

Building a New China

Hukou Investigation Practices in Beijing and Tianjin, 1949–1950

Carin Graminius, *Lund University*

As it emerged victorious from the civil war in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) found itself with scant reliable information about the actual state of the country, due in part to the chaos created by the civil war, preceded by years of staving off Japanese aggression.¹ Knowledge of economic and social conditions was pivotal to the building of the new state. Whereas older forms of governing had prioritized territorial management, the CCP embraced modern forms where the goal was the management of populations and subjects, a task that demanded systematic information gathering.² The organized collection of information about the populace is generally described as a sub-function of modern governance, in line with Foucauldian theories of managing populations.³ This development was not new in China, built instead on the efforts of previous regimes.⁴ However, the CCP sought to expand and intensify these efforts, increasing the number of government programs to target all aspects of social life.⁵ Indeed, administrative programs were seen as crucial for bringing about a new regime.⁶ But by which means and methods were these programs to be implemented?

In his monograph *Seeing Like a State*, political scientist James Scott argues that certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision. For states, standardizing and classifying creates knowledge that purposely reduces complexity and local heterogeneity. As such, Scott turns our attention to the practices behind the creation of knowledge for the purpose of governing, highlighting the role of formalist methods.⁷ Analyses of China, however, have downplayed the role of formalist methods, focusing instead on discontinuous mass campaigns – a governance method generally described as a *sui generis* feature of the Mao era. The essence of this method is to use informal and irregular measures involving the mobilization of the masses and civil organizations.⁸ In fact, sociologist Eddy U has argued that the irregularities and informalities surrounding Maoist administration extended beyond campaigns and were present in the everyday operations of the workplace. Like other socialist states, China developed counter-bureaucratic procedures, lacking predictability and uniformity in spheres commonly seen as important for the development of a functional bureaucracy.⁹ However, recent studies of the initial years of CCP rule have documented the government's efforts to implement various formalist work methods in different state programs and highlighted the importance of these methods in the building of the communist state. Scholars

have investigated the role of statistics and big data in the development of the socialist state,¹⁰ and they have examined the methods behind the creation of ethnic taxonomies to shed light on the act of standardization and its role in building the nation.¹¹ Yet, little attention has been paid to the early methods of what was arguably the most influential and encompassing administrative system of them all – the household registration system, *hukou* 户口, hailed as the foundational administrative basis for the new state.¹² The *hukou* system served, and still serves, as a legal basis for identifying and registering individuals, as well as for gathering information about citizens.¹³ Designed for the purposes of state security, surveillance, industrialization and social and economic development, in line with the communist modernist vision, the *hukou* system evolved to become an essential aspect of everyday life in the PRC and a tool integral to the new socialist order.¹⁴ The responsibility for the development and administration of the *hukou* system fell to the public security bureau and, by extension, the local police station (*paichusuo* 派出所).¹⁵ As political scientist Michael Dutton's study shows, surveillance methods applied by public security bureaus from the 1950s onward did indeed emphasize the campaign-style methods and irregular measures of mass mobilization, and these methods were later sewn into the fabric of *hukou* information gathering.¹⁶ In contrast, however, relatively little is known about other practices related to *hukou* investigations during the formative years of the communist state—an important period as attempts to impose organizational control were at their most intense in the immediate aftermath of the “liberation,” and close attention was paid to the development and implementation of new administrative methods.¹⁷ Our perception that campaign-style methods dominated *hukou* praxis comes primarily from studies of *hukou*'s security functions. However, the system had much wider applications, especially to the tasks of state building and socialist development. Thus I suggest we probe deeper into those foundational methods of *hukou* that were not associated with the system's security functions, to ascertain whether or not informal, campaign-style practices were still dominant. As I will show, formalist practices were also prominent in *hukou* investigation methods and assisted the construction of a *hukou* administrative system built on communist understandings of what constituted a person and a society. As such, the urgency of state-building and construction of a functional state bureaucracy at the time influenced the early *hukou* investigations in ways connected to but distinct from surveillance concerns.

In what follows, I explore internal documents, from 1949 and 1950, which were disseminated to local police offices by the municipal Public Security Bureaus in Beijing and Tianjin. I examine the *hukou* information gathering practices that were developed and promoted at those local levels, and I ask what such methodological practices can tell us about the CCP's views of the *hukou* system, communist state building in general, and state-society relations in particular.¹⁸ The documents I consult contain *hukou* investigation instructions and work summaries, the majority of which emanated from and referred to the urban, suburban, and rural districts of Beijing and Tianjin, though they also included occasional reprints from elsewhere (e.g. northeast China and Shanghai). What interests me here is not the specific situation in the local areas per se, but rather the *promoted work practices* that the Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus distributed to their local police offices. The documents are classified as internal to the police organization, but a closer examination reveals that one of the texts indirectly addresses the *hujiyuan* 户籍员 ("household monitor"),¹⁹ instead of using the professional term, *huqinjing* 户勤警 ("household inspection officers"),²⁰ thus suggesting that *hukou* investigation and information gathering was at this point not only undertaken by the *hukou* police officers,²¹ but also by civilian staff employed in the local *paichusuo*. A considerable number of investigation tasks were none too rigidly divided between these two groups: different texts, irrespective of whom they addressed in writing, promoted similar methods. Several texts made a general claim for proper investigative methods, not addressing any specific type of employee in particular.²² These findings can be contrasted with the procedures that were implemented at later stages, when routine *hukou* work was carried out specifically by local security defense committees.²³ In the initial stages of the *hukou* system, I show, *hukou* inspection officers did carry out investigations, and closer cooperation with other administrative municipal bureaus and public organizations was at an early stage.

Beijing and Tianjin were at this time so-called municipalities under direct central control, rather than sub-regional or sub-provincial administrative entities.²⁴ What these two localities offer, then, is a glimpse of how instructions for *hukou* information gathering played out in local government institutions in geographical and administrative proximity to the upper layers of the communist party and the central government.

