

# The CCP in the 1930s: The View from Defectors' Declarations (脱离共党宣言)

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On July 28, 1933, Du Heng, the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party's Shaanxi provincial committee was meeting with party colleagues in a Xi'an restaurant. That spring, a foolish attempt at May Day demonstrations had attracted police attention to the Xi'an party, and Shao Lizhi's replacement of Yang Hucheng as the civilian governor of Shaanxi had increased the local influence of Chiang Kai-shek's resolutely anti-Communist Nanjing regime.<sup>1</sup> During the summer, several Xi'an Communists had been arrested, and while none of their comrades were exposed, the party's usual meeting places came under surveillance. The restaurant gathering was supposed to avoid undue attention, but a couple of male patrons entered, sat at a nearby table, then departed. Du's suspicions were aroused, so he and his comrades cut their meeting short and left separately. Too late. The secretary and one other were arrested, while two more escaped. One of those arrested soon defected and began identifying other members of the Shaanxi organization. By September, after various forms of enhanced interrogation, Du Heng also cracked, and together with nine of his comrades, published an open letter in the Xi'an press.<sup>2</sup>

Their "Declaration on Leaving the Communist Party" (Tuo li gongdang xuanyan 脱离共党宣言) appeared in six successive issues of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) local paper, *Xijing ribao*. The opening lines set the tone:

China is a semi-colonial country. Imperialism internationally and the remnants of feudalism domestically combine to endanger China and the Chinese people. As a result, the task of the Chinese revolution is unquestionably to repel imperialism and eradicate feudal remnants in order to develop China's national industry and pursue freedom and equality in the international arena. Only in this way can China gain independence and liberation, and achieve final victory for the revolution. The Chinese Communist Party, however, contravenes these historical principles, ignores the special characteristics of China's political economy, and mechanically copies the Russian Revolution in an attempt to use Marxism-Leninism to carry out [Marx's notion that] "the workers have no fatherland [*gongren wu zuguo* 工人无祖国]," establish communism, and destroy China and the Chinese nation.<sup>3</sup>

The defection of Du Heng and his colleagues was hardly unusual. When party work resumed in Shaanxi, it was reported

that following the arrest of the provincial leadership, some were jailed, some shot, but 80-90 percent of Shaanxi's underground party defected and published confessions: some forced, some to save their lives, and some to advance their careers within the Nationalist Party.<sup>4</sup> The same was true across the country as the underground party in the white areas was decimated in the early 1930s.<sup>5</sup> Mao was certainly exaggerating when he said that at this time, the party lost 90 percent of its forces in the red bases and 100 percent in the white areas,<sup>6</sup> but the losses were certainly severe. The Nationalist Party used these defections as an integral part of its propaganda. In the confessions and open letters that I have examined, the same themes appear again and again. There was a clear script for these forced confessions, but the formulaic nature of these documents does not diminish their importance.




Figure 1  
Section of Du Heng et al., Declaration.

These defectors' declarations tell us a great deal about the political and revolutionary discourse of prewar China. Most importantly, they reveal an ideological commitment shared by Communists and Nationalists to a revolution against imperialism and feudalism. While abandoning the CCP, these defectors reaffirmed their commitment to that revolution. The declarations also reveal the dilemma that Communists faced in reconciling their commitment to China's national revolution with their obligations to uphold proletarian internationalism and defend the Soviet Union, the socialist fatherland. In ways not seen in contemporaneous CCP documents, they expose the tensions engendered by shifting party policy and the factional struggles

that accompanied them. For these reasons, these defectors' declarations are an important supplement to what we see in the party documents and memoirs that form the usual sources for party history. They get beyond the stock formulae of party documents and avoid some of the *ex post facto* rationalizations that fill the memoir literature.

