident along with the “Zhang Shunyou Incident” in 华北人民出版社 [North China People’s Publishing House], eds., 反官僚主义文件辑 [Anti-Bureaucraticism Documents Series] (Beijing: 华北人民出版社 [North China People’s Publishing House], 1953): 88-92.


56 “中共中央华北局关于在全区开展爱国增产节约竞赛运动的指示” [Instructions of the North China Bureau on launching a Patriotic Campaign for Increasing Production and Saving in the Region], 人民日报 [People’s Daily] (June 20, 1952): 1.

57 “华北局宣传部下达的 1952 年宣传要点” [Essentials of Propaganda and Education Work in 1952 Issued by the Propaganda Department of the North China Bureau], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C26-4-1.

58 “袁靳、王定坤给何静的信” [Letter from Yuan Jin and Wang Dingkun to He Jing], 山西省档案馆藏 [Shanxi Provincial Archives Collection], Archival No. C26-4-1.

59 On April 29, the People’s Daily published two articles that introduced the experience of the Xuchang Regional Committee, including the editorial “学习许昌地区经验做好党的宣传工作” [Learning from the Experiences of Xuchang Region and Compete the Party Propaganda Work Well] on page 1, and another article written by Guo Xiaochuan 郭小川, “中共河南许昌地委的宣传工作” [The Propaganda Work of the Xuchang Regional Committee of the CCP in Henan Province] on page 3. The Xuchang Regional Committee combined several tasks together, making them dependent on each other, and thus completed all the tasks successfully. The Party Center highly evaluated this experience. On April 30, 1951, the Center announced to all Central Bu-
reus and Sub-bureaus, with carbon copies to all provincial and municipal Party committees that everyone should learn from the propaganda work of the Xuchang Regional Committee and called to follow their example. See “中央关于学习许昌地委宣传工作经验的通报” [Bulletin of the Party Center on Learning from the Propaganda Work Experience of the Xuchang Regional Committee] (April 30, 1951), in 中共中央宣传部办公厅、中央档案馆编研部 [General Office of the Central Propaganda Department, and the Editorial and Research Department of the Central Archives], eds., 中国共产党宣传工作文献 (1949-1956) [Selected Documents on Propaganda Work of the CCP (1949-1956)] (Beijing: 学习出版社, 1996): 217.


61 “张顺有写信给中共中央华北局刘澜涛书记, 感谢党和政府实心实意为人民服务的精神” [Zhang Shunyou wrote to Liu Lantao, Secretary of the North China Bureau, to Thank the Party’s and Government’s Dedication in Following the Spirit of Serving the People with their Heart], 山西日报 [Shanxi Daily] (July 5, 1952): 2.

62 “张顺有写信给全国总工会, 感激工会帮助完成检举反革命分子任务” [Zhang Shunyou Wrote to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, to Thank For Their Help in Completing the Task of Reporting On Counterrevolutionaries], 山西日报 [Shanxi Daily] (July 5, 1952): 2.


