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Editorial Address: The Colorado College
14 E. Cache La Poudre
Colorado Springs, CO 80903 U.S.A.
(719) 389-6525 FAX: 719/634-4180
E-Mail: TCheek@CCnode.Colorado.edu

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The CCP's American Friends

by
Michael H. Hunt
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Materials coming out of the PRC have been instrumental in setting the study of the CCP's external relations on an entirely new basis.¹ Developments once viewed essentially from the outside can now be examined from the inside. Yet historical research, perhaps like history itself, can work dialectically, so that the new emphasis on the inner workings of the CCP opens the way to a fresh look at sources external to the party.

The American Friends of the CCP offer a good case in point. They were one strand in a far-flung and still inadequately understood international network through which the CCP gained ideological sustenance, political support, basic intelligence, and contacts for people-to-people diplomacy. Anyone intent on exploring that strand can start with a strikingly strong set of studies of some of the most prominent players.² However, more remains to be done, as a look at the papers of Philip J. Jaffe and Earl Browder recently reminded me.

The Jaffe papers, available at Emory University in Atlanta,³ are particularly revealing on the links between left-leaning Americans and Chinese in the 1930s and 1940s. Jaffe (1897-1980) was a New York businessman who channeled substantial personal effort, private funds, and intellectual energy into support for the CCP. In 1933 he began publishing pseudonymously the party-sponsored periodical China Today, drawing on material supplied by the CCP's Shanghai underground,⁴ and then in 1937 he started up

¹ Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems," *The China Quarterly*, no. 122 (Summer 1990): 258-72; and Steven M. Goldstein and He Di, "New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 4-6.

² Foremost are Janice R. MacKinnon and Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American Radical* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); John Maxwell Hamilton, *Edgar Snow: A Biography* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Qiu Ke'an, *Sinuo zai Zhongguo* [Snow in China] (Beijing: Sanlian, 1982); Tracy B. Strong and Helene Keyssar, *Right in Her Soul: The Life of Anna Louise Strong* (New York: Random House, 1983); and Albert Tomasz Grunfield, "Friends of the Revolution: American Supporters of China's Communists, 1926-1939" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1985).

³ The Jaffe papers, consisting of well over one hundred boxes, are housed in the Special Collections Department, Robert W. Woodruff Library. A detailed guide is available. The Special Collections Department also holds the extensive Theodore Draper research files. They consist of material assembled for Draper's two published books on the U.S. Communist party and for a third uncompleted volume covering 1930-1945.

⁴ See "Chinese Workers' Correspondence," a newsletter in English smuggled out between 1933 and 1935, in box 14, folder 14.

the more widely-read Amerasia. Throughout this period he was closely aligned with the U.S. Communist Party, though never a member. The notoriety that resulted from his arrest and guilty plea in the 1945 Amerasia case marked the beginning of his withdrawal from political activity. Even so, he retained a personal interest in China's revolution and the American left. He prodded his friend Earl Browder, former American Communist leader, to set his recollections down on paper, and he drew on those recollections in his own published account of the U.S. Communist Party.⁵

Perhaps the most interesting single item in the Jaffe papers is his autobiography, "The Odyssey of a Fellow Traveler," largely devoted to China.⁶ It offers fresh portraits of a variety of contemporaries, including Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Edgar Snow. It also includes a spirited account of the Amerasia case and a helpful portrait of Ji Chaoding, a relative by marriage who worked closely with Jaffe on a variety of China-related projects.

The Jaffe papers contain other notable items. Chief among them are several versions of an interview conducted with Mao Zedong during a 1937 visit to Yan'an only part of which was subsequently published⁷; a large collection of China Photos⁸; correspondence from Song Qingling and others on wartime aid for the CCP⁹; and the FBI files on Jaffe.¹⁰ The FBI materials make for fascinating reading, less for what they reveal about the American Friends of the CCP than for what they show about the FBI. They reinforce the impression created by recently declassified Office of Strategic Services records in the National Archives that U.S. intelligence had a fairly primitive grasp of CCP policy and leadership. (For example, one penetrating report ominously identified Zhu De, to whom it linked Jaffe, as a "known communist.") The lack of a sound understanding in turn left government agents vulnerable to tendentious, even fabricated reports supplied by Guomindang intelligence, and to McCarthy-era conspiracy theories.

Although Earl Browder (1891-1973) was a figure far better known to contemporaries and historians than Jaffe, the Browder papers, housed at Syracuse University but also available on microfilm, are unfortunately less impressive than Jaffe's.

⁵ Jaffe, *The Rise and Fall of American Communism* (New York: Horizon Press, 1975).

⁶ The fullest, 325-page version of the ms. appears in box 5, folders 6-9, but other seemingly earlier versions of various chapters along with the notes used in drafting are scattered throughout the papers.

⁷ In box 15, folder 2. One published version by Jaffe appears in *New Masses*, 12 October 1937. Another by T.A. Bisson can be found in his *Yenan in June 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders* (Berkeley: University of California Center for Chinese Studies, 1973), 46-60.

⁸ In series 11.

⁹ In boxes 11 and 18.

¹⁰ In series 14 in some twenty-plus boxes!

Browder became general secretary of the U.S. Communist Party in 1939 and associated himself with the "exceptionalist" current within the party. Convinced that socialism would not soon prevail in the United States, he argued that American Communists should work within the capitalist system and exercise their influence through a coalition of progressive forces. During World War II he vigorously promoted great-power cooperation and predicted peaceful coexistence for the postwar period. Then suddenly in mid-1945 he was deposed as party leader and thrust into political obscurity.