In format, most of these declarations were addressed to the defectors' former colleagues. The Shanghai labor leader Xu Xigen (徐锡根) begins with "My dear comrades!" and opens each section with the phrase, "Comrades...." Toward the end he writes "Dear comrades, I am 100 percent certain you are cursing me, saying 'Shameless turncoat (*pantu* 叛徒)! How could you have the face to talk with us?'"<sup>7</sup> Yuan Binghui (袁炳辉), a leader of the Canton seamen's strikes, and Hu Junhe (胡均鹤), a Communist leader who had attended the CCP Sixth Congress in Moscow, use similar language: "Dear comrades of the CCP and Communist Youth League (CY)!... After our transformation, we are not in the least afraid of the Communist Party accusing us of being turncoats, cursing us as reactionaries."<sup>8</sup> This was not just idle boasting, for such "turncoats" could pay a heavy price. The defectors were well aware of the Gu Shunzhang (顾顺章) case, where the entire family of this communist security chief was murdered after his defection.<sup>9</sup> But these defectors insisted on the sincerity of their political transformation and called on their former comrades to awake from misguided views and rally to the cause of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles.<sup>10</sup>

A fundamental theme of all these confessions was a continued commitment to the Chinese revolution. Throughout the republican era, a central tenet of almost all political discourse was that China's problems could only be solved through revolution. Whether it was political revolution, social revolution, national revolution, cultural revolution, literary revolution, or a revolution in language or education, everybody spoke the language of revolution.<sup>11</sup> In the conflict between the Communists and Nationalists after their united front collapsed in 1927, each claimed the mantle of revolution and accused the other of being counter-revolutionary.<sup>12</sup> The ensuing competition between these two Leninist parties was fundamentally a question of who would lead the revolution and what form the revolution would take. What is particularly striking about all of these defectors' declarations is their continued adherence to a revolution against imperialism and feudalism. This was, after all, the common cause that had brought the Communists and Nationalists together under Sun Yat-sen in the 1920s. Now it was asserted that the Nationalists were the proper heirs to that revolutionary tradition. We see this theme in Du Heng's declaration with which we began this essay. Here is another version from Yu Fei (余飞) a member of the CCP since January 1923 and a major leader of the Shanghai workers' movement:

Comrades of the entire party!

We participated in the Chinese revolution and led the Chinese revolution, but the Chinese revolution failed. The livelihood of the toiling masses is worse than before and the responsibility lies with the running dogs of Stalin.

Quite clearly, the Chinese revolution failed because Communist theory was mechanically applied to

China. Proper Marxism applies to societies where capitalism has developed, to countries where European and American style classes exist. But these vulgar (不肖) Marxists transport Marx's theory of capital to China. The Chinese Communist Party thinks that Chinese society is no different from the capitalist societies of Europe and America....

The nature of the Chinese revolution is still a national revolution. Even after the Great Revolution of 1925-27, the tasks of the Chinese revolution remain incomplete. Imperialism in China has not been eliminated; the feudal warlords, gentry strongmen (*hao shen* 豪绅) and landlords remain powerful. Therefore, the Chinese revolution is still a national revolution.<sup>13</sup>

The critical implication of these declarations was that abandoning the Communist Party did not mean abandoning the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

The declarations do little to elaborate on the struggle against feudalism under the Guomindang—and indeed after the Nationalists' early abandonment of Sun Yat-sen's "land to the tiller" program, they would have been hard-pressed to pursue this line of argument.<sup>14</sup> But the defectors say quite a bit about the struggle against imperialism. A major quandary for the underground Communist Party was its resolute adherence to the Communist International's line of "armed defense of the Soviet Union."<sup>15</sup> After the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Chinese public opinion was focused on resisting Japan. But the CCP insisted that all the imperialist powers were equally threats to China, and Japan was different mainly as a threat to the socialist fatherland.

The problem was compounded when, in 1932, the Soviet Union began dealing with Japan and its puppet state of Manchukuo to protect its interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway (CERR), which cut across northern Manchuria to connect the trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. In 1919, in the famous Karakhan Manifesto, the Soviet Union had promised to return the CERR to China without compensation. This renunciation of the fruits of Czarist imperialism had aroused great excitement and sympathy for the Soviet revolution when it was published in China in March 1920.<sup>16</sup> Over time, the Soviets backed away from this promise, but the issue came up again in 1929. Following the re-unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek, the Nanjing regime launched a policy of "revolutionary diplomacy" to end the imperialist powers' privileges under the "unequal treaties." Inspired by this example, Zhang Xueliang in Manchuria moved unilaterally to seize control of the railway. The Soviet Union responded militarily, and the crisis was resolved only by a return to joint management. During the confrontation, however, the Communist Party defended the position of the Soviet Union, leading to a vigorous dissent from Chen Duxiu and his expulsion from the Party as a Trotskyite.<sup>17</sup> After the Japanese occupied Manchuria in 1931, the Soviets dealt with Japan over the CERR, and eventually, in 1935, signed an agreement in Tokyo to sell the railway to the Manchukuo authorities.<sup>18</sup>