74  “本报读者纷纷来信表示，坚决拥护省委决定大胆揭发官僚主义” [Readers of This Newspaper Have Written To Express Their Resolute Support For The Provincial Party Committee’s Decision To Boldly Expose Bureaucratism], 察哈尔日报 [Chahar Daily] (June 11, 1952): 2.
77  Brief reviews of the following articles from the People’s Daily: “赶车工人张顺有口述、华北局纪律检查委员会李恒英笔” [Self-account Dictated by the Cart-driver Zhang Shunyou and transcribed By Li Hengying of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau]; “我检举反革命分子时遭遇了重重阻难” [I Have Reported on Counterrevolutionary and Faced Layer Upon Layer of Obstacles]; “中共中央华北局刘澜涛同志给全国总工会秘书长赖若愚同志的信” [Letter from Comrade Liu Lantao of the North China Bureau to Comrade Lai Ruoyu, Secretary General of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions]; “必须肃清官僚主义” [Bureaucratism Must Be Eliminated], 河北日报 [Hebei Daily] (June 2, 1952): 3.
78  “察哈尔山西绥远平原等省通过张顺有事件深入检查各部门官僚主义作风” [Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, Pingyuan and Other Provinces Conduct a Thorough Examination of Bureaucratic Style of Work on the Base of the Zhang Shunyou Incident]; “接受张顺有事件的教训，继续深入检查官僚主义作风” [Accepting the Lessons of the Zhang Shunyu Incident and Continuing the In-depth Inspection of Bureaucratic Style of Work], 河北日报 [Hebei Daily] (June 19, 1952): 1.
79  Pingyuan Province was located on the borders of southwest Shandong, north Henan and south Hebei, and was established in July 1949. It was under the direct leadership of the Central Committee. The province was abolished in November 1952, and the original area was re-assigned to today’s Henan, Shandong, and Hebei provinces.
80  Yang Peiyao 杨培要 (1916-1984) joined the CCP in 1938 and served as the head of the Policy Research Office of the Pingyuan Provincial Committee after 1949. On May 25, 1952, the Pingyuan Provincial Committee decided to expel Yang from the Party on the grounds that he had a strong “concern of honor and individualistic heroism, and that he had made a fuss about his position to the Party,” see “中共平原省委关于开除杨培要党籍处分的决定” [Decision of the Pingyuan Provincial Committee on Expelling Yang Peiyao from the Party], 平原日报 [Pingyuan Daily] (June 8, 1952): 1. Yang Peiyao was rehabilitated in 1980.
81  “省委宣传部召开会议，布置开展批判杨培要思想运动” [The provincial Propaganda Department Convened a Meeting in Order to Arrange the Criticism Campaign against Yang Peiyao Thought], 平原

83 “批判杨培要思想” [Critically Assessing the ‘Yang Peiyao Thought’], Propaganda Department of Provincial Party Committee Held a Meeting to Criticize Yang Peiyao Thought. Comrade Zhang Chengxian Gave Important Instructions that the Criticism Must be Linked with Anti-bureaucratism, 《平原日报》(Pingyuan Daily) (July 4, 1952): 3.

84 Wang Bingzhang 王秉章, “对前温县人民法院贪赃卖法案件的调查” [Investigating the Former Wen County People’s Court Corrupting the Law for Their Own Profits], 《平原日报》(Pingyuan Daily) (July 7, 1952): 3.

85 “短论《扫除思想障碍, 坚决把反官僚主义斗争进行到底》” [Short Commentary on “Sweeping Ideological Obstacles and Resolutely Carrying out the Struggle against Bureaucratism Until the End”], 《平原日报》(Pingyuan Daily) (July 7, 1952): 1.

86 中共中央内蒙古分局 [Inner Mongolia Branch of the Party Center], “中共中央内蒙古分局关于检查脱离群众的官僚主义的指示” [Instruction of the Inner Mongolia Branch of the CCP Central Committee on Inspecting Bureaucrats Who Separated Themselves from the Masses], 《内蒙古日报》(Inner Mongolia Daily) (June 21, 1952): 1.


88 “赶车工人张顺有口述, 华北局纪律检查委员会李恒英笔” [Self-account Dictated by the Cart-driver Zhang Shunyou and transcribed By Li Hengying of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau], “我检举反革命分子时遭遇了重重阻难” [I Have Reported on Counterrevolutionary and Faced Layer Upon Layer of Obstacles]; “中共中央华北局刘澜涛同志给全国总工会秘书长赖若愚同志的信” [Letter from Comrade Liu Lantao of the North China Bureau to Comrade Lai Ruoyu, Secretary General of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions]; “必须肃清官僚主义” [Bureaucratism Must Be Eliminated], “察哈尔山西绥远平原等省通过张顺有事件深入检查各部门官僚主义作风” [Chahar, Shanxi, Suyuan, Pingyuan and Other Provinces Conduct a Thorough Examination of Bureaucratic Style of Work on the Base of the Zhang Shunyou Incident]; “接受张顺有事件的教训, 继续深入检查官僚主义作风” [Accepting the Lessons of the Zhang Shunyu Incident and Continuing the In-depth Inspection of Bureaucratic Style of Work], 《天津日报》(Tianjin Daily) (June 19, 1952): 1. “中共中央华北局纪律检查委员会彻底处理张顺有事件” [The Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau Dealt Thoroughly with the Zhang Shunyou Incident]; “中共中央华北局纪律检查委员会会议上刘澜涛同志的讲话 (摘要)” [Comrade Liu Lantao’s Speech at the Meeting of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau (Summary)], 《天津日报》(Tianjin Daily) (June 20, 1952): 1. “中共中央华北局纪律检查委员会会议上王从吾同志的报告 (摘要)” [Report of Comrade Wang Congwu at the Meeting of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau (Summary)], 《天津日报》(Tianjin Daily) (June 20, 1952): 2.