Browder's papers reveal the pattern of fascination with China also powerfully registered in the Jaffe collection.¹¹ He worked in China between early 1927 and early 1929 as a Comintern labor specialist. Later as general secretary of the U.S. Communist Party he proved an outspoken supporter of the CCP and Mao's New Democracy. Along with copies of Browder's own extensive writing on China, his papers contain such notable items as a hitherto unknown 3 April 1945 Mao note to Browder¹²; a 1945 interview with Chen Jiakang on CCP negotiations with Hurley and the Guomindang¹³; and correspondence on wartime support for the CCP.¹⁴ The draft of Browder's autobiography in his own papers lacks the chapters on his stay in China in the late 1920s; however, those chapters can be found in the Jaffe papers.¹⁵

Like any research effort, an examination of these sources reveals gaps in our knowledge even as it fills in some blanks. Both the Jaffe and the Browder papers are silent on the Chinese bureau that was somehow linked to the U.S. Communist Party. What role did it play? Who led it?¹⁶ Did it serve as a source of information for Yan'an on American affairs? Together these two sets of papers also raise intriguing questions about the relationship of Mao and Browder as leaders of communist parties each seeking its own

¹¹ The Browder papers are in the George Argents Research Library. The microfilm edition, prepared by Microfilm Corporation of America, Glen Rock, NJ, consists of thirty-five reels and is accompanied by a detailed guide. For a sketch of the life, see the James G. Ryan, "The Making of a Native Marxist: The Early Career of Earl Browder," *Review of Politics* 39 (July 1977): 332-62.

¹² Microfilm edition, reel 2/45. For earlier Mao communications to Browder, see Takeuchi Minoru, ed., *Mao Zedong ji* [Collected writings of Mao Zedong] (10 vols.; Hokobosha, 1971-72; Hong Kong reprint, 1975), 5: 231-32 and 7: 287. See also *ibid.*, 9: 303-304, for Mao's telegram of 29 July 1945 congratulating William Z. Foster as the new head of the U.S. Communist Party but at the same time praising the ousted Browder for his contributions to the Chinese revolution.

¹³ Reels 4/79 and 10/392.

¹⁴ Reel 4/78.

¹⁵ Box 40, folder 3.

¹⁶ Jaffe's "Odyssey," 130, identifies "Mr. Ho" as the bureau head in 1935. Evidence in the Jaffe papers suggests that "Mr. Ho" may well have been Ji Chaoding. Jaffe credits Ji for "working" for the bureau, and describes him as authoritative in setting the correct line for *China Today* in the early 1930s. Ji returned to China in 1941 to work for the Guomindang government while reporting to Zhou Enlai. Stephen R. MacKinnon, who is preparing a biography of Chen Hansheng, confirms this guess and indicates that Chen was Ji's successor.

"national way" while maintaining internationalist solidarity. Was Mao's New Democracy important to Browder as part of his vision of the postwar peace?¹⁷ Was Browder's policy line and his strong endorsement of Mao's line somehow important to Mao? We may well have to await the appearance of Chinese and Soviet materials on inter-party relations before the ideological, political, and personal triangle linking Yan'an, New York, and Moscow becomes appreciably clearer.

¹⁷ See especially Browder's *Teheran and America* (pamphlet; New York: New Century, February 1945). At one point in his rejoinder to an inner-party attack inspired by the Duclos letter, Browder cited the Chinese case to bolster his contention that the appropriate measure of a communist party was the success of its policy and not the approval of Moscow. Browder's speech of 23 May 1945, Jaffe Papers, series 7, box 36, file 3. (A microfilm version of this portion of the Jaffe Papers is available from the Special Collections Department.)

"Consider your verdict": Otto Braun in China

by
Frederick S. Litten
 Munich, Germany

In recent years some books and articles on CCP history have been published which also touch on Otto Braun and his activities in China, mainly from 1933 to 1935.¹ The way these studies treat Braun (and, I dare say, history) reminds me of the trial of the Knave of Hearts in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* (chapters XI and XII). With precious little and in addition questionable evidence they give their historical verdict on Braun, like the King of Hearts tries to do in the story. The aim of this article is to give a picture as it comes from my research on Braun and the CCP, concentrating on three topics I consider especially important: Braun and the Comintern, Braun's military tactics and the Zunyi conference. In the end I will come back to the question of the "verdict".

Braun and the Comintern

It is commonly accepted that Braun was sent to China by the Comintern as military adviser to the CCP and entered the Jiangxi soviet in that capacity.² The only one to tell it differently (except Chapman Pincher, whose account is rather undocumented)³ is Lu Hong.⁴ He cites Wang Ming, by way of Wang Jiaxiang, who told the latter that Braun had not been sent by the Comintern but by the Soviet military, a story that Wang Jiaxiang did not believe but which was also confirmed later by Shi Zhe, who claimed to have known Braun in Moscow. Shi Zhe added that he had heard that Braun had been sent by the Soviet military to the *Dongbei* for intelligence work against the Japanese.

Concerning the circumstances of Braun's journey to the Jiangxi soviet Lu Hong presents three alternatives: that Bo Gu, who knew Braun, invited him on his own initiative

¹ Especially: Benjamin Yang, "The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao's Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party," *The China Quarterly*, (1986), p. 106, pp. 235-271. Shi Zhifu & Zhou Wenqi, eds., *Li De yu Zhongguo geming (youguan ziliao)* [Li De and the Chinese revolution (relevant materials)], (Beijing:1987) This book seems not to be available in Germany (East and West); I would like to thank Dr. Gregor Benton at the University of Leeds for lending me his copy. Thomas Kampen, "The Zunyi Conference and Further Steps in Mao's Rise to Power", *The China Quarterly*, 117 (1989), pp. 118-134. Benjamin Yang, *From Revolution to Politics - Chinese Communists on the Long March* (Boulder/CO: Westview Press, 1990).

² E.g. Kampen, p. 119; Yang, p. 315.

³ Chapman Pincher, *Too secret, too long*, (New York: 1984), pp. 12, 19.

⁴ Lu Hong, "Guomiyu Li De zai Huq huodong he jige youguan wenti de kaobian," [A Discussion of Li De's activity in China and some related questions], in *Li De yu zhongguo geming*, pp. 228-242, here 231ff.

