

BOOK REVIEW
Matthew Galway,
*The Emergence of Global Maoism:
China's Red Evangelism and the Cambodian Communist
Movement, 1949-1979*
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2022)

Jeanne Cho, University of Colorado, Boulder

When one takes only a quick look at the title of *The Emergence of Global Maoism*, it may be easy to miss that the bulk of the book focuses specifically on the Cambodian Communist Movement. However, the book does exactly what the title suggests; it tracks the emergence of “global Maoism,” of which the Cambodian Communist Movement was a significant part. Over the past decades, scholars have conceptualized Maoism as a global phenomenon by highlighting not only the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policies, but also the reception of Maoism and its cultural impact in other countries.¹ Examining Maoism from a global perspective is one way of “taking Maoism seriously,” which, according to Fabio Lanza, involves treating it as “worthy of examination as politics” and acknowledging the mark it left on the lives of millions of people.² Matthew Galway’s *The Emergence of Global Maoism* is a shining example of such a promise and a welcome addition to the growing body of literature as it carefully examines the logic of Maoism in its different forms at different localities. In the book, Maoism appears to be neither static nor singular. Galway demonstrates that as the beliefs and practices of Maoism traveled across national borders, they took on new meanings.

To show the process in full detail, Galway utilizes the “expanded traveling theory.” Building upon Edward Said’s traveling theory, he offers three subcategories to consider when looking at the reception stage: impact-relational reception, historical conditions of reception, and practical reception. Furthermore, he breaks down the adaptation stage into intellectual, practical, and normative adaptations. Lastly, for the

implementation stage, he identifies common themes of consolidation, economic configuration, and social transformation. These technical but clear-cut categories serve as a useful signpost that marks key ideas in the overall dense, academic text that can otherwise be difficult to keep up with.

Before he delves into the globalization of Maoism, Galway first explains the origin of Maoism (or the Mao Zedong Thought) in China. Maoism too was a product of a traveling theory. Chapter 1 explores how Mao synthesized Marxism-Leninism with China’s historical conditions, carefully dissecting his reception, adaptation, and implementation of the thought. His account of the implementation stage thoroughly covers the most important moments in the history of the PRC under Mao while framing those moments as part of a larger structural change—modernization. Chapter 2, then, examines how the Mao Zedong Thought transformed into Global Maoism. The emergence of Global Maoism was far from spontaneous or coincidental: The CCP played an integral role in the transmission of Maoism through its foreign policies. Here is where a look at the recent scholarship may be useful; Pol Pot’s visit to Beijing can be put in conversation with W. E. B. Du Bois’s China trip as analyzed by Robeson Taj Frazier.³ While the scarcity of sources that mention Pol Pot’s secret visit makes it impossible to know what exactly he saw, what he made of them, and what the act of traveling itself meant for him, Galway cogently argues that his visit played a significant role in his turn to Maoism. He also shows that in addition to facilitating visits, the CCP contributed to the transmission of Maoism by exporting *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, which *Mao’s Little*

Red Book has examined extensively as a global history.⁴

The remaining chapters detail the “Kampucheanization of Maoism” while focusing on three key figures: Pol Pot, Hu Nim, and Hou Yuon. Chapter 3, which tracks the origins of Maoism’s appeal to Cambodian intellectuals, is an excellent piece of intellectual history that combines textual analysis with consideration for material conditions. Adhering to the traveling theory model, Galway examines why Maoism was relevant to the Cambodian setting and the colonial context, which left a deep imprint on the Paris Group as they began their intellectual journey “from paddy to Paris.” In Paris, social factors such as participation in Marxist reading groups and political factors such as the Soviet and Vietnamese support for Sihanouk pushed the group to adopt Maoism. The chapter ends with Pol Pot’s “Monarchy or Democracy?” that he penned while still in Paris. The analysis of Pol Pot’s first-ever essay is a necessary and fitting end that ties together the meticulous contextualization that preceded it. However, its connection with Mao’s 1919 essay “Great Union of the Popular Masses” is rather thin and relies only on the fact that both show “pre-Marxist ideological leanings” that nonetheless stress popular political engagement (104). It seems like the link exists between the developments in their lives, not necessarily between their texts.