Seeing Like a Communist State: Old and New *Hukou* Investigation Practices

In excerpts from 1950, the Tianjin Public Security Bureau lamented the state of the *hukou* police force and denounced the current, "erroneous" investigative methods:

Quite a few household inspection officers (*huqinjing*) had only a vague idea about what they were meant to do when they were given household inspection responsibilities. They committed the mistake of

conducting stereotyped and repetitive investigations regardless of the target, and their understanding of whom to protect and whom to monitor was not clear. The powerful Guomindang ideology of "controlling" people still lingered on. After hearing bureau chief Xu [Jianguo] lecture on the subject, quite a few policemen soon overcame this weakness, but there are still those whose understanding of "inspecting households" (*hucha* 户查) is muddled and who continue to stick to the old ways. They enter the door and ask: "How many people?" If the numbers match, they just leave.²⁵

Such expressions of discontent about work practices were not uncommon in the *hukou* instructions, and the subsequent errors were blamed on old investigative methods. The binary pairing of the new versus the old investigative order framed the general narrative throughout the texts; with fervor and unceasing repetitions, the documents attempted to break with the past and sensitize *hukou* inspection officers and *hukou* monitors to new *hukou* standards in line with the new political order. In particular, numeric counting of people and what was said to be "a controlling" mindset inherited from the previous regime's practices constituted the main methodological and ideological offences. At the same time, just like its KMT predecessor,²⁶ the communist *hukou* investigation served the purposes of control and surveillance; the question of the omnipresent enemy, the detection of "bad elements" and the restriction of enemy activities were central issues by which the Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus tried to justify *hukou* investigation to their employed subordinates.²⁷ The intent to "control" people was certainly present, even if the public security bureaus preferred to keep this intent covert in the investigation process. Thus, what is at stake here is not so much the security application of the *hukou* system per se, but what can be explained by the new perspectives of governance and the additional features and intents the *hukou* system had acquired by 1950.

For the communists, the question of how to govern had ceased to be merely hypothetical well before 1949. David Bray suggests the Yan'an period saw the emergence of communist policies aimed at both knowing and governing the population in economic, bureaucratic, and social life. In practice, these policies were manifest as early as 1937 in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region, a region that had seen a dramatic increase in government programs targeting various aspects of social life, such as health, education, the arts, public security, agriculture, and literature.²⁸ Likewise, the Tianjin documents used *hukou* information to provide a general statistical overview of the composition of subjects in Tianjin based on education, profession, residence, and class for administrative and developmental purposes. It was through the previous year's statistical overviews that the authorities discovered a worrying matter: the percentage of people classified as working class was regrettably low. This

was the class the Tianjin authorities deemed crucial to their goal of changing Tianjin from a "consumption city" (*xiaofei chengshi* 消费城市) to a "production city" (*shengchan chengshi* 生产城市). In addition, they noticed high fluctuations of people entering and leaving the city, indicating a large floating population (*liudong renkou* 流动人口²⁹), a phenomenon problematic³⁰ for planning and production.³¹ As this example shows, apart from its surveillance functions, the *hukou* system was integrated with wider socialist concerns and goals for society; in the words of the Beijing Public Security Bureau, *hukou* work was needed "to establish a new democratic revolutionary order, to grasp social changes and understand class relations."³² Thus, the knowledge sought from the *hukou* investigation was expansive; investigations constituted more than a simple counting of household members. The Soviet historian Peter Holquist notes that this form of governing is not unique to socialism, authoritarian states, or any specific country. He suggests, however, that the Soviet Union stood out for the urgency of its population management needs, urgency that arose from the avowed goal of creating a communist state inhabited by communist citizens.³³ Likewise, the sinologist Michael Schoenhals has concluded that in this respect, China differed little from its Bolshevik counterpart, as in both cases the intention of the Communist Party was to influence and change people.³⁴ The documents distributed by the Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus make it clear that creating a "New Democratic Socialist Order" meant molding the people, society, and cities and rested on a new type of investigation.

Investigation had a profound meaning to CCP Chairman, Mao Zedong. During the Sino-Japanese war Mao had repeatedly emphasized the importance of information gathering and investigation; it was essential to what he envisioned as the Marxist research method, and it defined how the communists viewed the task of socialist governing.³⁵ In a reprint of his writings on the topic from the 1930s and 1940s, entitled *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research* (circulated by the CCP Central Committee in 1961), Mao not only established correct political theory as inherently intertwined with social investigation,³⁶ but he also argued that it was only through investigation that one gained the right to speak: "Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into the social and historical facts of a problem and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense."³⁷

In Mao's view, the communist political ideology was directly related to a particular type of investigation: Marx had arrived at his theory only after thorough investigation of the commodity in its historical, social, and material context. For Mao, China's problems could only be solved with "Marxist methods,"³⁸ and thus those methods were to be applied universally in the very work practices of state officials³⁹ and *hukou* inspectors alike. In the documents distributed by the Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus, the new information to be collected included people's life stories, classes, economic conditions, social relations, and educational backgrounds. Researching the historical, social

and, material conditions of a household, this approach made the investigation both "socialist" and more extensive than the simple and despised "counting" methods attributed to the previous regime. Such "crude" methods were discouraged. In fact, Mao insisted that formalist methods at large were useless: "Since infantile, crude, philistine and lazy-minded formalist methods are prevalent in our Party, we must expose them; only thus can everyone learn to use the Marxist method to observe, pose, analyze and solve problems [...]"⁴⁰ Instead, the CCP chairman valued practical experience, opposed book worship, and urged cadres and officials to study conditions in real life – "go among the masses and investigate the facts!"⁴¹ a method closely related to CCP's idea of the mass line (*qunzhong luxian* 群众路线), which theoretically encouraged popular participation in the political process.⁴² This imperative was at times echoed in the *hukou* instructions by the Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus. The Tianjin Bureau encouraged *hukou* inspection officers not to distance themselves from the masses;⁴³ the path forward was to initiate collaborations with other administrative municipal bureaus and public organizations.⁴⁴