(as Shi Zhe claimed); that Bo Gu and Luo Fu invited him together and got the *placet* by the Comintern for Braun to go as "advisor without jurisdiction" (Braun's version); or that Braun was sent by the real military adviser on a reconnaissance mission and then worked in Ruijin under orders from Shanghai because the real adviser could not get through the lines (the version of Wang Zhitao, who was an interpreter of Braun).

Independently, my research also gave rise to the strong suspicion that Braun had been sent to China not as a Comintern adviser but for intelligence work in Harbin,⁵ and this is confirmed in his "biographical notes" dated April 1969, where he mentions having been sent to Manchuria by Soviet Military Intelligence (also known as GRU) for the fight against the Japanese.⁶

In autumn 1932 he removed to Shanghai to work in the military section of the Far Eastern Bureau there.⁷

Regarding the question of how Braun came to work in the Jiangxi soviet as a military adviser, I am not much more certain than Lu Hong. Contrary to his own assertion I believe that Braun acted in Ruijin by default (it cannot be excluded that he had also come to Shanghai by default), because the senior military advisor, Manfred Stern, was not able to get there - a version not only given by Wang Zhitao but also by Zhang Guotao and the Stern-biographer Krymov.⁸ This goes some way to explain Braun's title ("without jurisdiction"), his claim that he had no direct communication with the Comintern even before the Long March,⁹ and the curious fact that the Comintern does not seem to have cared about him after 1935¹⁰ - after all, he was not really one of their people.

On the other hand, Braun was debriefed by the Comintern after his return to Moscow in 1939. Contrary to assertions in his published memoirs he got into difficulties

⁵ Frederick S. Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken im China* [Otto Braun's Early Work in China] (1932-1935), (München: 1988), pp. 16ff.

⁶ I received a copy of these notes, signed by Braun, from his widow. For Braun's earlier possible connections with Soviet intelligence, cf. Frederick S. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland 1900-1928", *Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, 27 (1991), pp. 171-182. In this context it should be mentioned that Braun's belief in his profession as a German soldier (Yang, pp. 80, 105) was somewhat weak: he was drafted on 25 June 1918 and demobbed on 26 November 1918, never saw any real action and had no reason to be proud of the beaten German army. See, for example, Otto Braun, "Gegen die 'weiße' Schlinge", *Neue Berliner Illustrierte*, 45 (1968), p. 38.

⁷ This is my interpretation of Braun's statements. A military section of the Far Eastern Bureau existed already in earlier years, as I will show in my article "The Noulens Affair", which is in preparation.

⁸ Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1928-1938*, (Lawrence/KS: University of Kansas Press), p. 172. A.G. Krymov, "Manfred Stern - General Kleber" [Manfred Stern - General Kleber], *Narody Azii i Afriki* [Peoples of Asia and Africa], 1 (1978), pp. 59-67, here 62. Getting to Ruijin had already frustrated Braun's and Stern's predecessors.

⁹ Otto Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen* (1932-1939), [Berlin (Ost):1973], p. 102.

¹⁰ Braun, p. 362.

with the Comintern but was saved, according to a Chinese source, by the head of the International Control Commission of the Comintern, the German Wilhelm Florin,¹¹ or according to GDR sources, by Walter Ulbricht, later head of the German Democratic Republic.¹²

Braun's Military Tactics

It also seems to be commonly accepted today that Braun, and especially his tactics of "short, swift strikes" (*duancu tuji*), was responsible for the Red Army's disasters during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign.¹³ Thus I consider it necessary to give a short résumé of the salient points of Braun's *duancu tuji*, based only on his articles in *Geming yu Zhanzheng* (Revolution and War).¹⁴

The hallmark of Braun's *duancu tuji* is the two- or three-pronged attack on a tactical scale. A small diversionary unit involves the enemy away from his fortification, at the appropriate moment the major Red Army force sallies forth--ideally from the sides--encircles the enemy and annihilates him. If they are successful the Red Army units will go on, if not they will rapidly but orderly retreat.

Regarding Red Army fortifications, Braun wants to keep them to a minimum, so as not to inhibit the movement of the Red Army units and stretch their meagre resources.

Leaving the tactical domain, Braun prefers regular troops which should, however, be complemented by guerilla troops. Being unable to defend the whole front it is important to control strategic points, e.g. heights.

¹¹ Li De, p. 241 (based on a statement by Shi Zhe).

¹² Information by Braun's widow. See also Helmut Peters, "Einige Anmerkungen zu Otto Braun und seiner revolutionären Tätigkeit in China", *Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg*, (Sonderheft: 1989), pp. 173-190, here p. 175.

¹³ E.g., Thomas Kampen, "Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong and the 'Triumph of Mao Zedong-Thought' (1935-1945)", *Modern Asian Studies*, 4 (1989), pp. 705-727, here 707. Yang, pp. 80ff. In Chinese publications the same is said: for example, Wu Chuangun, "Jian lun Li De de 'duancu tuji' zhanshu he diwuci fan 'weijiao' " [A short discussion of Li De's "duancu tuji"-tactic and the defeat in the fight against the Fifth "Encirclement Campaign"], Li De, pp. 210-219.

¹⁴ The problem with Wu Tien-wei's study is his tendency to mix up the conceptions of Xiang Ying, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and Braun, although there are differences between them. Wu Tien-wei, *Mao Tse-Tung and the Tsunyi Conference--An Annotated Bibliography*, (Washington: 1974), pp. 9, 65, 68. The same is done less obviously by Yang, pp. 81, 256. On the other hand, Chi-hsi Hu's reading of these differences is normally wide off the mark. Chi-hsi Hu, "Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference", *The China Quarterly*, 43 (1970), pp. 31-46; and "Mao, Lin Biao and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign", *The China Quarterly*, 82 (1980), pp. 250-280. For a discussion of Hu's interpretations, see Litten, pp. 108ff.