89 Brief reviews of the following articles from the People’s Daily: “赶车工人张顺有口述, 华北局纪律检查委员会李恒英笔” [Self-account Dictated by the Cart-driver Zhang Shunyou and transcribed By Li Hengying of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau]; “我检举反革命分子时遭遇了重重阻难” [I Have Reported on Counterrevolutionary and Faced Layer Upon

90 “赶车工人张顺有口述、华北局纪律检查委员会李恒英笔” [Self-account Dictated by the Cart-driver Zhang Shunyou and transcribed by Li Hengying of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau]; “我检举反革命分子时遭遇了重重阻难” [I Have Reported on Counterrevolutionary and Faced Layer Upon Layer of Obstacles], 解放日报 [Liberation Daily] (June 20, 1952): 3. “中共中央华北局纪律检查委 召开会议, 彻底处理赶车工人张顺有事件, 将继续在全区开展反官僚主义斗争” [The Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau held a Meeting to Thoroughly Deal with the Case of Cart-driver Zhang Shunyou, and will Continue to Carry out Anti-bureaucratism Struggles in the Whole Region], 解放日报 [Liberation Daily] (June 23, 1952): 1. Brief reviews of the following articles from the People’s Daily: “赶车工人张顺有口述、华北局纪律检查委员会李恒英笔” [Self-account Dictated by the Cart-driver Zhang Shunyou and transcribed by Li Hengying of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the North China Bureau]; “我检举反革命分子时遭遇了重重阻难” [I Have Reported on Counterrevolutionary and Faced Layer Upon Layer of Obstacles]; “中共中央华北局刘澜涛同志给全国总工会秘书长赖若愚同志的信” [Letter from Comrade Liu Lantao of the North China Bureau to Comrade Lai Ruoyu, Secretary General of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions], 南方日报 [South China Daily] (June 6, 1952): 3.

91 “哈尔滨亚麻厂厂长任荪以官僚主义态度对待基本建设” [The Bureaucratic Attitudes Towards Fundamental Construction of Ren Sun, a Director at Harbin Linen Factory], 东北日报 [Northeast Daily] (June 9, 1952): 1.

92 “中央人民政府关于中央人民政府所属各机关在《人民日报》上发表公告及公告性文件的办法” [The Instructions of the State Council on the Publication of Announcements and Proclamations in the People’s Daily by Affiliated Offices of the Central People’s Government], 北京市档案馆藏 [Beijing Municipal Archives Collection], Archival No. 1-1-1099.

93 “各地报纸展开反对官僚主义的斗争” [All Local Newspapers Launch Struggles Against Bureaucratism], 人民日报 [People’s Daily] (February 1, 1953): 3.

94 An Ziwen 安子文, a native of Suide, Shaanxi, was the head of the Transportation Section of the North China Bureau, secretary of the Taiyue Work Committee of the CCP, head of the United Front Work Committee of the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Provincal Committee, secretary of the Taiyue District Party Committee, and deputy head and head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. See Yue Ping 岳平, ed., 共产党员辞典 [Thesaurus of CCP Members] (Harbin: 哈尔滨出版社 [Harbin Publishing House], 1991): 326.

95 “中共中央批评安子文《关于结束「三反」运动和处理遗留问题的报告》(1952 年 10 月 18 日)” [Party Center’s Reply and Endorsement of An Ziwen’s ‘Report on Bringing “Three-Anti” Campaign to An End and Solving Its Remaining Problems’ (October 18, 1952)], in 中共中央文献研究室 [Literature
Research Center of the Central Committee, eds., 建国以来重要文献选编 [Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the People’s Republic], vol 3 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press  中央文献出版社, 1992): 384-388.

“处理工人张顺有控诉案，有关人员检讨了官僚主义错误或受了处分” [In Dealing with the Appeal of the Worker Zhang Shunyou, the People Concerned Examine their Bureaucratic Mistakes or Face Discipline], 工人日报 [Workers’ Daily] (June 20, 1952): 1.