We often see the Mao Era as characterized by such anti-formalist notions of research, where individual practical experience, mass participation and mass campaigns were valued over standardized and formal methods. However, as historian Arunabh Ghosh has shown in his study of statistics in Maoist China, it is misleading to portray the PRC, a modern state with a planned economy, as built exclusively on campaigns without any formalist, standardized methods.⁴⁵ Likewise, for the purpose of governing, James Scott has claimed that methods of standardization and abstractions serve to enhance state capacity and power over subjects as social and local complexity is reduced, a phenomena the author calls "seeing like a state."⁴⁶ Despite Mao's scorn for formalist methods, the documents from Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus similarly reveal that certain issues demanded standardization and "formalist rules" for both pragmatic and ideological reasons. The creation of communist taxonomies of people and classes is one example of the Security Bureaus' attempt to reduce the social and local complexity of the people in order to align them with a communist understanding of what constituted class and what counted as a member of the people,⁴⁷ while at the same time showing the *hukou* inspection officers and fellow *hukou* employees how to "see like the new state." The same phenomenon is exemplified in the basic instructions on how to fill in a *hukou* report according to set standards—a seemingly simple task, but not without impediments.⁴⁸ The educational level of many cadres and state employees was low; new police recruits often came from rural areas and lacked not only education, but also familiarity with the various "modern" appliances to be found in the cities.⁴⁹ Just how elementary vocational training had to be is illustrated by the "general urban knowledge" that CCP soldiers had to digest prior to entering the cities: it included practical instructions on how to answer a telephone, flush a toilet, and switch on or off an electric light.⁵⁰ Formalized methods for investigative *hukou* work were thus both ideologically important and practically urgent. In the next section, I will take a closer

look at the nature of both the formalist and informal methods promoted in the *hukou* instructions.

What Was to Be Gathered? Standardizing and Categorizing Information and People

Anthropologists have frequently studied classification and categorization as a means of understanding cultures and social systems.⁵¹ In their in-depth studies of classificatory systems, sociologists Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star follow in the footsteps of their anthropologist colleagues and assert that classification is something people everywhere act upon, a tool which structures worlds and social interactions. In a similar way, it serves as a political tool for purposes of control and unity.⁵² Likewise, the Beijing and Tianjin instructions on *hukou* work provide the reader with an insight into how local public security organs attempted to create unity and gain control through standardization and formalist methods. Of primary importance to the functioning of the new *hukou* system was the introduction of new fields of information to be collected. The documents proclaimed that *hukou* investigators should record profession, age, name, educational level, address, life history, class background, political views, social relations, and economic data⁵³—all the demographic indicators by which the state classified people into communist social categories. Some of the new fields of *hukou* information required an understanding of how to categorize in order to fill in the relevant boxes on the new forms: for instance, what counted as a profession as opposed to its counterpart, unemployment? In a text reminiscent of online FAQ instructions on websites, the Beijing Public Security Bureau instructed its officers how to understand the category of "occupation":

Question: If a woman is at home cooking and doing housework, does this count as having an occupation? What should it say on the household registration form? *Answer:* It doesn't count as an occupation. Leave the [relevant] box in the household registration form empty.⁵⁴

This is one of many examples illustrating the subtleties of classification and the process through which those engaged in *hukou* investigation might have come to understand society. Once a person was investigated and assigned a classification, the practical implications of such classification had to be considered. The Beijing Public Security Bureau was fairly explicit about the immediate destiny of those categorized as "unemployed" or "bums" (*erliuzi* 二流子)—they were to be given a prompt "re-education."⁵⁵ Other occupational classifications brought more positive consequences. For instance, people working in the army or engaging in revolutionary efforts elsewhere were exempt from bureaucratic procedures pertaining to the transfer certificate (*qianyizheng* 迁移证).⁵⁶ In the FAQ section compiled by Beijing Public Security Bureau, there were different measures to be taken if a household member had migrated to some other part of the country due to revolutionary en-

agements, in contrast to ordinary work. The revolutionary migrant was to be treated as if he were still part of the household, and no transfer certificate needed to be submitted, whereas the opposite was true for family members who had migrated for other reasons.⁵⁷ "Profession" here emerges as one pervasive classificatory field, which justified differential treatment.

Among the new categories, "class" is often seen as the most pervasive, and it proved a powerful influence on the way people were perceived. Naturally, differentiation based on economic, social and cultural status was not foreign to China, but the communists underscored the importance of class analysis and thereby encouraged the identification of individuals based on class status.⁵⁸ Marx had thought of class identification in primarily economic terms, but Mao allegedly adapted that classificatory schema to pre-existing social categories and used the term *jiejí* 阶级, which evoked connotations of a ladder or steps.⁵⁹ He originally identified nine classes to aid cadres in distinguishing potential "class enemies" from persons assumed to be supportive of the CCP.⁶⁰ The boxes on the *hukou* forms (profession, life history, education, and so forth) served the purpose of determining exactly which of the nine classes applied to a given individual, and, by extension, of separating suspicious persons from "good" persons.⁶¹ Categorization efforts were complicated by the existence of people who might have belonged to the "right" class but whose opinions, actions or life histories gave them enemy potential, in the eyes of the communists. The investigation of someone's life history and social relations thereby helped to clarify his or her status. As such, the Tianjin documents stressed that "good" and "bad" elements could only be identified, with anything approaching certainty, when the *hukou* analysis was complete.⁶²

In practice, establishing where a person fell on the "good" / "suspicious" spectrum proved to be quite problematic. A text entitled *How to carry out household investigations*, published by the Beijing Public Security Bureau, illustrated the difficulties that *hukou* officers experienced. According to the author, problems were often the result of bad research practice: "Only detailed investigation and analysis together with accurate statistics can clarify political divisions and thus differentiate enemy from friend, thereby showing whom to protect and whom to monitor."⁶³ The belief in the superiority of systematic research was not even shaken when *hukou* inspection officers were found to have miscategorized people; this was said to have been due to sloppy research and individual errors, not to the system itself.⁶⁴ In the eyes of the party, a misunderstanding in the process of synthesizing the different bits of information about a person's *hukou* could have grave outcomes—if "good" people mistakenly became suspects, the monitoring efforts would be misdirected, while "real" suspects would go undetected. It is unsurprising, then, that local authorities promoted detailed instructions, for *hukou* workers, on how to categorize and classify. The good/suspect binary that is visible in the *hukou* guidelines closely resembles the friend/enemy dialectic that Michael Dutton asserts was central to CCP praxis.⁶⁵ The energy with which the public security authorities engaged in this issue similarly supports

Dutton's claim, albeit with the modification that a "suspect" is more of a latent or potential enemy, and therefore quite difficult to detect. It demanded considerable expertise in correct classification.