In all, his tactics can be described as mobile warfare¹⁵ (on a tactical scale) concentrating on attack and defense¹⁶ --which may be the reason that Braun became a teacher of tactics at the *Kangda* at a time when *duancu tuji* were all the rage.¹⁷

Differing presentations of Braun's tactics--apart from suggesting somewhat sloppy research on the side of western historians¹⁸ --are either due to a mix-up with other people's *duancu tuji* (Xiang Ying's, for example, were more defense-oriented, and Lin Biao's offer a subtly different picture, too);¹⁹ are based on descriptions of the execution of *duancu tuji*, which did not relate much to Braun's theory (as he himself also noticed);²⁰ can be traced to a confusion between strategy and tactics; or, in the case of Chinese memoirs and studies, are most of the time just simple historical distortions to give us a scapegoat for other (people's) failures - on the strategic level (Zhou Enlai?) and on the battlefield (from army corps commander downwards, but possibly including a meddling Braun).

To give a verdict on Braun, we would have to know how much he was involved in strategic or even political decision-making, because any tactics had to fit the parameters decided on those levels, and in command itself, which we only know at the moment from hopelessly prejudiced memoirs.²¹ Braun's tactics cannot be blamed for anything if the strategy, i.e. to defend the Jiangxi soviet, was mistaken and/or his tactical prescriptions were not followed, and to find this out, there is still a lot to do.²²

¹⁵ This is involuntarily confirmed by Peng Dehuai in his memoirs, where he gives an excellent description of Braun's *duancu tuji* - only to attribute these tactics to himself. Peng Dehuai, *Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal*, (Beijing:Foreign Language Press, 1984), p. 353.

¹⁶ See the articles by Braun in Li De, pp. 93-145. Also cf. Frank J. Tarsitano, *The Collapse of the Kiangsi Soviet and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign*, (New York: St. John's University, 1979), here pp. 149-154. This dissertation is based mostly on Chinese articles of the time covered and is cited neither by Yang nor by Kampen.

¹⁷ Li De, pp. 326ff. It is interesting to note that Lin Biao was first honoured and later condemned for his *duancu tuji*. Edgar Snow, *Random Notes on Red China* (1936-1945), (Cambridge/MA: 1957), p. 30; Zhan Libo, "Pipin Lin Biao de 'Lun duan zu tuji' " [Criticising Lin Biao's "On short, swift strikes"], in *Hong Qi* [Red Flag], No. 1 (1975), pp. 39-44.

¹⁸ Neither Yang nor Kampen care to cite one original article on tactics by Braun.

¹⁹ See Litten, pp. 50ff.

²⁰ Otto Braun, "Zui lun zhanshu yuanze" [Further Discussions on Tactical Principles], *Geming yu zhanheng* [Revolution and War], No. 4 (1934), pp. 8-13. Just compare Nie Rongzhen's description of battles with Braun's proposals. One might ask Nie, for example, what his troops were doing on the battlefield to give the enemy the time to pull back and send in planes to bomb them in the open. This has nothing to do with Braun's conception. See *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* [Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen], (Beijing: 1983), p. 197.

²¹ Including Braun's own, who, despite Yang's (p. 94) contention, could be quite a fairy-tale spinner.

²² What is sorely lacking is a detailed military study of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign using all available sources. See Litten, pp. 52ff., on some problems.

The Zunyi Conference

Much has already been written on the Zunyi Conference so I will keep myself to two observations. First: the third speaker, who presented the critique of the reports by Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai was very likely not Mao but Luo Fu. Besides internal evidence, which I won't review here,²³ there exist statements by Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun in this respect.²⁴

The other point concerns the so-called "Zunyi Resolution": This document is not much more than a propaganda piece, decidedly not a historical or analytical study, as is often implied.²⁵ It distorts history, e.g. concerning the Fujian-rebellion²⁶ and the first phase of the Long March.²⁷ Anyone able to read "We did not clearly understand that to command a battle was to determine its outcome"²⁸, keeping in mind that the Red Army had been fighting already for more than half a decade, and then to conclude that this reflects any historical analysis should perhaps read the Russian interpretation of the resolution.²⁹

Besides, it is to be expected that in the middle of a flight for your life you won't sit down and coolly analyze the errors of the past, but that you could not care less about historical accuracy or correct interpretations, and look for the nearest convenient scapegoat to bolster morale - with Braun, a foreigner, a spy and not really a true Comintern advisor, quite near and not too unlikely a candidate.

²³ Cf. Litten, pp. 78ff., 88ff.

²⁴ "Zai Zhang Wenti tongzhi zhui yihui shang Deng Xiaoping tangzhi zhiyi ci" [Commemorative address by Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the memorial service for Comrade Zhang Wentian], *Peoples Daily* 26 August 1979, p. 2. Zhang Peisen et. al., "Lun Zhang Wenti zai Chang cheng zhongde lishizuoyong" [On the historical activity of Zhang Wentian during the Long March], in: *Dangshi yanjiu* [Party Research], No. 3 (1987), pp. 36-42, especially 38.

²⁵ Yang, pp. 112ff., is not as critical as necessary and sometimes seems to use the interpretation-model of the Zunyi Resolution and certain texts by Mao as his guide for the historical study, e.g. p. 256.

²⁶ Cf. Frederick S. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion", *Republican China*, 1 (1988), pp. 57-74.

²⁷ As Yang, p. 123, himself says. It would distort even facts, if one accepts Yang's description of the Xiangjiang battle (which I do not, cf. Litten, pp. 71f.), because this "fiercest engagement on the Long March" (Yang, p. 104) surprisingly fails to be mentioned in the resolution. Also cf. *CCP Research Newsletter*, 6/7 (1990) pp. 48-51.

²⁸ Cited from the Zunyi Resolution in the translation of Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference", *The China Quarterly*, 40 (1969), pp. 1-40, here p. 14 (section 13).

²⁹ V. I. Glunin & A. S. Titov, "K voprosu o sove'anii" (On the question of the Zunyi Conference), *Problemy Dal'nego Bostoka* (Far Eastern Problems) 1 (1982), pp. 120-130, especially 123. It probably takes a propagandist to catch a propagandist.