Several of the defectors' declarations address this Soviet betrayal of China's national interest. Yu Fei writes:

As for the slogan "support the Soviet Union" (*yonghu Sulian* 拥护苏联), of course we should "support the Soviet Union" if the Soviets aid the Chinese national revolution. But have the Soviets in fact aided China's national revolution? They have not, but on the contrary they have helped the imperialists, conspired with the imperialists to partition China. The CERR issue is a perfectly clear example of Soviet aggression against China. When the Japanese occupied Manchuria, the Soviets offered their implicit consent. When the bogus Manchukuo was established, the Soviets proposed a mutual non-aggression treaty.... Comrades! The facts are before you. Have the Soviets really aided the Chinese revolution? Supporting the Soviet Union is in fact selling out the interests of the Chinese nation.<sup>19</sup>

One pervasive and powerful argument that turned the anti-imperialist position against the Communists was that rebellion divided the nation and diverted attention from resistance to Japan. We are all familiar with Chiang Kai-shek's policy of "first pacification, then resistance" (*rangwai bixian annei* 攘外必先安内) and public opposition to it on grounds that national unity against Japanese aggression should take priority over the campaign against the Communists. But this opposition was most pronounced in 1935-37, after the Nanjing government's pusillanimous response to Japan's incursions into Rehe and Chahar and Japanese promotion of North China autonomy. Nanjing's concessions in the He-Umezu agreement, its suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda, and finally the arrest of National Salvation Movement leaders including the famous "Seven Gentlemen" (an awkward English translation of the Chinese *qi junzi* 七君子, since one of the seven, Shi Liang 史良, was a woman) left many skeptical of Nanjing's nationalist credentials.<sup>20</sup> By this time, the Comintern had shifted its position to favor national united fronts against fascism, and the CCP had followed suit with its August 1, 1935, call for a united front against Japan. In the early 1930s, the situation was quite different. In Lloyd Eastman's summary judgment, "public outrage against the Japanese after 1932 was muted.... [T]he years 1932 to 1935 formed an interlude during which domestic concerns overshadowed the Japanese problem,"<sup>21</sup> and the Communists were more vulnerable to the argument that they were dividing the nation and turning Chinese against Chinese.

Li Xiaolan (李晓岚) had studied in Moscow and was a central representative sent to Shaanxi when she was arrested and defected in 1933. She accused the CCP of using the Leninist tactic of "turning an imperialist war into a civil war," taking advantage of the national crisis to foment domestic unrest.

In the countryside, they seize the opportunity to lead the red bandits of the Soviet areas to attack and create disorder, oppressing the villagers, burning and looting, plunging people into an abyss of misery... and causing the national government to have no choice but to care for the suffering people, endure the pain of withdrawing soldiers from the resistance against Japan to eradicate the bandits and save the people. The Communists then seize this opportunity to say 'The Nationalist Party is not sincere about resisting Japan.'<sup>22</sup>

Du Heng and his colleagues went a step further, claiming that "more than two-thirds of the army is tied up fighting the Red Army, and is not able to directly resist Japanese imperialism."<sup>23</sup> Two former politburo members, Lu Futan (卢福坦) and Wang Yuncheng (王云程), particularly condemned Communist attempts to foment mutinies in the national armies, and especially accused them of undermining the heroic resistance of the Nineteenth Army against the Japanese attack on Shanghai in January 1932. They called the Communists "traitors (*hanjian* 汉奸) to the Chinese nation."<sup>24</sup>