Once hukou investigators made the relevant categorizations and classifications, their next important task was the memorization of the information they had compiled. The Beijing Public Security Bureau went as far as to compare a hukou investigator to a living household register, stating:

At any time, you should be able to recite from memory the information about any person in the area. You should know his address, which household he belongs to, how many people his household consists of, and how long they have lived in the area. Furthermore, you should know his background, current profession, political views, life situation, economic situation, his social relations, and so forth. Your brain should be a living household registration ledger!⁶⁶

To achieve this goal, mnemonic devices and time frames were introduced to guide the hukou officers and hukou monitors in their investigation process. First, it was of crucial importance that one did not try to memorize written hukou information without actually having visited the household in person. Second, the investigator should bring a supplementary hukou registration ledger (*hukou buzhu bu* 户口补助簿) and, whenever convenient, write down the problems discovered, as this method boosted memory. The Beijing Security Bureau stated that if one spent five hours engaging in hukou investigative work using this method, one could gain an understanding of up to six households per hour and thirty households per day.⁶⁷ Thus, ten minutes per household was thought to be sufficient time to research and memorize data, setting an incredible standard for the pace of work.

The introduction of time frames is seen as a common way that organizations attempt to standardize activity across geographical regions and different metrics, thereby standardizing certain aspects of work and, by extension, producing more predictable behavior. Sociologists Martha Lamp-land and Susan Star explain standardization as the expression of power over others, imposing not only formalist methods but also ideal ways of being.⁶⁸ In the above examples from the Beijing Public Security Bureau, tight time-schedules indirectly promoted such personal characteristics as speed and efficiency. But other time frames in the official instructions downplayed the importance of speed. The Beijing and Tianjin Public Security Bureaus suggested that three to four months should be spent investigating the basic hukou situation in a designated area.⁶⁹ When monitoring a suspicious person, it was suggested that concerns be thoroughly investigated and resolved over seven-to-eight months.⁷⁰ Finally, in both municipalities, procedures stressed the importance of continuity and demanded that hukou investigation was approached as routine work.⁷¹

Documents on hukou work also addressed the issue of time units, the standardization of which has long been part of state efforts to enforce homogeneity at the expense of local or traditional measurements.⁷² The Beijing Public Security Bureau explicitly requested the use of the Gregorian calendar and insisted that birthdays be written in Arabic numerals.⁷³ These standardizations helped regulate the completion of hukou forms and were effective at introducing new concepts of time, detached from traditional and local concepts. The Gregorian calendar had been officially adopted in 1912.⁷⁴ But the Beijing Public Security Bureau's 1950 instructions suggest it was not necessarily in common use. In fact, the local practice of keeping track of a person's age solely using the lunar calendar, *nongli* 农历, persisted as late as 1953. Historian Thomas Mullaney describes how Chinese officials charged with the task of classifying ethnic minorities in 1953 brought charts into the field to facilitate the conversion from *nongli* to the Gregorian calendar.⁷⁵ By adopting the Gregorian calendar as a standard expression of time, hukou investigators were likewise exposed to a new way of conceptualizing time, which could pose challenges for those not familiar with the system. Similarly, the imperative to use Arabic numerals in combination with the traditional Chinese practice of writing text from right to left clearly proved something of a challenge to the typesetter responsible for the printed hukou instructions — the headings were numbered consecutively as "...11, 21, 13..."⁷⁶

Beijing and Tianjin promoted similar work instructions in their efforts to reduce personal opinions and to impose a set of standardized work practices. The documents reveal the formal procedures involved in early hukou investigation: the collection of data according to specified categorical fields, classifying according to instructions, completing the work within specific time frames, and filling in the hukou forms according to particular rules. Taken together, such instructions were a means by which the authorities tried to standardize certain aspects of hukou work, in line with the new communist vision of how the hukou system would be used. These instructions also shed light on the role of formalist practices in the construction of functional state administrative structures. Simultaneously, the instructions provided an illustration of the government's ultimate ambition: to create and control individuals capable of seeing like a communist state, or "living household registers," in the words of the Beijing Public Security Bureau.

When Collecting Hukou Information, Forget Formalist Methods!

Debates about the nature of communist methods for bringing about social change have tended to focus on whether CCP practices were mobilizational or organizational. "Mobilization" is primarily associated with spontaneous political campaigns, and "organization" with the institutional infrastructure and formal administrative procedures.⁷⁷ These concepts are seen as opposites, with the dominance of one mode ostensibly suspending or disrupting the operation of the other.⁷⁸ But this framework does not fully capture the range of methods that the CCP deployed in

the rebuilding of China; it might lead one to overlook the fact that spontaneity and informality were also built into the institutional infrastructure and did not disrupt the workings of the bureaucratic institution. As much as the public security bureaus emphasized rigorous uniformity in the investigation process, they simultaneously stressed the opposite of formality, namely flexibility. In true Maoist fashion, the documents encouraged the *hukou* investigator to oppose rigid and standardized questioning and to rely on individual experience. Asking entirely standardized questions was likened to "bad practice," which did not embody the meaning of investigation. In the words of one writer: "There are some comrades who – even though they appreciate the importance of investigation in theory – simply do not understand how to go about it, and who let the household investigation become a mere inspection. They bring along a copy of the register and inquire about each person's name and age. That, to them, counts as conducting a household investigation."⁷⁹ The public security bureaus in Beijing and Tianjin expected far more, and their contempt for this sort of practice was evident. To illustrate how to conduct exemplary or "model" investigations, the Tianjin Public Security Bureau introduced readers to several short texts written in a colloquial and inviting tone, sharing personal, practical experiences of information gathering. What the authors seem to have grasped is that people are rarely as enthusiastic about giving away personal information as Mao's writings on investigation might lead one to believe:

Before, when I investigated households, I used to ask questions according to the standard *hukou* form, in a very mechanical and rigid fashion. Proceeding in this way not only made it difficult to discover the true circumstances of my targets, but also made them very suspicious of me. It put them on guard and prevented them from opening up to me.⁸⁰

The anonymous writer went on to suggest how one should proceed instead: adopt a less formal attitude, be friendly and obtain information of interest through small talk and light conversation. He continued:

I first learnt the name of the head of the family that had just moved in and when knocking on their door I asked in a familiar tone, "Is Mr. Niu at home?" When the family members sensed my friendly attitude, which seemed to suggest that I already knew Mr. Niu, they invited me in. Then, when I met the head of the household, we sat down and engaged in a free and unrestrained conversation.⁸¹

The author went on to explain how he obtained the essential information to fill out his forms by asking indirectly about Mr. Niu's background, his age, his education and class – in effect trying to conceal, as much as possible, his actual agenda. He may well have embellished his account some-

what, but the anecdotes he shared with his readers were clearly meant to show that information gathering required more than simply reading questions from a page: flexibility and conversational tricks were to be put to good use in order to make the "targets" (*duxiang* 对象) answer truthfully. In modern academic methodological terms, what he suggested based on his own experience was that so-called "formal structured interviews" were, in the *hukou* investigation context, considered to be "bad praxis," as the information thus obtained was likely to be less reliable and rich than if it had been shared in the course of ordinary conversation.⁸² However, getting someone to engage in an "ordinary conversation" was not always easy, and a different text suggested a number of alternate ways to proceed: "In a conversation you may begin by asking: Is the room cold? Have you eaten? Are there any thieves in the vicinity? How are you managing?"⁸³ These "icebreakers" were meant to convey to the target that the *hukou* investigator cared, thereby making people well-disposed to chat.

Another text expressed some related ideas. The sector that the author and his colleagues had been given to investigate consisted of thirty-seven scattered villages, whose inhabitants were busy farmers, either working hard in the fields or making handicrafts at home. Experience told the author that people were not willing to open up and talk if he disturbed them at work. On rainy days, however, when people might be home, at leisure, the roads were too muddy to traverse. The solution? "When the weather is clear, go out to investigate, but take the opportunity to go at midday, when people are at home to eat."⁸⁴ In another text, the Beijing Public Security Bureau stated that officers should not enter a home without knocking: instead, they should observe local customs so as not to be perceived as troublesome.⁸⁵ Adaptation to local conditions, both geographical and social, was put forward in both of these documents as a skill essential for a competent *hukou* investigator. The crucial adaptation – seen by local authorities as decisively improving the quality of the information gathered – was to simply blend in, become one of the people, and thereby make "the masses" (partly) forget the investigator's real identity and professional purpose. In general, keeping the masses at a distance was discouraged, as that was thought to generate poor information and to have a detrimental effect on the CCP's general work of building socialist society. One way to "blend in" was to actually engage in the same work as the people one investigated or to collaborate with existing organizations and administrative structures. The author of *A good way to investigate households*, published by the Tianjin Public Security Bureau, recommended that the reader engage in the same work tasks as the people investigated, thus showing goodwill, making people content, and permitting the investigator to talk while working. In the end, it helped investigators to gain affection: "If you are seen as helpful, people will not be afraid to talk to you."⁸⁶

The "blending in" part of the work shares surprising affinities with anthropological methods of information gathering. The alleged (and disputed) forefather of anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski, stressed that to get to know the people under study, a researcher had to live among them

and take part in their activities. According to this method, later labeled "participant observation," the researcher immerses herself in the setting, participates in the activities of the people, and conducts unstructured interviews in order to gain knowledge about a group. The success of "participant observation" depends very much on the personality and social skills of the researcher, as these will help to establish good relations with the people being studied.⁸⁷ The official decrees on information gathering methods from Beijing and Tianjin similarly appealed to the social skills of the investigator.

To help *hukou* investigators blend in and hide their investigative purpose, the Beijing Public Security Bureau also suggested combining *hukou* work with tasks such as education about fire prevention, noting that "any kind of work that lets you enter people's homes may be used in order to gain knowledge about the *hukou*."⁸⁸ Whereas the former methods resembled anthropological research practices, this one was more surreptitious, urging the investigator to go "undercover" and hide the true nature of her work behind activities that would be viewed more positively by her targets.

It is evident in the texts that the *hukou* investigators faced an uphill struggle, not only because of their own "erroneous" methods, but also because citizens were traditionally used to the idea that *hukou* investigations were primarily about numbers, and thus used stock replies to silence the inquisitive investigator. As an elderly woman told one urban *hukou* inspection officer: "The house has not collapsed, no one has died, and our household registration has not changed."⁸⁹ In order to cure the popular habit of responding as briefly as possible, the Tianjin Public Security Bureau stressed that *hukou* inspection officers should avoid loudly announcing the purpose of the visit, as this invariably had the following result: "[he] entered and said 'I have come to investigate *hukou*', whereupon the target (*duxiang* 对象) quickly responded 'No change!' and then there was nothing more to say."⁹⁰ Household investigation "concealment" thus helped *hukou* investigators obtain information, but they were treading a fine line, since working "undercover" also had its shortcomings – it could raise suspicion among the targets. The Beijing Public Security Bureau recognized this problem and issued a warning, stating that the inspectors should publicly declare the purpose of their visit. Whether they hereupon actually said that it was a "*hukou* investigation" seemed to have been of less importance, as the Beijing Public Security Bureau also mentioned "fire prevention" or any other possible reason as legitimate excuses.⁹¹