On the other hand, the following chapters’ analysis of the dissertations of Huo Yuon and Hu Nim provide a much stronger link with the Mao Zedong Thought. Galway argues that even though Yuon’s work was also not “categorically Maoist in the fullest sense,” it still reflected Mao’s method of investigating rural China prior to the Great Leap Forward (110). Using Maoist concepts, Yuon investigated the nature of Cambodia’s rural-urban divide and the class system in rural Cambodia. He then urged for state-sponsored autonomous development, mutual aid teams, and modernization of productive forces that would lead to self-sufficiency. Like Yuon, Nim also provided a Maoist class analysis, but with more substantial data. Out of the three texts, Nim’s dissertation most explicitly referenced Mao and conditions in China. Through case studies, he praised Chinese leaders for the

“systematic socialization” during the “Little Leap” from 1953 to 1957 (132). His incorporation of the semiproletariat, poor peasants, and the lumpen proletariat into the revolutionary force also borrowed heavily from Mao’s proposal for “New Democracy” that rests on the joint dictatorship of anti-imperialist classes.

In Chapter 5, Galway traces the trajectory of Cambodian Maoism by looking at the political careers of Yuon, Nim, and Pol Pot. While Yuon and Nim sought to reform Cambodia from within the Sihanouk government, Pol Pot took a more revolutionary route. Yuon and Nim eventually fled from Sihanouk’s repression and joined Pol Pot. Together, they launched the Cambodian Communist movement, which utilized the Maoist strategy of a people’s war. Here, Galway stresses that the three figures believed in very different Maoisms—highlighting again that Maoism was never monolithic. The Maoism Yuon and Nim favored emphasized socioeconomic analysis, while the Maoism Pol Pot favored emphasized personal charisma and strong leadership, which Pol Pot himself had observed during his visit to China.

Like the PRC, Democratic Kampuchea also underwent the political process of consolidation, economic configuration, and social transformation, although the details often varied. The Communist Party of Kampuchea followed the CCP’s footsteps in utilizing political persecution and purges, and even leading the country into a disastrous leap to socialism. The outcomes of the Super Great Leap also led the CPK to lean toward faith Polpotism, just as the Great Leap Forward directed the CCP to faith Maoism. However, unlike faith Maoism, faith Polpotism emphasized “national characteristics” in not only leading the leap through agricultural development, but also placing the blame for its failures. Unlike Mao who never targeted ethnic minorities, Pol Pot branded the Vietnamese people as Cambodia’s “eternal enemy” (184-185). By Year Zero during which the CPK implemented social transformation, Maoism was considered outdated and even treasonous, as marked by the execution of Yuon and Nim. The book thus ends with the complete transformation of Maoism into Polpotism. However, as Galway brilliantly points out, Pol Pot’s

rejection of Maoism is in fact “very Maoist,” as Mao had also broken from the Soviet model in branding the Mao Zedong Thought (199). Maoism’s journey to Cambodia, therefore, ended in a Maoist fashion.

Besides the traveling theory model, another important analytical framework that Galway lays out in the introduction is Kenneth Jowitt’s thesis that Leninist organizations utilize a combination of charismatic-impersonal and rational-bureaucratic modes of domination. Using the theory as an “explanatory tool that does not elide historical complexities,” he emphasizes that the two forms of power were not so dichotomic and that there were bureaucratic components in faith-Maoism and vice versa (9). While such an observation indeed neatly sums up the complexities that he illuminates in the book, it leaves me with one question: Where did the charisma of Mao and Pol Pot originate from? I remain hesitant to ask what seems like a jaded question because it may seem like a distraction to PRC scholars’ “efforts to move away from a Mao-centric perspective of the Cold War” (14). However, it still feels like a necessary inquiry when their “charisma” seems to have provided a solid foundation for legitimacy. Relatedly, where do we draw the line between charisma and irrationality? Undoubtedly, there seems to be some tension between the need to recast the localization of Maoism in Cambodia as rational and the need to

acknowledge the irrationality of the Khmer Rouge. Should we see irrationalism as part of charisma?