Guidelines for Contributors

Contributions are welcome from scholars worldwide, regardless of institutional affiliation or country of residence. A look at the recent issues of the *Newsletter* will give you an idea of what contributions will be most suitable. Reviews, booknotes, teaching experiences, research notes, or commentaries, as well as letters responding to material previously published in the *Newsletter* can be sent to the Editor or any member of the Editorial Board. Within reason and subject to normal academic revisions, we will publish everything sent to us.

Review of a source or a book should remind non-specialists of the significance of the topic concerned, very briefly review current research and outline what this new source has to offer. The critique should aim to inform readers *by detailed example* (including page references) about the strengths and weaknesses of the text. Finally, the review should be written in a manner that invites readers to go to that source themselves; please provide full bibliographic information (including *hanzi* for author, title, publisher), explain technical terms and provide Chinese characters (or whatever original script) for important names or terms (but not for well-known terms such as "Chairman Mao" or "CCP"). We find it particularly helpful to give precise page references to topics or examples cited in such reviews.

There is no predetermined length limit for contributions. However, most detailed reviews will likely be between 1250-2500 words (5-10 pp. double-spaced manuscript). Booknotes should be under 500 words. Both *must* give precise information as to how the text can be located by other scholars. Research activities and other notices should give the name and address for a contact person.

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A CCP Crackdown in Prospect Garden: the Ousted Minister of Culture's Aesopian Lament

by
Philip F. Williams
Arizona State University

Though ousted from his post as Minister of Culture in 1989, the CCP novelist Wang Meng has continued to make a strong enough impact on his fellow intellectuals that the Party leadership ordered one of his essays from 1990 banned. By retaining his presence on the Central Committee at the same time as writing an allegorical essay highly critical of the CCP leadership, Wang Meng embodies the continuing tension between the CCP establishment intellectual's desire to serve the party-state and the need to maintain intellectual integrity in the face of political abuse.¹

A Veiled Rebuke to an Allegorical Tract

He Jingzhi, long a powerful hard-line figure in the Ministry of Propaganda, startled his audience of bureaucrats and writers at a restricted-access policy briefing late in 1990.² Noting that many PRC writers had erred in days past by staging allegorical historical dramas that meddled with contemporary politics, He Jingzhi cautioned that it was still inexcusable even nowadays to bend theoretical articles on classic literature to the same sort of present-day political purposes.³ He Jingzhi's statement came across as a very mild version of Kang Sheng's unpublished speech at a Beijing theater festival during the summer of 1964, at which time the security chief denounced Wu Han's *Hai Rui ba guan* as a "poisonous weed."⁴ Unlike Kang Sheng, the more cautious He Jingzhi named no names.⁵ Still, few in the audience missed the object of his displeasure: Wang Meng's

¹ For a succinct general characterization of the CCP establishment intellectual, see Timothy Cheek and Carol Lee Hamrin, "Collaboration and Conflict in the Search for a New Order," in Hamrin and Cheek, eds., *China's Establishment Intellectuals* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), pp. 3-4. (I would like to thank Timothy Cheek for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any errors or oversights that remain are the author's responsibility.)

² This information comes from a reliable source within the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing who requested anonymity.

³ For more information on late-1950s and early-1960s PRC authors' lavish use of historical and literary figures under the *ancien regime* to make allegorical comments on present-day matters of state, see Rudolph G. Wagner, *The Contemporary Chinese Historical Drama* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), esp. pp. 236-333.

⁴ Wagner, *The Contemporary Chinese Historical Drama*, pp. 300-301.

⁵ He Jingzhi's cautiousness must not be given full credit for his unwillingness to criticize Wang Meng by name. As Richard Kraus has pointed out, the February 1981 Party Central Directive Number Seven sharply limited the broad discretion Party officials had once enjoyed in denouncing enemies by name. See Kraus,

banned essay on Cao Xueqin's 18th-century classic novel *Honglou meng*, entitled "Soujian Daguan yuan" [A Search Raid on Prospect Garden].⁶

An Essay on Classical Fiction--or a Political Allegory?

One of the many relatively liberal-minded Party officials demoted as a result of the 1989 crackdown, Wang Meng wanted to retain whatever inside political influence he could, and thus avoided publicly expressing his dismay over the events of June 1989 with the frankness of such old friends as Yang Xianyi and Liu Binyan.⁷ How could he publicly distance himself from the crackdown while avoiding an open break with the Party gerontocracy? Following in the footsteps of the playwrights Wu Han and Tian Han, Wang would "point at the mulberry while denouncing the ash." He would make his point about present-day failures of judgment by honing in on parallel misjudgments committed during a past, and thus "safe," epoch. In so doing, he and other similarly inclined CCP writers bear a resemblance to their scholar-official counterparts from at least as early as the Tang, as Michael Fish's reference to political allegory during that dynasty suggests: "It was...part of the Chinese poetic tradition that self-expression, especially when on political topics, be limited by allegorical statements, to comment by allusion and by nuance."⁸

If Wang Meng's controversial essay on *Dream of the Red Chamber* were to be interpreted simply as an academic essay on a centuries-old novel, it would not quite tally with the general run of his expository writings on literature. Up until 1990, Wang Meng had almost always confined himself to the modern-day literary scene when writing expository essays. Though in various post-Mao literary essays he alluded to *Dream of the Red Chamber* now and then to illustrate a point in his argument, he would invariably bring the focus back to problems of the contemporary age.⁹ In focusing wholly upon an 18th-century novel and avoiding any direct mention of contemporary matters, was Wang evincing a heretofore unacknowledged antiquarian streak? While one could not absolutely

"Bai Hua: The Political Authority of a Writer," in Hamrin and Cheek, eds., *China's Establishment Intellectuals*, p. 205.

⁶ Published in *Wenxue yichan* [Literary Heritage], no. 2, 1990, pp. 109-119.

⁷ Yang Xianyi made an open and withering attack on the June Fourth crackdown in a BBC interview from Beijing early that month, while Liu Binyan's plans to return to China had to be shelved for the near future due to his public evaluations of the crackdown.