Even though the purpose and type of information to be collected in no way differed from what was outlined in the previous section, adaptation to local conditions was understood to be highly necessary. Instead of using a standardized way of asking questions as a work method, the investigators were encouraged to use their personal social skills and experience to get to know people and extract information from them. Sociologist Eddy U finds Maoist administration, and by extension socialist administration, to be counter-bureaucratic, where norms regulating procedure (such as job descriptions, monetary compensation, and discipline) are not systematically applied. U describes an environment that

favors political norms over technical skills, and personal experience over formalist rules, thereby lacking predictability.⁹² The skills the *hukou* investigator is called upon to develop are partly in line with U's vision of Maoist and socialist administrators: the *hukou* investigators were encouraged to develop their intuition when conducting interviews and to rely on experience. However, the embrace of such personal methods did not equal the abolition of rules regulating other aspects of the *hukou* investigation. The detailed job descriptions and instructions show efforts to simultaneously introduce both bureaucratic elements and unregulated methods into workplace operations, allowing a greater degree of individuality to shine through. As such, it supports political scientist Harry Harding's assertion that the CCP did try to integrate bureaucratic elements into the state apparatus at an early stage.⁹³

Early *Hukou* Investigation Practices: Concluding Remarks

Due to its long-lasting effects on life prospects and its role in the socialist planned economy and the contemporary political-economic system, the household registration system is arguably one of the most discussed Chinese administrative systems among scholars focusing on both contemporary Chinese studies and PRC history.⁹⁴ My study of *hukou* investigations makes clear that the CCP initially envisioned a new type of administrative system, one that was closely aligned with the communist model of a society built around class and social relations, and which thus necessarily differed from its predecessors in requiring new types of data. In addition, the methodologies they devised illustrate how the *hukou* system served political purposes by probing deep into the circumstances of every household. This was necessary to ascertain the political mindsets and standings of the members, and it simultaneously created a comprehensive surveillance system to detect enemies. These findings are in line with other scholars' assertions that the police force was charged with the task of enforcing political commitment in the Maoist era. The *hukou* system clearly constituted one tool in this endeavor.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, as I have argued, the deep knowledge generated by the *hukou* investigation also facilitated other goals, such as the creation of a communist society and communist citizens: if one knew what people thought, one could act to change them.

During the period in question (1949-1950), the campaign-style methods that are often seen as the epitome of Maoist "anti-formalism," were still in a formative state, at least in *hukou* work. The state may later have broken away from standardized routines and induced zeal and activity among its cadres in order to uphold their proximity to the people, but in 1949 and 1950, such methods did not yet constitute a major part of promoted work practices. Although ideas of collaboration with other administrative structures and social organizations appear in the documents and were encouraged, they were clearly not yet fully in place. Instead, the documents meticulously outline the basic methodological infrastructure of the *hukou* investigation system. By reading what the guidelines on *hukou* information practices stipulated, one discerns two distinct types

of promoted methods: formalist methods linked to time frames and categorization (e.g. how to fill in reports and collect information according to set categories) and anti-formalist methods (e.g. conducting interviews, adapting to local conditions) that gave full play to the *hukou* investigator's personality, ingenuity, and social skills. Thus, political campaigns were not the only means by which the CCP state used flexible, non-standardized methods in the building of the communist state; several routine activities, such as promoted work practices among *hukou* investigators in Beijing in Tianjin, also fall within the spectrum of flexible methods. In *hukou* matters, close ties and good relations with the masses were thought to be formed by everyday work practices, not necessarily by the nature of irregular political campaigns.

The existence of two such seemingly antithetical methodological binaries – formalist and informal – appears puzzling, and Mao's ideological preferences for Marxist research cannot fully deliver a satisfying explanation. Informal methods did fulfill Maoist criteria of what constituted good research, but they also had a functional advantage. The Beijing and Tianjin documents show that informal methods of *hukou* investigation were thought to produce "quality" information. By immersing oneself in the life of the masses and abstaining from formal interviews, the *hukou* investigator could gather quality information, superior to that gathered through the "rigid" ways of the old regime. But for an administrative system to be of use to a state, it must undergo certain simplifications and standardizations.⁹⁶ The formalist methods helped to reduce local complexity and introduce standardized categories of desired information in line with a communist world-view. Such formalist methods assisted the CCP to "see like a state" or, considering the categories specified in the *hukou* instructions, to see like a "communist state." Whether or not these work-practices were later implemented on the ground by *hukou* investigators in Beijing or Tianjin is another story, on which the documents are silent.

NOTES

¹ I would like to thank two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also want to thank Michael Schoenhals for his many comments on initial drafts of this text.

² Susan Greenhalgh & Edwin A. Winckler, *Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

³ Peter Holquist, "Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context," *The Journal of Modern History* 69:3 (1997): 415–450.

⁴ See Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2004). Under Qing rule, health controls and mandatory public hygiene check-up measures were implemented in Manchuria in an effort to manage the health of the population. Lane J Harris, "From democracy to Bureaucracy: the Baojia in Nationalist Thought and Practice, 1927–1949," *Frontiers of History in China* 8:4 (2013): 517–557. The *baojia* system was a regulative sub-bureaucratic function for population census taking, mutual local collaboration and policing, as well as a system designed to assign collective responsibility for crimes committed in imperial China. The Nationalist

government put resources into expanding the *baojia* system, and it became a way for the government to exercise greater local bureaucratic control, extract desired resources, and create popular representation at local levels.

⁵ David Bray, *Social Space and Governance in Urban China: the Danwei System from Origins to Reform* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

⁶ Chen Long, "Zai dongbei ge sheng shi chujian gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao: guanyu zhencha gongzuo de ji ge wenti" [Report on the Work of Weeding out Traitors in Different Regions and Cities in the Northeast: On Some Investigative Work Issues], *Huabei gongan tongxun* [North China Public Security Bulletin], Vol. 5 (1948): 62.

⁷ James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

⁸ Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981); Eddy U, *Disorganizing China: Counter-Bureaucracy and the Decline of Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007): 19; Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics: A History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005): 141, 162.