Lastly, I would like to use this opportunity to ask the author if he sees any possibility of making further connections between Maoism in Cambodia and variants of Marxism-Leninism in other parts of Asia. As Galway writes, Nim’s dissertation did not only concern China; it also praised North Korea and North Vietnam. Is there any connection between Maoism and the variants of Marxism-Leninism observed in those two countries? If so, do those variants hold any significance for Cambodia?

The Emergence of Global Maoism is an important work that sheds light on the existence and the significance of Global Maoism, as well as the Paris Group of intellectuals who played a fundamental role in the founding of DK. Galway’s methodological contribution to the traveling theory model will serve as a useful framework for anyone pursuing a global history of ideas. His emphasis on the dialectical nature of the reception of Maoism is especially important as it highlights local agency.

¹ See, Robert J. Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Robert J. Alexander, *Maoism in the Developed World* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Christopher Leigh Connery, “The World Sixties,” in *The Worldling Project: Doing Cultural Studies in the Era of Globalization*, ed. Rob Wilson and Christopher Leigh Connery (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2007), 77-108; Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Julia Lovell, *Maoism: A Global History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2019); Jacopo Galimberti, et al, ed.,

Art, Global Maoism and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).

² Fabio Lanza, “Introduction: The Politics of (Maoist) History,” *positions* 29, issue 4 (November 2021): 678-682.

³ Robeson Taj Frazier, *The East is Black: Cold War China in the Black Radical Imagination* (Durham: Duke University, 2015).

⁴ Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Response

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I will begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to Jeanne Cho for her attentive and generous review of my book, *The Emergence of Global Maoism*, and to *PRC History Review* for this wonderful forum in which to respond to her queries. As Cho identifies in her review, my book tracks the rise of Maoism in China as an ideological system of global significance, with Cambodia serving as an important locus in which Mao's writings and Maoist praxis found a receptive audience among Cambodian intellectuals. I set out in *The Emergence of Global Maoism* to track genealogies of "Maoisms" and to place primacy on intellectuals' agentic engagements with radical thought. For the Paris Group of Cambodian radicals who went on to lead the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, aka. Khmer Rouge), this was Mao Zedong Thought in exported form as Maoism, the ideological system. My aim for this book was to fill a longstanding gap in the extant scholarly literature on Maoism and to correct the record on why Maoism might appeal to so many in the Global South, notably one particular study with a Sinocentric view of China manipulating Third World actors into doing Beijing's Cold War bidding.¹ I also sought to build upon extant scholarship on the CPK by drawing on sources in Chinese, French, and Khmer, whereas previous studies largely relied on non-Chinese materials. My hope is that *The Emergence of Global Maoism*, imperfect though it is, will nonetheless provide a launch pad for further studies on Global Maoism and Maoist revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America down the road.

As for Cho's kind review of my book, she raises three important questions and offers a helpful suggestion. I will respond to her questions to the best of my ability in the paragraphs below. I begin by addressing her suggestion to put Pol Pot's 1965-1966 visit to Beijing in conversation with W.E.B. Du Bois' China trip, which he lauded as "the most fascinating eight weeks of travel and sight-seeing [he had] ever experienced."² My initial reaction to this suggestion