⁸ Michael B. Fish, "The Tu Mu and Li Shang-yin Prefaces to the Collected Poems of Li Ho," *Studies in Chinese Poetry and Poetics*, ed. Ronald Miao (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1978), p. 232.

⁹ In a major collection of Wang Meng's post-Mao essays, *Dang ni naqi bi...* [Right When You Pick up Your Pen...] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1981), he makes only a few paragraph-long references to *Hong lou meng*, and does so merely to buttress arguments concerning issues on the contemporary literary scene (pp. 47-62, esp. pp. 57-58).

exclude the possibility of a radically new direction in Wang's approach to problems in literature, his previous references to classical literature have not been made for the sake of reaching a better understanding of the classical tradition, but instead have embodied the Maoist idea of "making the past serve the present" [*yi gu wei jin yong*].

Wang Meng's focus in this essay seems puzzling in the context of other studies on this novel; no other scholar has so downgraded the significance of the first seventy-three chapters of the novel in order to dwell on such a prolonged and detailed analysis of the seventy-fourth, in which the overwrought and insecure Jia family matrons order a devastating search through all the living quarters within Prospect Garden. Probably the only article that comes close to Wang Meng's in its preoccupation with Chapter 74 is an unusual treatise on the portrayal of anger in *Hong lou meng*.¹⁰ As it turns out, a careful reading of Wang Meng's article leaves little room for doubt that he was indirectly expressing his own exasperation over the CCP elders' overreaction to the nonviolent protests that spring. Little wonder, then, that the government recalled and pulped this issue of *Literary Heritage*, but not before the article began changing hands through clandestine circulation in photocopied form.

Relatively minor problems blown far out of proportion triggered both the Jia matrons' search raid on the Grand View Garden and the PLA's violent crushing of the demonstrations around Tiananmen Square. The matrons Lady Xing and Lady Wang flew into a rage after a silk purse embroidered with the scene of two lovers in sexual embrace was found in the garden, whose inhabitants were supposed to be pre-pubescent and free of noxious sensual influences. As Wang Meng notes, "From the premise of a housefly emerged the conclusion of an elephant": the matrons feared that the erotic purse was but the first step of an inevitable progression toward monstrous sexual license in which lecherous men from the outside might jump the garden wall at all hours to engage in unspeakable conduct with the young maidens inside.¹¹

While the allegorical referents to the 1989 crackdown cannot be pinned down with certainty, the Goddess of Democracy statue in Beijing resembled the erotic embroidery in that it provided visible, tangible evidence that sinister forces from the outside had invaded an inner "pristine" space of ritualistic importance. Just as the overwrought Jia matrons brandished the erotic embroidery as hateful proof that the younger generation of the family

¹⁰ See Song Xin, "*Honglou meng xie nu xi*" [An Analysis of Portrayals of Anger in *Dream of the Red Chamber*], *Honglou meng yishu lun* [On the Art of Dream of the Red Chamber] (Jinan: Ji-Lu shushe, 1983), pp. 331-344. In Song Xin's discussion of various Prospect Garden inhabitants' anger over the search raid, he notes that two or three of the brightest young women there had sensed that the Jia clan elders were leading the entire family to the brink of disaster (pp. 339-340).

¹¹ Wang Meng, "Soujian Daguan," p. 112.

residing in Prospect Garden was succumbing to sordid outside influences, the CCP elder leaders indignantly denounced the Western-looking statue of the goddess as a sign that the students coming out of the party-state's own educational system were tainted by the insidious foreign influence of "bourgeois liberalization."¹²

Wang Meng goes on to argue that the search raid on the garden dealt an insuperable blow to Wang Xifeng, the youngest and most capable administrator among the several powerful women who ran the Jia household. Since two of the elder matrons blamed her as at least partly responsible for the erotic embroidery affair, and even interrogated her at one point as the most likely instigator of the whole affair, her former airs of self-assured authority were damaged beyond repair by the incident. Moreover, her inability to prevent the ill-conceived and undesirable search raid betrayed the severe limits of her own power, as compared with the occasionally dormant but wholly tangible power of the older matrons. Yet however powerful these older matrons may have been, neither they nor their protégés have sufficient talent to handle Wang Xifeng's duties properly once she fades from the scene. The connection between Wang Xifeng's rapid decline in authority during Chapter 74 and that of her present-day CCP counterpart becomes clear when Wang Meng avers that Xifeng had "slipped into the passive role of having to defend herself" as result of the search raid.¹³ Here there is no doubt that Wang Meng has used Wang Xifeng's fall to describe the plight of Zhao Ziyang, the talented if flawed administrative head who found himself unable to mount a credible challenge to the authority of CCP elders above him in the hierarchy of loyalty-network politics.

The question inevitably returns to the key factor that led to the debacles at the Jia mansion and Tiananmen. An unreflective exaggeration of fears and an impatience to find a quick solution both emerge as underlying causes. Ostensibly commenting on how a piece of hearsay about a male intruder vaulting the Prospect Garden wall led to inflated fears about an imminent outbreak of licentiousness among the girls, Wang Meng tacitly implies that a tactful or gradualist approach to handling the Beijing demonstrations was rejected in favor of violent suppression of the grossly exaggerated threat: "They'd only allow minor matters to escalate into serious conflicts, and for problem-free areas to become problem areas; they wouldn't permit serious conflicts to settle out as minor problems, or problem areas to dissipate into non-problem areas."¹⁴

¹² William Hinton argues that the Goddess of Democracy bore a closer resemblance to the home-grown, salt-of-the-earth PRC heroine Liu Hulan than to the goddess of the U.S. Statue of Liberty; see *The Great Reversal: The Privatization of China, 1978-89* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), p. 178.

¹³ Wang Meng, "Soujian Daguan," p. 112.

¹⁴ Wang Meng, "Soujian Daguan," p. 111.