The theme of dividing the nation was not limited to the military challenge posed by the Red Army and the diversion of Nationalist forces from resistance to Japan. A parallel accusation was applied to the economy and the task of economic development. China needed to develop its industrial capacity, and this required the unity of capital and labor; but the communists insisted on turning workers against their employers, thus disrupting the economy. "As a result [of communist-fomented strikes] both labor and capital lose, the political economic crisis in China gets worse, and the nation's capacity to resist Japan in weakened."<sup>25</sup>

A final and particularly striking aspect of these declarations is their complaints against the internal workings of the Communist Party. They describe a party riven by factions and constantly shifting its line depending on which group dominated the Center. The terminology used in these sections closely mirrors the language of the party's own internal documents, and for that reason, these portions of the declarations seem especially useful in conveying the real voices of former Communists rather than the favored themes of a Guomindang propagandist. Here is the complaint of the Center's representative to Shaanxi, Li Xiaolan:

The errors in the line of the Communist Party grow more evident by the day. [Communists] have become social vermin threatening the extinction of the Chinese nation. In the past, Chen Duxiu's opportunism, Qu Qiubai's adventurism, and Li Lisan's semi-Trotskyite line all represent completely absurd positions on the Chinese revolution. Countless revolutionary youth have been sacrificed to these erroneous political lines....

Inner-party factional struggles become increasingly sharp. Excluding one's rivals, plotting against each other, jockeying for position, seeking power and profit have become the party's way of waging the so-called "two-line struggle." This is not a joke. In promoting cadres, they select their own people who will support them and favor those whom they can order around.

The corruption of their living conditions is particularly bad. Consider Qin Bangxian (秦邦宪) and the other Central Committee members. They live in foreign-style homes, eat well, ride in automobiles, and even go to dance halls and movies. They have more ways of wasting money than the big capitalists. Meanwhile, the lower-level party workers live in conditions that are difficult to endure; working on an empty stomach is normal for them. If they make a little mistake,



they are demoted, given a warning or even dismissed from the party.<sup>26</sup>

The criticism of Chen Duxiu's opportunism and Qu Qiubai's adventurism repeats the language of countless internal party documents, after those leaders had fallen from favor. The characterization of Li Lisan's line as "semi-Trotskyite" is less common, but can be found in memoir accounts.<sup>27</sup> The same refrain of Chen's opportunism, Qu's adventurism and Li's semi-Trotskyism is repeated in the declarations of Du Heng and his Shaanxi colleagues<sup>28</sup> and of Sun Jimin.<sup>29</sup> The sensitivity to an ever-changing party line and the factional struggles that lay behind these shifts was an integral part of party life. Anyone who has read internal party documents from this period is familiar with the refrain of self-criticism from provincial committees for following a line that had recently been discredited.<sup>30</sup> What these defectors' declarations add is contemporary evidence for the resentment felt by local cadres who worked for the revolution under extremely difficult conditions and were then blamed for political errors that resulted from the Center's shifting political line. The fact that Central cadres, in order to disguise their activities, lived in far more comfortable conditions than their subordinates only enhanced the frustration of lower-level operatives.<sup>31</sup>

It is not clear how many local party cadres were aware of the living conditions of the party's leaders, but those who worked in or traveled to Shanghai must have learned of these things, and the Guomindang certainly sought to advertise the point through its publication of these defectors' declarations. Several of the accounts are quite explicit. Lu Futan and Wang Yuncheng report that Qin Bangxian spent 1300 yuan on his Shanghai house.<sup>32</sup> The Shanghai workers' leader Xu Xigen seems particularly well-informed on inner-party dynamics. He recounts his own history as secretary of the Jiangsu party committee "elected by the masses" but, after a protracted struggle, removed by Li Lisan "in order to solidify his [Li's] position and strengthen his leadership and control."

At this point, Pavel Mif of the Far East Bureau of the Comintern, in order to increase his status in the organization, sent his running dogs, Chen Shaoyu (陈绍禹 [aka Wang Ming 王明]) and others to come to take over leadership of the CCP and act as his tools. But these guys were as timid as mice and of no use. How would they dare oppose Li Lisan?... Then a letter came from the Comintern, and they also received a directive from Mif. Now their courage returned, and they were brave enough to join the anti-Li Lisan movement. Then their patron (*lao zuzong* 老祖宗) Mif came as the Comintern representative to China, enhancing their influence.... The Central leaders Qu Qiubai, Zhou Enlai, Xiang Zhongfa panicked, terrified that they would not be able to get their rubles, so they too sought the support of Chen Shaoyu, and allowed him to become secretary of the Jiangsu provincial committee.