⁹ Eddy U, *Disorganizing China*: 1–29

¹⁰ Arunabh Ghosh, "Making it Count: Statistics and State-Society Relations in the Early People's Republic of China, 1949–1950" (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2014) Retrieved from <http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A177233>.

¹¹ Thomas S Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

¹² Wang Haiguang, "Dangdai Zhongguo huji zhidu xingcheng yu yange de hongguan fenxi" [A microscopic analysis of the formation and evolution of contemporary China's household registration system] *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu* 4 (2003): 22–29. Available at: <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/14840.html>.

¹³ Fei Ling Wang, "Conflict, Resistance, and the Transformation of the Hukou System," in Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, eds., *Chinese Society: Change Conflict and Resistance* (London: Routledge, 2010): 82. In the early years of the communist state, the household, not the individual, served as the basic registration unit. See Wang Haiguang, "Dangdai Zhongguo huji zhidu xingcheng yu yange de hongguan fenxi."

¹⁴ Wang Haiguang, "Dangdai Zhongguo huji zhidu xingcheng yu yange de hongguan fenxi"; Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System," *The China Quarterly* No. 139 (Sep., 1994): 644–668; Jeremy Brown, *City versus Countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the Divide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

¹⁵ Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*: 177; Kam C. Wong, "Community Policing in China: Philosophy, Law and Practice," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, vol. 29, No. 2 (June, 2001): 127–147.

¹⁶ According to Dutton, this method was in place most notably after 1953, when temporary national household registrations laws were enacted nationwide. See Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*: 177.

¹⁷ Martin King-Whyte, *Small groups and Political Rituals in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974): 36.

¹⁸ The documents were purchased by a Swedish academic in the Panjiayuan flea market in Beijing in the early 2000s. They are today part of course readings in the Lund University Master's level course in Chinese entitled "No Investigation, No Right to Speak" (KINM14), described in detail here: <http://libguides.lub.lu.se/c.php?g=297403&p=2986830>.

¹⁹ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo" [Speaking About Household Investigation Work], *Renmin Gongan Zengkan* [People's Public Security: Supplement], No. 9: 30–34.

²⁰ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao" [Report on Household Work in 1949], *Tianjin gongan* [Tianjin Public Security], Vol. 1, No. 4: 2–5; "Huji-jing ruhe jinxing hucha" [How the Household Policeman Conducts Investigations], *Tianjin gongan*, Vol. 1, No. 4: 6; Zheng Kuizhi, "Ruhe jinxing hucha" [How to Carry Out Household Investigations], *Renmin Gongan Zengkan*, No. 9: 35–39.

²¹ The documents do not give any clues regarding the gender of the *hukou* inspection officer. In general, the majority of police officers were men; women were in a minority. They often faced the hard task of combining a full-time job with child rearing with little support from their husband. For more information on the situation among female employees in traditional male occupations in Maoist China, see Jiping Zuo, *Work and Family in*

Urban China: Women's Changing Experiences since Mao (Palgrave MacMillan, 2016): 51-52. For specific information about female cadres and soldiers in the PLA, see James Gao, *The CCP Takeover of Hangzhou* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).

²² Shiju huji ke, "Hukou wenda" [Household Questions and Answers], *Renmin Gonggan Zengkan*, No. 9: 35-40; Wo zenmeyang diaocha hukou?" [How Do I Investigate Households?], *Tianjin gongan*, Vol. 1, No. 4: 8; Huang Feng'e, "Diaochahukou yi ge hao banfa" [A Good Way to Investigate Households], *Tianjin gongan*, Vol. 1, No. 4: 8.

²³ Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*: 177; Kam C. Wong, "Community Policing in China: Philosophy, Law and Practice:" 135.

²⁴ Dorothy Solinger, *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

²⁵ Zheng Kuizhi, "Ruhe jinxing hucha:" 36-37.

²⁶ Lane J Harris, "From democracy to Bureaucracy: the Baojia in Nationalist Thought and Practice, 1927-1949:" 517-557.

²⁷ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 2-5; "Hujijing ruhe jinxing hucha:" 6;" Zheng Kuizhi, "Ruhe jinxing hucha:" 35-39; "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 30-34.

²⁸ David Bray, *Social Space and Governance in Urban China*: 46.

²⁹ The national hukou regulations of 1958 promulgated the registration of workers as rural or urban and restricted movement between rural and urban areas. See Zhang Lei, Wang Guixin, "Zhongguo huji zhidu yu chengshihua jin Cheng" [The household registration system and the urbanization process] *Zhejiang ligong daxue xuebao* Vol. 30, No. 2 (2013): 274.

³⁰ According to Cheng and Selden, the early fifties were the "honeymoon" years of unrestricted movement between rural and urban areas as this facilitated economic recovery. The same point is raised by Wang Haiguang. However, as the Tianjin documents illustrate, in 1949 the authorities certainly did not encourage free movement and were at best ambivalent toward the phenomena. See Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System:" 646; Wang Haiguang, "Dangdai Zhongguo huji zhidu xingcheng yu yange de hongguan fenxi."

³¹ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 2.

³² "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 30.

³³ Peter Holquist, "Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work:" 415-450.

³⁴ Michael Schoenhals, "Nebulous Nexus: Modernity and Perilustration in Maoist China," in Michael Kim, Michael Schoenhals, & Yong Woo Kim, eds., *Mass dictatorship and Modernity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 56-57.

³⁵ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong lun diaocha yanjiu*, (Beijing: Zhongyang Baogongting jiyaooshi, 1961) [Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research, CCP Central Committee Circular No. 261, 1961] I have used and refer in my notes to the complete translation into English of this particular collection available at <http://prchistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/毛泽东论调查研究.pdf>.

³⁶ Mao. Zedong, "Reform our Study," in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*, 22.

³⁷ Mao Zedong, "On investigation work," in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*, 5.

³⁸ Mao Zedong, "Excerpt from rectify the party's style of work," in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*: 43-44; Mao Zedong, "Reform our Study," in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*: 18-24.

³⁹ Mao Zedong, "Preface to Rural Surveys," in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*: 15.

⁴⁰ Mao Zedong, "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing" in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*: 36.