In *Dream of the Red Chamber*, the matronly instigators of the garden ransacking eventually themselves suffer an imperial confiscation of much of the Jia family property. Like Cassandra in Greek lore, the Jia maiden Tanchun insightfully warns her elders involved in the initial search raid on Prospect Garden that the elders' turn for suffering a search raid will eventually arrive; and this future raid by outside forces will turn out to be a much more decisive blow to the clan now that it has been divided by a first search raid instigated from within.¹⁵ None of the elders takes serious heed of Tanchun's warning, but her prediction in Chapter 74 of a Pyrrhic victory for the raiders does in fact come true in Chapter 105, when a state-ordered confiscation of clan property and arrest of many Jia elders takes place. Similarly, the CCP elders apparently dismissed the warnings of present-day Tanchuns about the eventual dire consequences of unleashing a ferocious military crackdown.

The surface-level "restoration of order" achieved by the CCP leadership lost the party-state a significant portion of its remaining legitimacy, not least among establishment intellectuals with sufficient educational background to fathom such allegorical political critiques as Wang Meng's. At the same time, Wang Meng's allegory still lends itself to a simple surface reading as ordinary fiction criticism, thus providing him with cover during attacks from political enemies like the writer of the denunciatory letter to the editor in the 14 September 1991 issue of *Wenyi bao*.¹⁶ Having protected himself from being pinned down to an unambiguous political statement on the 1989 crackdown, Wang Meng indeed resembles the elusive butterfly with which he has compared himself: "If you hold me down by the head, you won't be able to keep me pinned down at the waist. If you pin me down by my legs, you won't be able to grab hold of my wings. You'll never know as well as I do just who Wang Meng really is."¹⁷

¹⁵ Wang Meng quotes Tanchun's warning word for word about the dire future consequences of the search raid in "Soujian Daguanyuan," p. 110. To consult the original, see Cao Xueqin, *Honglou meng*, vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1979), p. 965; also see David Hawkes, tr., *The Story of the Stone*, vol. 3 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 471.

¹⁶ The notorious letter to the editor in *Wenyi bao* makes the baseless claim that Wang's story from 1989 entitled "Jiaying de xizhou" was an allegorical diatribe against China's reform program and its leader, Deng Xiaoping. During autumn 1991, the letter and the controversial story were both reprinted in *Shijie ribao*, 23 Oct., p. 28; 24 Oct., p. 26; 25 Oct., p. 26; and 26 Oct., p. 26.

¹⁷ Wang Meng, "Hudie weishenmo deyi" [Why the Butterfly is Pleased with Itself], in *Dangdai Zhongguo zuojia bairen zhuan* [A Hundred Accounts of Contemporary Chinese Writers], ed. Jie Min (Beijing: Qiu shi chubanshe, 1989), pp. 2-3.

**History on Command: On the Writing and Representation of
'Local' Revolution in the People's Republic of China**

by
Roger R. Thompson
The University of Maryland at College Park

The textually-based and circumstantial argument I made in 1989 concerning Deng Xiaoping's manipulation of the Maoist exhortation to "seek truth from facts" to his own ends was corroborated by evidence gathered in Xunwu County, Jiangxi Province, in October 1990. I had argued that Deng added a completely new chapter to early party history by focussing on Mao's short stay in Xunwu in May 1930, when he wrote "The Work of Investigation" (also known as "Oppose Bookism") and *Report from Xunwu*. Mao himself had, in 1961, emphasized the significance of "The Work of Investigation" but not his *Report from Xunwu*. That would be Deng's legacy, and it was done to show how Mao's actual "work style" in 1930 was remarkably free of the dogmatic and theory-laden pronouncements of the Cultural Revolution. The *Report from Xunwu* was 80,000 characters long and covered diverse subjects: administration, commerce, transportation, communication, land tenure, taxation, religion, and social practices.¹

Policy machinations in Beijing were played out in very concrete ways in Xunwu, situated at the intersection of the borders of Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian provinces, from 1954 until the present. There are five key sites in Xunwu that have been at the center of contending interpretations of the significance of Xunwu's local revolution in the historiography of the national revolution. These sites and their depiction of revolutionary history illuminate the struggle for control of a revolutionary memory and also the way in which the Party is attempting to manipulate the symbols of that past as a way of reaching out to the youth of China today. The sites are: the Martyrs' Memorial; an exhibition focussed on the two documents mentioned above; a reconstruction of the residence of Dr. Cyril and Lillian Bousfield, American Baptist missionaries in Xunwu in 1912-28 whose residence served as Mao's headquarters in 1930; a museum commemorating the failed 25 March 1928 uprising by local Communists; and finally, a memorial park to Gu Bo, the local revolutionary whose efforts made Mao's *Report from Xunwu* possible and who served as Mao's personal secretary after both men left Xunwu for Ruijin in June 1930.

¹ See "The 'Discovery' of Mao Zedong's *Report from Xunwu*: Deng Xiaoping Writes a New Chapter in Early Party History," *CCP Research Newsletter*, No. 3 (1989), pp. 8-17 and "Introduction" in Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 3-41.

There have been three forces shaping views of Xunwu's revolutionary past: the first is the effort that began in 1954 when Beijing called for a hagiography of martyrs to be created. As one enters the Xunwu County Revolutionary Martyrs' Memorial (Xunwu xian geming lieshi jinianguan) a large book of honor is at center, listing the names and giving brief biographical sketches of the 3,253 Xunwu natives who died during the second revolutionary civil war period (1928-37).

The second source of revolutionary history in Xunwu was, again, familiar in a national context. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution places large and small documented the moments when Chairman Mao's greatness touched their communities. In Xunwu this was marked by establishing an office in Xunwu to recover and preserve this history. Its activities included making a photographic record of still-extant buildings and sites. Furthermore, efforts were begun to reconstruct the Bousfield home--Dr. Bousfield had left Xunwu in April 1928--which was used by Mao in 1930 as his headquarters. The home and the mission hospital compound surrounding it had been reduced to ruins by 1933, after the see-saw battle between the CCP and KMT for control of Xunwu finally was won by the latter. Missionaries associated with the China Inland Mission approved the construction of new buildings, which was completed in 1939. But in 1972 Jiangxi provincial authorities wanted a replica of the Bousfield home. The reconstruction of the residence, whose design had been influenced by the domestic architecture to be found along the Maine seacoast where the Bousfields spent their furloughs, was based upon descriptions given by elderly Xunwu natives during interviews done in 1971-72. A remarkably accurate reconstruction resulted.