Finally, Chen Shaoyu was accused of exposing the senior CCP cadre, former Peking University student, and respected labor

leader He Mengxiong (何孟雄) leading to his arrest and execution along with over twenty of his comrades.<sup>33</sup>

As a rival of both Li Lisan and Chen Shaoyu and a loser in the factional struggles, Xu Xigen certainly had an axe to grind, but his account is not without credibility. At another point in his lengthy declaration, he explicitly refers to "the running dogs of Mif, the so-called Twenty-eight 100 percent Bolsheviks" who blindly attempt to import Western-style Marxism into China.<sup>34</sup> Yu Fei adds additional details to this picture. Addressing, as usual, his former cadres in the party, he writes:

What kind of guys are Chen Shaoyu and his group? You probably all know, don't you? Before he went to Moscow, Chen Shaoyu was really reactionary, and Zhang Wentian was a leader of the New Guomindang. After they entered Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, they sucked up to [the school's rector] Pavel Mif. That's how they sold out to Mif, how they became the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks. These Twenty-eight Bolsheviks already did a number of vile and filthy things in Moscow. Now all the manipulation, ostracism, and disorder that manifest themselves in the party are the work of these same Twenty-eight Bolsheviks.<sup>35</sup>

The scripted nature of these defectors' declarations leaves no doubt that they were carefully edited by the Guomindang apparatus – they "stay on message," as political strategists everywhere advise. There was clearly a prescribed format, and one sees it in virtually all of these texts: continued adherence to the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, a commitment to national unity, the inapplicability of Marxism's anti-capitalist agenda to a developing country like China, the faction-ridden nature of the CCP, and the Comintern's manipulation of these factions, especially in the emergence of Wang Ming and the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks. Given the near total decimation of the CCP in the Guomindang-controlled areas of China in the period between 1929 and 1935, it is reasonable to assume that these arguments had some force. But are there perhaps some further implications that we can draw from these texts?

The central premise of these declarations was that the Chinese revolution against imperialism and the remnants of feudalism required national unity. This was an enduring theme of political discourse throughout the republican era—indeed it continues to the present day. In this discourse, defending the nation against imperialism had unmistakable priority; combatting feudalism was a means to that end. The "remnants of feudalism" were conventionally linked to warlordism, and warlords were the very symbol of self-seeking local potentates who obstructed progress toward a powerful national government. A powerful national government was precisely what was needed to defend the nation against imperialism.

Such success as the Chinese revolution achieved in the 1920s was due to the United Front fashioned by Sun Yat-sen and his Soviet allies, joining the Communists and Nationalists in the struggle against imperialism and warlordism. It is no accident that most of the leading Communists who defected in the



early 1930s had joined the revolution during that period. The revolution that had energized them was the national revolution. When Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931 and then continued its aggression in what is now Inner Mongolia and North China, the imperialist threat assumed an ever more menacing form. National unity to develop China and defend it against Japan became an ever more pressing priority.

In the defectors' declarations that we have seen, it was the Chinese Communist Party that was accused of dividing the nation by diverting military forces from the resistance to Japan and obstructing economic development by turning labor against capital. In the early 1930s, this seems to have been an effective argument, for (together with an increasingly effective Guomindang security apparatus) it led to the virtual elimination of Communist activity in the urban areas.<sup>36</sup> But after 1935, and most dramatically in the Xi'an Incident of 1936, it was the Guomindang that was accused of damaging national unity, by pursuing Chiang Kai-shek's policy of "first internal pacification, then resistance." Exactly how the blame shifted from the Communists to the Guomindang will require further study, but my initial impression is that the key factors were the growing Japanese threat to North China and the Comintern Seventh Congress' shift toward a policy of united front against fascism. This in turn brought the CCP's August 1 Declaration, calling for a united front against Japan. After that, Chiang Kai-shek's continued prosecution of his Communist-eradication campaign made him appear to be the barrier to national unity.