was to note that several prominent Communists visited Maoist China to further their education and/or acquire specific training in waging revolution, and any one of them would be a great case for comparing and contrasting with Pol Pot's visit. Malaysian Communist Party leader Chin Peng (in 1961 and again in 1970)³ and Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso (in 1965 and again in either 1966 or 1967),⁴ among others, spent some time in Maoist China. These figures even stayed at the same training center where Pol Pot housed during his visit, the Asian, African, and Latin America Training Centre (亞非拉培訓中心/*Ya-Fei-La peixun zhongxin*) near the Summer Palace in Beijing.⁵ So why Du Bois, in particular? A late-in-life Communist and long-time socialist advocate, Du Bois visited China with a similar goal to Pol Pot in mind: for a path forward for his aims. Pol Pot needed rhetorical and material support from the leader of the Communist world revolution; Du Bois, an Asian-African tactical alliance premised upon racial solidarity and anti-imperialism.

To provide context for readers of this review who have yet to peruse the pages of Robeson Taj Frazier's brilliant study, *The East Is Black*, the two-month visit to China in 1959 by W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois presented them with "instructive lessons about the challenges facing de-colonial movements and newly independent Third World governments."⁶ The Du Boises were among many prominent African-American intellectuals-activists who gravitated toward China. Black Panther Party (BPP) members Huey P. Newton, Elaine Brown, and Robert Bray visited for ten days on official invite in September 1971 and received a warm reception upon arrival.⁷ Newton recounted that thousands of people carrying signs with the message "we support the Black Panther Party, down with US imperialism" and "we support the American people, but the Nixon imperialist regime must be overthrown" greeted him.⁸ "What I experienced in China," Newton

recalled, “was the sensation of freedom – as if a great weight had been lifted from my soul and I was able to be myself, without defense or pretense or the need for explanation. I felt absolutely free for the first time in my life – completely free among my fellow human beings.” He continued, “[t]his experience of freedom had a profound effect on me, because it confirmed my belief that an oppressed people can be liberated if their leaders persevere in raising their consciousness and in struggling relentlessly against the oppressor.”⁹ Likewise, fellow BPP member and China visitor (1970), Eldridge Cleaver, once dubbed Mao “the baddest motherfucker on the planet earth.”¹⁰ American civil rights leader and public intellectual Robert F. Williams also visited China, but for refuge there in 1965. He famously lauded Mao as “the first world leader to elevate our people’s struggle to the fold of the world revolution.”¹¹

As with Du Bois, Maoism as an ideological system was appealing because of its emancipatory, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist elements, as well as its dual emphasis on the primacy of practice and creative adaptation.¹² In China’s foreign policy, Du Bois also recognized the CCP’s promotion of autonomous socialist development among newly independent nations across the Global South. Under Mao, Du Bois intimates, China had transformed into “a nation where human nature was so abreast of scientific knowledge; where daily life of everyday people was so outstripping mechanical power and love of life so triumphing over human greed.”¹³ “I have never seen a nation which so amazed me and touched me as China in 1959,” he reflected on his time there.¹⁴ Shirley Graham Du Bois likewise reflected positively about her trip with her husband. “We have seen how the Chinese people literally move mountains, level valleys and change the course of rivers,” she recounted, and even went so far as to label Maoist China “The Land of Tomorrow.”¹⁵

Pol Pot’s visit and the one undertaken by the Du Boises, BPP members, and Robert F. Williams are indeed quite similar. In Maoist China, Du Bois and Pol Pot—two figures with similar motives to visit China but who could not be more different—identified an alternative modernity. Maoism, for them, opposed American and Soviet imperialisms and promoted “economic sufficiency and social values of selflessness, sacrifice, and collective

toil.”¹⁶ As my book details, Pol Pot was a decade-plus into waging a guerrilla struggle against Cambodian leader Norodom Sihanouk, then a close personal friend of Mao and Zhou Enlai. Pol Pot visited Beijing for endorsement of his Cambodia program after Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary, Lê Duẩn, rejected it in late 1965. My book’s second chapter tracks how Pol Pot’s experiences in Beijing in 1965-1966 and subsequent visits after he seized power in Phnom Penh in 1975 were characterized by similar fanfare and warm receptions that Newton and Williams experienced on their trips (62-70). Upon receiving tacit support from the officials he purportedly met during his time in Beijing, he returned to Cambodia with Maoist literature and immediately renamed the Worker’s Party of Kampuchea the “Communist Party of Kampuchea” to indicate alignment with Beijing rather than Hanoi, the headquarters of the Worker’s Party of Vietnam.