Guo County Discipline Inspection Commission 崞县纪检委, “关于张顺有回县后活动情况 (1952 年 7 月 7 日)” [About Zhang Shunyou’s Activities after His Return to the County (July 7, 1952)], 原平市档案馆藏 [Yuanping Municipal Archives Collection], Archival No. 45-1-3.

“张顺有从北京回到崞县后，县里村里都请他作报告” [On Zhang Shunyou’s Return to Guo County from Beijing, both the County and the Village Invited him to Give Talks], 山西日报 [Shanxi Daily] (July 9, 1952): 2.

“中共中央关于反对官僚主义、反对命令主义、反对违法乱纪的指示 (1953 年 1 月 5 日)” [Party Center Directive on Bureaucratism, Commanderism and Legal Misconduct (January 5, 1953)], in 中共中央文献研究室 [Literature Research Center of the Central Committee], eds., 建国以来重要文献选编 [Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the People’s Republic], vol 4 (Beijing: 中共文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 1993): 10.

Liu Yajuan 刘亚娟, “张丽女士访问纪录 (访问、纪录)” [Record of the Visit to Ms. Zhang Li (Interview and Transcript)], Xiafengwa Village, Guoyang Town, Yuanping City, Shanxi Province, September 18, 2013, unpublished manuscript. After his death in 2011, Zhang Shunyou left behind more than a thousand sheets of personal handwritten materials, which are now collected in the home of his second daughter, Ms. Zhang Li (hereafter: “崞阳镇张家藏” [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang]). The author expresses her thanks to Ms. Zhang Li for providing access to the collection. Individual titles of the referenced materials are assigned by the author.

“张顺有自述 (时间不详)” [Zhang Shunyou’s Self-account (Date Unknown)], 崞阳镇张家藏 [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang].

“张顺有去信 (底稿) (时间不详)” [Zhang Shunyou’s Letter (Original Draft) (Date Unknown)], 崞阳镇张家藏 [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang]. The letter was sent to the police, the procuratorial organs and people’s courts of Shanxi Province on June 17, 1970, to the Central Committee on July 6, to the Premier of the State Council on July 10, to the Shanxi Daily offices and the People’s Daily offices on July 15, again to the Central Committee and the Shanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee on July 18. It was then sent again to the two newspaper’s offices and the Provincial Revolutionary Committee on July 3, and to the Premier of the State Council on July 24.


Trans.: This was a special term used to describe ex-KMT army members crossing lines to join
the PLA during the latter stages of the civil war.

107 “张顺有去信 (1971年1月8日)” [Letter from Zhang Shunyou to the Party Center (January 8, 1971)], 崮阳镇张家藏 [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang].


110 “张顺有去信 (底稿)” [Letter from Zhang Shunyou (Basic Draft)”, 崮阳镇张家藏 [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang]. The letter was written on November 21, 2010 and sent to the Public Prosecution Office of Yuanping City and the CCP Central Committee in February 2011.

111 On the one hand, model workers are closely associated with the construction of a socialistic new human by the CCP, such as in the emphasis on getting rid of selfish desires, or in the formation of a spirit of selfless devotion and loyalty to the Party. On the other hand, the cultivation of such models also is permeated by CCP’s political work, similarly as the frequent occurrence of class struggle and destructive political campaigns, or in the need to rely on production [of models] in nation-building. See Miin-ling Yu, “‘Labor is Glorious: Model Laborers in the PRC,” in Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-yu Li, eds., China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010): 231-258.


113 In his self-account, Zhang repeatedly mentions his “family’s tragic deaths” as he claims that, during his imprisonment, “his mother died of anger” and his son was humiliated by his father’s status and “took his own life” (“张顺有自述 (2007)” [Zhang Shunyou’s Self-account (2007)], 崮阳镇张家藏 [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang]). In his 2004 application for retrial at the Guoyang County Court, he wrote that during his imprisonment, his son was “threatened and intimidated” by people in the county, which caused him to “kill himself by taking poison” and that “his mother died of anger when she had nowhere to redress her grievances and nowhere to complain” (“张顺有向崾县法院提交的再审申请书 (2004)” [Zhang Shunyou’s Application for Retrial to the Guoyang County Court (2004)], 崮阳镇张家藏 [The Zhang Family Collection in Guoyang]).