The CCP's subservience to the Soviet Union had long been its Achilles heel. Institutionally, the national party was but a branch of the Communist International, and the professional revolutionaries in the underground party were almost entirely dependent on Soviet subsidies to carry out their operations.<sup>37</sup> But after 1934, the destruction of the party's urban apparatus severed the channels through which the funds flowed, and in the years that followed the party became basically economically independent.<sup>38</sup> More importantly, in the early years of the War of Resistance against Japan, the Soviet Union was the principal supplier of military aid to the national government, so once again the Soviet Union could be viewed as an ally of the Chinese national revolution.<sup>39</sup>

The Communists named in these declarations as privileged tools of the Comintern are Qin Bangxian (later known as Bo Gu), Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming) and the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks. This was, of course, precisely the group that Mao Zedong targeted in the Yan'an rectification campaign of 1942-44. They were, in the 1940s, attacked for "sectarianism" and "dogma-

tism" – different terms for the same sort of errors that these defectors' declarations had identified. Indeed the "Sinification of Marxism" that Mao pursued was precisely designed to defend against the accusation that Communism was an imported ideology unsuited to Chinese conditions. As for the allegation that the Communist leaders were living in foreign-style houses and attending dance halls, the primitive conditions and plain living of Yan'an pretty much put an end to such talk (with the important exception of Wang Shiwei's "Wild Lilies").<sup>40</sup> In the end, then, the defectors' declarations may have been devastating to the Communist Party of Wang Ming and Bo Gu, but they posed little threat to the new party of Mao Zedong.

These defectors' declarations suggest one final methodological point. Recent years have seen significant advances in research on party history and the Chinese revolution. We have a far better understanding of the complexity, the evolution over time, and the local diversity of the revolutionary process. New PRC publications of internal party documents and memoirs and (at least for a time in the 1980s and '90s) better access to archives have been fundamentally important to these advances.<sup>41</sup> It is striking, however, that the non-Communist press is little cited in this new scholarship. We know, however, that the republican era press was lively, diverse, and widely read by the politically engaged. When young people rallied to the CCP after the outbreak of war with Japan, much of their knowledge of the party would have come from the press in the Nationalist areas. It is therefore worth reading these declarations as part of the mental baggage that many would have carried to Yan'an after 1937. While the press was certainly full of Guomindang propaganda and misleading or erroneous accounts (we are all familiar with the frequent reports of Mao's death),<sup>42</sup> the public was presumably accustomed to reading through these obfuscations. I suspect, however, that the defectors' declarations had a dispositive power greater than other reports. They were, after all, written by men and women with a long history in the party. I reckon that their accounts were not easily dismissed at the time. In any event, a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese revolution will require our attention to sources from all quarters.<sup>43</sup> Perhaps this examination of defectors' declarations can be a small addition to our source base and open another window on the Chinese revolution and the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party.

## NOTES

The author would like to express his thanks to Tim Cheek for several insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

<sup>1</sup> See *Xijing ribao* 西京日报, May 5, 1933, on Shao's appointment the previous day.

<sup>2</sup> Jia Tuofu report to Center (November 13, 1933). Zhonggong Shaanxi shengwei dangshi yanjiushi 中共陕西省委党史研究室, ed. *Tudi geming zhan-zheng shiqi de Zhonggong Shaanxi shengwei 土地革命战争时期的中共陕西省委* [The CCP Shaanxi provincial committee during the period of the land revolution] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1991): 550-62. Hereafter cited as *TDSW*.

<sup>3</sup> *Xijing ribao*, September 17, 1933. The phrase *gongren wu zuguo* translates Marx's statement in the *Communist Manifesto* that "The working men have no

country." Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954): 50.

<sup>4</sup> Report by Communist Youth League (CY) representative Han Xueya 韩学亚 (February 16, 1934), *TDSW*: 565.