W.E.B. Du Bois, too, looked to China when support for him and his ideas was difficult to find among American intellectuals and politicians. The US State Department had seized his passport in 1951 on suspicion that he was a Soviet agent. Although he won acquittal, he did not regain his passport for nearly a decade. Unable to travel freely, Du Bois was cut off from his source of income, which also “marginalized [him] from employment” and led “various wings of the mainstream black political and intellectual establishments” to distance themselves from him.¹⁷ Once Du Bois regained his passport, he immediately set for Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. It was at this last stop of his tour that he bore witness to China’s socialist transformation and came to regard Maoist China’s economic advancement as a potential force in aiding decolonization efforts across Africa.¹⁸ Both he and Pol Pot, though immensely different, likewise regarded their time in China as eye opening for their respective causes and ultimately shifted politically further to the left upon completing their respective sojourns abroad. Their personal witness, in a sense, evangelized them to the global Communist cause, either for the first time (Du Bois) or in the Chinese mould (Pol Pot).

On Cho’s first question about the appropriateness of the connection between Mao’s 1919 essay, “The Great Union of the Popular Masses” (*Minzhongde da*

lianhe/民眾的大聯合) and Pol Pot's first political essay in 1952, entitled "Monarchy or Democracy?," I will push back a bit on her assessment. Perhaps I could have driven the point home beyond merely stating that both texts indicate "pre-Marxist ideological leanings" that emphasize popular political engagement. Both texts contain strong moralist overtones too. Mao wrote in his essay that "[t]he decadence of the state, the sufferings of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme" under the "union of the oppressors."¹⁹ In his essay, Pol Pot decried the degeneracy of Sihanouk's reign: his outright ignorance of popular will; his autocratic overtures that disregarded the democratic tradition set by his predecessors; and his neglect of his duties as a patron to the Buddhist *Sangha* (monastic order). Although the moralist tones in Mao's essay are less explicit than the obvious Buddhist moralist overtones in "Monarchy or Democracy?," they are nonetheless a feature of his criticism of the wealthier classes (aristocrats and capitalists) who, through conscription and other "admirable schemes," have turned sons against fathers and intimidated the poorer classes from speaking out.²⁰

Other instances of these two pieces speaking to like issues by prescribing similar solutions are also noteworthy. Both texts emphasize the strength of popular unions, reflect on global historical examples, particularly the French and Russian Revolutions, and draw upon them to support their contentions. Both Mao and Pol Pot reference historical actors who may set important precedents for such unions: Mao names Karl Marx, Pyotr Kropotkin, and late Qing/early Republican military leader Lu Rongting 陸榮廷; Pol Pot names French revolutionaries Maximilien Robespierre and Georges Jacques Danton, Soviet leaders Lenin and Stalin, and Cambodian Democratic Party leader, Prince Sisowath Youtevong. The two texts also betray strident anti-capitalist and anti-corruption stances and find in domestic precedents a path toward achieving their ultimate aim of greater union and political engagement.²¹ I agree with Cho that the link between these two pre-Marxist texts exists partly because of important developments in the lives of Mao and Pol Pot, as my book details at length in chapters one and

three, but in this case, two things can be, and indeed are true.

Cho's second question on the origins of Mao's and Pol Pot's charisma contains a few parts that I will answer in sequence. As Cho observes rightly, their respective charismas did indeed provide a pillar, but not the entire basis, on which rested a foundation of legitimacy. But her question, "where do we draw the line between charisma and irrationality?" presupposes that the two are not coeval, when in fact irrationality can, and often does, operate as the impetus for charisma and charisma can lead to irrationality once its instability is no longer concealable with grand promises, platitudes, and a "sellable" modernizing vision.