⁴¹ Mao Zedong "On investigation Work" in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*: 11.

⁴² Eddy U, *Disorganizing China*: 19.

⁴³ 1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 3.

⁴⁴ 1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 3; "Ruhe jinxing hucha," 38.

⁴⁵ Arunabh Ghosh, "Making it Count: Statistics and State-Society Relations in the Early People's Republic of China, 1949 -1950:" 23-25.

⁴⁶ Scott, *Seeing like a State*.

⁴⁷ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 31; "Hujijing ruhe jinxing hucha:" 6; "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 4

⁴⁸ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 3-5; "Hujijing ruhe jinxing hucha:" 6;" Zheng Kuizhi, "Ruhe jinxing hucha:" 35-39; "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 31-34; Shiju huji ke, "Hukou wenda:" 35-40.

⁴⁹ Jeremy Brown *City versus Countryside in Mao's China*; Frank Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945-1957*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*: 145-147.

⁵⁰ Mu Yumin, *Beijing Jingcha Bai Nian* [One Hundred Years of the Beijing Police], (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin Gonggan daxue chubanshe, 2004): 360.

⁵¹ Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002 [1966]); Stanley J. Tambiah, *Culture Thought and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1985).

⁵² Geoffrey. C. Bowker & Susan Leigh Star, *Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences* (Cambridge: MIT press, 2000).

⁵³ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 31.

⁵⁴ Shiju huji ke, "Hukou wenda:" 36.

⁵⁵ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 31.

⁵⁶ See Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden for more information about the need for residents to obtain permission to move from one's residence. Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System:" 663.

⁵⁷ Shiju huji ke, "Hukou wenda:" 35-36.

⁵⁸ David Johnson, "Communication, Class and Consciousness in Late Imperial China," in David Johnson & Andrew J Nathan, eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987): 34-74. According to Johnson, social stratification in late imperial China was based upon two major principles: the level of economic security and the enjoyment of legal privileges. Legal privileges combined with economic capital created high social status and independence.

⁵⁹ Wolfgang J Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974): 60; Kevin Latham, "Lecture on social stratification" (SOAS, London, February 9, 2010).

⁶⁰ Mao Zedong, "On investigation work," in *Mao Zedong on Investigation and Research*: 9. The classes were: the industrial proletariat and the agricultural workers, the lumpen-proletariat, the urban poor and small handicrafts men, the poor peasants, the middle peasants, the rich peasants, the landlords, the commercial bourgeoisie, the industrial bourgeoisie.

⁶¹ Class-divisions were not set in stone, and there was room for local negotiation. As Jeremy Brown shows, on the grassroots level, personal grudges might change a person's original class-label, repositioning the person along the good/bad spectrum. See Jeremy Brown, "Moving Targets: Changing Class-labels in Rural Hebei 1960-1979," in Jeremy Brown and Matthew Johnson, eds., *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China's Era of High Socialism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2015): 51-76.

⁶² "Hujijing ruhe jinxing hucha:" 6; "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 4.

⁶³ "Zheng Kuizhi, "Ruhe jinxing hucha:" 35.

⁶⁴ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 4.

⁶⁵ See Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*: 137.

⁶⁶ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 31.

⁶⁷ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 32.

⁶⁸ Martha Lampland & Susan Leigh Star, *Standards and Their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying, and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

⁶⁹ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 30, 33; "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 5.

⁷⁰ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 5.

⁷¹ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 2-5; "Hujijing ruhe jinxing hucha:" 6; "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 33.

⁷² Scott, *Seeing like a State*: 41.

⁷³ Shiju huji ke, "Hukou wenda:" 39.

⁷⁴ Paul A Cohen, "Time, Culture, and Christian Eschatology: The Year 2000 in the West and the World," *The American Historical Review* Vol. 104,

No. 5 (Dec., 1999): 1615–1628.

⁷⁵ See Thomas Mullaney's study of ethnic classifications for details on the translation of lunar calendar time units. Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation*: 32.

⁷⁶ Shiju huji ke, "Hukou wenda:" 39.

⁷⁷ For a more detailed discussion on the mobilization-versus-organization framework, see Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980): 180-193.

⁷⁸ Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin*: 8-9.

⁷⁹ Dongbei renmin zhengfu gonganbu, "Guanyu hukou gongzuo ji ge wenti de yijian" [Opinion in Some Matters Concerning Household Work], *Tianjin gongan*, Vol. 1, No. 4: 5.

⁸⁰ "Wo zhenmeyang diaocha hukou?": 8.

⁸¹ "Wo zhenmeyang diaocha hukou?": 8.

⁸² Steinar Kvale, *Doing interviews* (London: Sage, 2008). A structured interview is a form of standardized interview, where the aim is to make sure all interviews follow the same pattern and the same questions are asked in the same order. No question outside the stipulated order can be asked.

⁸³ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 33.

⁸⁴ Huang Feng'e, "Diaochahukou yi ge hao banfa:" 8.

⁸⁵ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 32–33.

⁸⁶ Huang Feng'e, "Diaochahukou yi ge hao banfa:" 8.

⁸⁷ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1966); Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, *Social Anthropology* (London: Routledge, 1967).

⁸⁸ Zheng Kuizhi, "Ruhe jinxing hucha:" 38.

⁸⁹ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 3.

⁹⁰ "1949 nian hukou gongzuo baogao:" 3.

⁹¹ "Tantan hukou diaocha gongzuo:" 33.

⁹² Eddy U, *Disorganizing China*: 1-29.

⁹³ Harry Harding, *Organizing China*: 329-330.

⁹⁴ Zhang Lei, Wang Guixin, "Zhongguo huji zhidu yu chengshihua Jincheng:" 274-278; Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System:" 644-668; Fei Ling Wang, "Conflict, Resistance, and the Transformation of the Hukou System:" 80-100.

⁹⁵ Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*: 18; Kam C. Wong, *Police Reform in China* (London: CRC Press, 2012): 6.

⁹⁶ At the same time, Scott argues that simplification and rigidity in excess make a system obsolete and inefficient for real life applications. See Scott, *Seeing like a State*: 6-8.