<sup>5</sup> Patricia Stranahan, *Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927-1937* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998): 103-43; Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993): 105; Kathleen Hartford, "Fits and Starts: The Communist Movement in Rural Hebei, 1921-36," in Tony Saich and Hans Van de Ven, eds., *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995): 144-174. For memoir accounts, see Wang Fan-hsi [Wang Fanxi], *Memoirs of Chinese Revolutionary 1919-1949* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980): 105-125; Chang Kuo-t'ao [Zhang Guotao], *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party: The Autobiography of Chang Kuo-t'ao* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1971), vol. 2: 139-173.

<sup>6</sup> Mao Zedong, "Guanyu ren de renshi wenti 关于人的认识问题" [On epistemology] (August 24, 1964), in *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* 中共中央文献研究室, ed., *Mao Zedong wenji* 毛泽东文集 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), vol. 8: 393. Also cited in Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, "Zhongjian didai" de geming: guoji beijingxia kan Zhonggong chengong zhi dao "中间地带"的革命: 国际背景下看中共成功之道 [Revolution in the "middle realm": the international context of Chinese Communist success] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 2010): 317.

<sup>7</sup> Xu Xigen declaration (December 3, 1932), in *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zuzhibu diaocha* 中国国民党中央组织部调查科, ed., *Zhongguo gongchandang zhi toudi* 中国共产党之透视 [A look inside the Chinese Communist Party] (Taipei, Wenxing shudian reprint, 1962; original: 1935): 327. [Hereafter cited as *ZGTS*.] I am indebted to Professor Yang Kuisong for bringing this source to my attention.

<sup>8</sup> Yuan Binghui and Hu Junhe declaration (December 16, 1932), in *ZGTS*: 352.

<sup>9</sup> Wang Yuncheng (王云程) declaration (February 24, 1933), in *ZGTS*: 357. On the Gu Shunzhang case, see Stranahan: 105-7, 116-8; Frederic E. Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995): 151-61; Elizabeth J. Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006): 119-120.

<sup>10</sup> *ZGTS*: 327, 336, 343, 349-50; Du Heng et al., *Xijing ribao*, September 22, 1933.

<sup>11</sup> Luo Zhitian 罗志田, *Jindai dushuren de sixiang shijie yu zhixue quxiang* 近代读书人的思想世界与治学取向 [The intellectual world and scholarly choices of modern scholars] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2009): 104-141.

<sup>12</sup> Wang Qisheng 王奇生, *Geming yu fangeming: shehui wenhua shiyexia de minguo zhengzhi* 革命与反革命: 社会文化视野下的民国政治 [Revolution and counter-revolution: a socio-cultural perspective on republican politics] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010): 66-120 in particular.

<sup>13</sup> Yu Fei declaration, n.d. [1932?], *ZGTS*: 328-329.

<sup>14</sup> Bradley Kent Geisert, *Radicalism and Its Demise: The Chinese Nationalist Party, Factionalism, and Local Elites in Jiangsu Province, 1924-1931* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies Publications, University of Michigan, 2001); R. Keith Schoppa, *Blood Road: The Mystery of Shen Dingyi in Revolutionary China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

<sup>15</sup> Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai*, 260-73. For a representative sample of party documents on this theme, see *Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu* 中共中央书记处, ed., *Liuda yilai* 六大以来 [Since the Sixth Congress] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980): 204-251.

<sup>16</sup> Zhou Yuefeng 周月峰, "Liening shike": Su-E diyici dui-Hua xuanyan chuanru Zhongguo yu wusihou sixiangjie de zhuanbian "列宁时刻": 苏俄第一次对华宣传传入中国与五四后思想界的转变 [A "Leninist Moment": The first Soviet declaration's spread to China and intellectual transformation in the post May 4 period], *Qinghua daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue)* 清华大学学报 (哲学社会科学), 2017 (forthcoming). In English, see James Pinckney Harrison, *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972): 25-6.

<sup>17</sup> Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai*: 206-10.

<sup>18</sup> A.J. Kantorovich, "The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway," *Pacific Affairs* 8.4 (December 1935): 397-408. The diplomatic history of the CERR is recounted in George Alexander Lensen, *The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises, 1924-1935* (Tallahassee: Diplomatic Press, 1974).