In my book, I draw upon Kenneth Jowitt's neo-Weberian concept of charismatic authority. "A charismatic leader," Jowitt notes, "dramatically reconciles incompatible commitments and orientations." This charismatic figure is "a revolutionary agent" because "in certain social circumstances institutionally [they] combine (with varying degrees of success for varying degrees of time) orientations and commitments that [were hitherto] mutually exclusive." This leader's "extraordinary and inspirational quality" thus "makes possible the recasting of previously incompatible elements into a new unit of personal identity and organizational membership, and the recommitment of (some) social groups to that unit."²² However, charismatic authority loses its appeal and lasting power if, and in my case studies *when*, the charismatic authority confronts certain unignorable contradictions in their utopian vision and actual, on-the-ground praxis. Irrationality, then, is the response: blame enemies real and imagined; encourage the populace to merely double its efforts and work harder for longer; emphasize the primacy of committing oneself fully to the charismatic-impersonal Party and to think not of pre-revolutionary life and society; and push people to become the "blank sheet of paper" (*yizhang baizhi* 一张白纸) or "Comrade ox."²³

Charisma aided Mao and the CPK intellectual thrust to garner support for their causes despite their privileged positions as educated savants. They could

penetrate into rural society despite their positionality (even though they all had rural origins) and speak to local grievances while simultaneously pitching a utopic, egalitarian, and high modern socialist country in which the most destitute and exploited would live prosperously. In Cambodia, irrationality underpinned charisma to inform the charismatic-impersonal yet faceless Organization (*Angkar*) to draw peasants and workers into the Party's orbit and to wage protracted warfare. Once in power, the Organization's leadership fractured and stronger personalities like Pol Pot shattered the collective leadership that had featured in the CPK's struggle from 1967 onward. The Pol Pot regime regarded itself, rather irrationally, as without equal in world history and pushed its overworked masses to initiate a "Super Great Leap Forward" (*mahā lotphloh*) that some regarded, derisively, as simply "a big leap beyond all reality" (*mahā hā romlon*).²⁴ "Our socialism is characterized by its speed," Pol Pot once said, and he regarded the CPK program for socialist transition and development as "extremely fast" (181).

Cho's last question, a two-parter on whether there are further links between Cambodian Maoism and Marxist-Leninist adaptations elsewhere in Asia and if so, whether those adaptations hold significance for Cambodia, is a great one. Cho references Hu Nim, whose dissertation lauds socialist economic reconfiguration underway in Maoist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, particularly for the common emphasis on measures of autarky and self-reliance (132-133). Adaptations of Marxism-Leninism in North Korea (the "Koreanization" of Soviet Communism²⁵ in Kim Il-Sung's *Juche* and, later, Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism) and North Vietnam ("class struggle under the appearance of nationalist struggle") are both examples of normative adaptations of Marxism-Leninism.²⁶ Both stress revolutionary distinctness and the importance of self-reliance that supreme theorists based, or claimed to base, on concrete historical conditions of that particular country. Both adaptations are also deeply nationalist, but in the North Korean example, scholars have appraised *Juche* as an adaptation that is, fundamentally, "Stalinist in form... [but] nationalist in content," an adaptation that has "turn[ed] Marxism-Leninism upside down," or an

iteration that "took from Marxism-Leninism what it wanted and rejected much of the rest."²⁷ In this way, for certain, Cambodian Maoism and North Korean Marxism-Leninism, whether *Juche* or its later accretion, are starkly similar.