In my interview with Zhang Li, she confirmed that these events took place, but not when her father claimed they did. She explained that her father had traveled widely, submitting petitions, and thus spent the family’s savings in the process. Zhang Shunyou’s mother tried but failed to persuade him to stop, and died in 1965 due to heavy depression. In 1975, Zhang’s eldest son went to a construction site in hopes of finding work, but was rejected by the site manager because of his relation to Zhang. After returning home, he drank a pesticide and died as a result (Liu Yajuan 刘亚娟, “张丽女士访问纪录 (电话访问, 纪录)” [Interview with Ms. Zhang Li (Telephone Interview and Transcript], Shanghai, May 20, 2014, unpublished manuscript). The confusion of dates found in Zhang Shunyou’s own account may be related to a certain exaggeration of his suffering in order to gain sympathy, which is a common practice of petitioners. But there is also another possibility, namely that the falsehoods he has repeatedly told and retold over decades had eventually become his actual memories. This possibility raises further issues that I have no space to discuss here.

114 Right after the founding of the CCP, there was quite a lot of correcting and adjusting done to
local propaganda work, indicating the prevalence of such phenomena. Here is one telling example. In 1951, the Party Center forwarded to local propaganda departments an inspection of the Party propaganda by the Chahar Provincial Committee, in which the Chahar Provincial Committee reproached the county committees for their propaganda on production. It stated that “to get rich, plant sunflowers” and “to get rich, raise sows”. It also pointed out that “in carrying out propaganda about the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in Yu County, the emphasis was on revenge and settling scores.” It further stated that in propagating resisting the US and aiding North Korea, “the propaganda only emphasized “Defending Your Own Good Fortune,” leaving aside the national interest. … [And] propagated only in general terms that “Production is Resisting the US and Aiding North Korea.” The Center characterized this as “a tendency to be apolitical in propaganda”, which was actually a result of the adaptation of propaganda work to local needs in accordance to the requirement of “reaching people’s hearts and minds and being easy to understand.” However, only some people responsible for that were named, and even if they were named, the consequences were not serious. See “中央转发察哈尔省委宣传部关于党内不同政治倾向的检查报告 (1951 年 8 月 16 日)” [Report of the Party Center on the Inspection of the Propaganda Department of the Chahar Provincial Committee on the Independence of Political Tendencies within the Party (August 16, 1951)], in 中共中央宣传部办公厅, 中央档案馆编研部 [General Office of the Central Propaganda Department, and the Editorial and Research Department of the Central Archives], eds., 中国共产党宣传工作文献 (1949-1956) [Selected Documents on Propaganda Work of the CCP (1949-1956)]: 270.

On the issue of the CCP’s mobilization of the masses, the scholarly community has generally focused on the Party’s propaganda techniques, with the “masses” becoming a passive presence. When discussing the CCP’s propaganda work about the Soviet Union, Yu Miinling argues that “the people” facing the Party’s official propaganda very actually very diverse, and that there were also various voices among the people’s responses, further indicating that in our studies on propaganda we ought to put more focus on the target audiences. (See Yu Miinling 余敏玲, “学习苏联: 中共宣传与民间回应” [Learning from the Soviet Union: Chinese Communist Propaganda and Its Effects], 中央研究院近代史所集刊 [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica], no. 40 (June 2003): 99-137.) In recent years, there has been a shift in the object of study, with the focus moving toward studying the masses amidst the agrarian reforms, see for example Li Lifeng 李里峰, “运动中的‘理性人’—华北期间各阶层的形势判断和行为选择” [Rational People Within the Campaign: The Situation Judgments and Behavioral Choices of Various Classes in North China], 近代史研究 [Modern History Studies], no. 1 (2008): 4-20; Li Fangchun 李放春, “苦,革命教化与思想权力—北方土改期间的「翻心」实践” [Bitterness, Revolutionary Culture and Ideological Power: The Practice of ‘Turning Over the Hearts’ during the Northern Agrarian Reform], 开放时代 [Open Times], No. 10 (2010): 5-35; Wu Yi 吴毅 and Chen Qi 陈颀, “「说话」的可能性—对土改「诉苦」的再反思” [The Possibility of ‘Speaking’: Rethinking ‘Suffering’ in the Agrarian Reform], 社会学研究 [Sociological Studies], No. 6 (2012): 146-171, 244-245. All this, however, touches upon another set of questions which I will discuss in a separate article.