<sup>19</sup> Yu Fei declaration, *ZGTS*: 330. Cf. Yuan Binghui and Hu Junhe declaration, *ibid.*: 345, where the Soviets are termed "red imperialists."

<sup>20</sup> Parks M. Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1991).

<sup>21</sup> Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974): 246.

<sup>22</sup> Li Xiaolan, *Xijing ribao*, July 30, 1933.

<sup>23</sup> Du Heng et al., *Xijing ribao*, September 18, 1933.

<sup>24</sup> Lu Futan (卢福田) and Wang Yuncheng (王云程), *ZGTS*: 337.

<sup>25</sup> Li Xiaolan, *Xijing ribao*, July 31, 1933.

<sup>26</sup> Li Xiaolan, *Xijing ribao*, July 30, 1933.

<sup>27</sup> Chang Kuo-t'ao, vol. 2: 129-31; P. Mif, *China's Struggle for Freedom* (London: 1937): 70-1, cited in Thomas Kampen, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of Chinese Communist Leadership* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000): 38.

<sup>28</sup> Du Heng et al., *Xijing ribao*, September 21, 1933.

<sup>29</sup> Sun Jimin, *ZGTS*, 360.

<sup>30</sup> In my own research on the Shaanxi party, I find this theme repeatedly in the documents of Zhongyang dang'anguan Shaanxi dang'anguan 中央档案馆. 陕西档案馆, ed., *Shaanxi geming lishi wenjian huiji* 陕西革命历史文件汇集 (n.p., 1991-).

<sup>31</sup> The Guomindang intelligence report that includes many of the confessions used here notes that the arrest of Gu Shunzhang and his exposure of the Shanghai party apparatus forced the party leaders to adopt a bourgeois lifestyle to avoid detection (*ZGTS*: 316-7). Yuan Binghui and Hu Junhe (*ZGTS*, 347-9) reflect well the resentment of local cadres blamed for errors by the Center. Patricia Stranahan cites a Guomindang-captured Organization Department document stipulating that "Members of the Central Committee usually reside in upper-class residential areas with their own cars and clothing appropriate to their assumed economic status." Stranahan, *Underground*: 141.

<sup>32</sup> Lu Futan and Wang Yuncheng, *ZGTS*: 338.

<sup>33</sup> Xu Xigen, *ZGTS*: 325-6. On He Mengxiong's opposition to the Center and his fate, see Stranahan, *Underground*: 67-85.

<sup>34</sup> Xu Xigen, *ZGTS*: 323. Mao Zedong, in the talk cited in note 6, also uses the term "100 percent Bolsheviks." Needless to say, these documents from the 1930s contradict Thomas Kampen's claim that "the term '28 Bolsheviks' was not used in China." Kampen, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai*: 3. This stands as another reason to read the contemporary press, rather than relying exclusively on memoirs and reprinted party documents. We should also realize that even internally circulated (*neibu* 内部) collections are not always free of editorial tampering.

<sup>35</sup> Yu Fei, *ZGTS*: 331.

<sup>36</sup> On the security apparatus, see Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai* and *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2003); on the dismal failings of urban CCP organizations, see Stranahan, *Underground*.

<sup>37</sup> Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai*, 176; Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, "Gongchan guoji wei Zhonggong tigong caizheng yuanzhu qingkuang zhi kaocha" 共产国际为中共提供财政援助情况之考察 [A study of Communist International financial assistance to the Chinese Communist Party], *Xueshu lunheng* 学术论衡 (April 2004): 4-24.

<sup>38</sup> Yang Kuisong, "Gongchan guoji": 21-24. The National Government's subsidy to the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region from 1938 to 1940 was an important exception to this fiscal self-sufficiency.

<sup>39</sup> John W. Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1988): 15-52.

<sup>40</sup> On Wang Shiwei, see Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and "Wild Lilies": Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

<sup>41</sup> Saich and van de Ven's *New Perspectives on the Chinese Revolution* is an excellent example of these advances in the history of the revolution.

<sup>42</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1961): 5-6, 122.

<sup>43</sup> I would note that I discovered these defectors' declarations while reading the *Xijing ribao* in an effort to understand what people were reading about Shaanxi politics, society and economy in the 1930s.