In North Korea, however, leaders-theorists proclaimed their adaptations were not merely creative ones, but new phases of revolutionary theory altogether that represented a fourth sword of Marxism-Leninism to account for new developments in history. CPK theorists, as I show below, proclaimed similarly that their adaptation was distinct and grounded in Cambodian historical realities, but never sought to develop it in word or deed as a fourth sword with lessons for revolutions and socialist experiments elsewhere. In this way, CPK Maoism was by nature rather insular. In terms of whether CPK leaders *themselves* identified links between their revolutionary experiment and others elsewhere, the answer lies in Party speeches and internal documents. Aside from stressing revolutionary uniqueness, CPK leaders viewed Democratic Kampuchea (Maoist Cambodia) as a revolutionary society without equal or precedent, and as such, did not seek to export it globally or leave a radical blueprint for others to follow.²⁸ An internal CPK document entitled "Socialism in the Industrial Sector" assessed that China, North Korea, Vietnam, and the USSR had failed in their socialist development because their leaders focused too heavily on developing heavy industry (180). "We [the CPK] rely on the powerful revolutionary spirit, experience, and creative ingenuity of our people," Pol Pot declared in a 1977 speech. "We take agriculture as the basic factor and use the fruits of agriculture to build industry to rapidly transform Kampuchea from a backward agricultural state into a modernized one... by standing firmly on the principles of independence, initiative, and self-reliance," he elaborated further.²⁹ As my book concludes, though, the Pol Pot regime's development of Polpotism as Cambodian Maoism and rejection of Maoism in so doing is, in fact, quintessentially Maoist; Mao had rejected key points in Stalinism and the Soviet model of authoritarian total governance in pursuance of the "Chinese road to socialism" (Maoism in implementation) (161, 199).

¹ See Julia Lovell, *Maoism: A Global History*. (London: Bodley Head, 2019). For a critical review of this book, see Matthew Galway, "Review of *Maoism: A Global History* by Julia Lovell," PRC History Review, No. 23 (August 2020): 5. <http://prchistory.org/prc-history-review/>; and Fabio Lanza, "On the Existence of (Global) Maoism," *Critical Asian Studies* 54, No. 3 (2022): 487-494.

² Robeson Taj Frazier, *The East Is Black: Cold War China in the Black Radical Imagination*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 19, quoting W.E.B. Dubois, *The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century*. (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 47.

³ Chin Peng, *My Side of History: Recollections of the Guerrilla Leader Who Waged a 12-Year Anti-Colonial War against British and Commonwealth Forces in the Jungles of Malaya*. (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), 426-430.

⁴ Matthew Rothwell, "Gonzalo in the Middle Kingdom: What Abimael Guzmán Tells Us in His Three Discussions of His Two Trips to China," *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 9, No. 3 (2020): 114.

⁵ Julia Lovell implies that Guzmán and Pol Pot may have met in China, but provides only a reference that cites a rather nebulous "personal communication" to Sihanouk's biographer, Julio Jeldres. I have commented on her speculation in my review of her book. See Galway, "Review of *Maoism: A Global History* by Julia Lovell," 5.

⁶ Frazier, *The East Is Black*, 19.

⁷ Huey P. Newton and J. Herman Blake, *Revolutionary Suicide*. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 349-351.

⁸ Newton and Blake, *Revolutionary Suicide*, 351.

⁹ Newton and Blake, *Revolutionary Suicide*, 348.

¹⁰ Quoted in Bob Avakian, *Summing Up the Black Panther Party: An Excerpt from a Speech by Bob Avakian, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, Cleveland, 1979*. (Chicago, IL: RCP Publications, 1979), 3.

¹¹ Robert F. Williams, *Crusader*, No. 1 (July 1967), 1, quoted in Betsy Esch and Robin D.G. Kelley, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," *Souls* 1, No. 4 (Fall 1999): 6.

¹² "Maoism," Bill Mullen contends, "entered the ideological current of the US left most forcefully as a tool of building a Third World anti-imperialist internationalism created by African American and Asian American activists who saw in the Little Red Book a syncretic device for conceptualizing and advancing their own national self-determination struggles." Bill V. Mullen, "By the Book: *Quotations from Chairman Mao* and the Making of Afro-Asian Radicalism, 1966-1975," in *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 246.

¹³ Du Bois, "The Vast Miracle of China Today: A Report on a Ten-Week Visit to the People's Republic of China," in *W. E. B. Du Bois on Asia: Crossing the World Color Line*. Bill Mullen and Cathryn Watson, eds. (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005), 190, quoted in Frazier, *The East Is Black*, 38.

¹⁴ Du Bois, "The Vast Miracle of China Today," in *W. E. B. Du Bois on Asia*, 190.

¹⁵ Shirley Graham Du Bois, *His Day Is Marching On: A Memoir of W.E.B. Du Bois*. (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1971), 294; and Shirley Graham Du Bois, "China's Expansions Make It 'The Land of Tomorrow,'" *Pittsburgh Courier* (11 April 1959), B2.

¹⁶ Frazier, *The East Is Black*, 40.

¹⁷ Frazier, *The East Is Black*, 41.

¹⁸ Frazier, *The East Is Black*, 46-47.

¹⁹ Mao Zedong, "Minzhongde da lianhe/民眾的大聯合," (21 July 1919), in 毛澤東集/*Mao Zedong ji*. Takeuchi Minoru, ed. (Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1970), 14; and Mao Zedong, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," (21 July 1919), in *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949. Volume 1: the Pre-Marxist Period, 1912-1920*. Stuart R. Schram, ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 378-379.

²⁰ Mao Zedong, "Minzhongde da lianhe/民眾的大聯合," in 毛澤東集/*Mao Zedong ji*, 14-15; and Mao Zedong, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," (21 July 1919), in *Mao's Road to Power. Vol. 1*, 379-380.

²¹ Mao Zedong, "Minzhongde da lianhe/民眾的大聯合," in 毛澤東集/*Mao Zedong ji*, 15-22; and Mao Zedong, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," in *Mao's Road to Power. Vol. 1*, 379-385.

²² Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1992), 2. Lenin's innovation, he elaborates, contained within it the core feature of a "conflictual but effective recasting of charismatic-heroic and organizational-impersonal orientations in the form of a party in which heroism is defined in organizational, not individual, terms." Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 4.

²³ Pin Yathay, *Stay Alive, My Son*. (New York: Touchstone, 1987), 170-171.

²⁴ Henri Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book: the Sayings of Angkar*. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005), 72.

²⁵ Charles Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 241.

²⁶ On *Juche*, see Gi-wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 89-93; Jae-cheon Lim, "North Korea's Hereditary Succession Comparing Two Key Transitions in the DPRK," *Asian Survey* 52, No. 3 (May-June 2012): 561;a and Sandra Fahey, *March Through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 1084, 186-187, 190. On Vietnamese Marxism-Leninism, see Tuong Vu, "'To Be Patriotic is to Build Socialism': Communist Ideology in Vietnam's Civil War," in *Dynamis of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity,*

and Culture. Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 33-52; and Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

²⁷ Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution*, 398; and Bruce Cumings, "Corporatism in North Korea," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 4 (1982-1983): 277. See also Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea*, 94.

²⁸ Matthew Galway, "The Most Dissolute and Dishonest' Khmer to Aid China," in *Experiments with Marxism-Leninism in Cold War Southeast Asia*. Matthew Galway and Marc H. Oppen, eds. (Canberra, ACT: ANU Press, 2022), 69-70.

²⁹ Pol Pot. "Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot, secrétaire du comité du parti communiste du Kampuchéa au meeting commémorant le 17^e anniversaire de la fondation du parti communiste du Kampuchéa et a l'occasion de la proclamation solennelle de l'existence officielle du parti communiste de Kampuchéa" [Speech by comrade Pol Pot, Communist Party of Kampuchea Central Committee secretary, at a meeting commemorating the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and on the occasion of the solemn proclamation of the official existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea], (Phnom Penh, 27 September 1977), 70-71.