Maoist hagiography was manipulated to new ends beginning soon after Mao's death by the third force, most apparent in the years after Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation in 1977, that has shaped representations of Xunwu's local revolutionary history. Although the Bousfield replica resulted from efforts that began in the Cultural Revolution, it is significant that the exhibit was not opened until 28 December 1987. Visitors are now shown Mao's bedroom, private office, the central room where the Xunwu investigation meetings took place, and the office of the Fourth Army. To lend authenticity to this reconstruction, visitors are shown the faded characters on the walls announcing what organization occupied which room. The explanatory signs in each room follow the narrative line established in the 1983 annotations to "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of the Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic" in which readers were told the history of the development of Mao's work-style, especially the development of the

"investigation meeting," in the larger context of the importance of "seeking truth from facts."²

The attempt in the post-Mao era to redefine Cultural Revolution symbols is seen most clearly in the so-called "*Report from Xunwu* Exhibition" (*Xunwu diaocha chenlieguan*). In the early 1970s this exhibit, housed in a nondescript building in the shadow of the Bousfield residence, was taking form as a classic statement of Maoist omnipotence, especially in the room devoted to "Oppose Bookism," complete with a glass case of more than a dozen foreign language versions of the document. But Mao died before the exhibit was completed.

The exhibition that opened in 1978 is a product not of the Cultural Revolution, but rather of Deng Xiaoping's reinterpretation of the historical significance of Mao's life. Although visitors entering the building come face-to-face with the famous image of Mao still to be found at Tiananmen, instead of moving to the left and into the room of theory and "Oppose Bookism," one is directed to move to the right as the exhibit unfolds as one of practice. The history of Xunwu's local revolution and the larger context of the Jiangxi soviet period is first sketched and then the background of the Xunwu investigation is given, complete with a list of the participants and an oil painting depicting Mao, Gu Bo, and others hard at work in the former Bousfield residence. Continuing, the exhibit highlights key topics in the report, including the important functions of the petty bourgeoisie and the nature of the peasants' burden under an exploitative system of land tenure. All of this leads to the room depicting the land revolution, complete with large-character posters exhorting peasants to "Strike Down Local Bullies and Divide the Land." The exhibition's penultimate room is a *mélange*, highlighting both the land revolution, Mao's penchant for investigation, and the revolutionary strongholds of the Jiangxi period. Finally, visitors come to the room in honor of "Oppose Bookism."

The overall effect is to place Mao in a very human context and to show the degree to which his accomplishments required the support of many individuals. This point is driven home with displays of artifacts and documents, including weapons of spears and swords, farm tools, the tea kettle Mao used to warm the tea cups of his fellow investigators, lamps, and land deeds.

The process of shifting attention away from Mao, so perfectly captured in this exhibit that was begun before Mao's death and completed a few years later, is not to be found in the last two Xunwu sites. Revolutionary memory is distinctly local at these sites.

² *Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi zhushi ben xiuding* (An annotated "Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic," revised) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp. 556-63.

The event memorialized was a failed insurrection that took place in March 1928 when young Xunwu revolutionaries, in alliance with secret society members, seized control of Xunwu City and other key administrative points. Their victory was short-lived, for within days they were routed by forces from all four counties surrounding Xunwu (Anyuan, Huicheng, Pingyuan, and Xingning). Several leaders were captured and executed, but one, a young man of 22 named Gu Bo escaped to Xingning County, Guangdong. Gu would return and was a key leader during the retrenchment in 1928 and the resurgence of local revolution in 1929 and 1930. Gu Bo headed a government-in-exile in southern Xunwu established in late 1929 and presided over the land revolution there. In May 1930, after the climactic battle with counterrevolutionaries in their stronghold in northern Xunwu was won by local Communist forces moving from south to north and national forces moving down into Xunwu from the north, Gu moved the government to Xunwu City.³

These events are commemorated in an exhibit that opened in August 1986 in a building that faces the *Report from Xunwu* Exhibition. The guiding hands of Mao and Zhu De are missing here; this is a paean to local revolution. There are important links between this Xunwu Revolutionary History Memorial (Xunwu xian geming lishi jinianguan) and the re-installed Martyrs' Memorial. A small section in the latter reprises the museum and in both cases one of the main intended audiences are young people. Numerous school groups have visited both museums and in each hall there are exhortations to draw inspiration from the revolutionary sacrifices of an earlier generation of Xunwu young people. In the end, the signs read, it is to be hoped that a "socialist spiritual civilization" will be fostered.⁴

The figurative and literal topping off of these commemorations is the site of the Gu Bo Memorial (Gu Bo lieshi jinianbei) statue and park, situated on a hill overlooking the Martyrs' Memorial and commanding a view of Xunwu City. Centered on the plaza is an imposing statue of Gu Bo, set on a ten-foot pedestal, in which Gu heroically emerges from roughly-cut rock. We can be certain of the importance of this memorial in the eyes of Beijing and the CCP, for the calligraphy that guided the engravers of the plaque on the pedestal--"A memorial tablet to the Martyr Gu Bo"--was done by Deng Xiaoping in July 1984. We also know that on 11 May 1984 the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP sent a directive that instructed provincial and local authorities to

³ Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu*, pp. 14-17.

⁴ Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 187-91. This effort echoes earlier attempts by national authorities to create revolutionary martyrs. The periodical *The Red Flag Waves* (Hongqi piaopiao), published by China Youth Press included a "veritable martyrology" in Volume Five that was intended to create a "cult of model heroes to be emulated by the younger generation." See Robert Rinden and Roxane Witke, *The Red Flag Waves: A guide to the Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao Collection*, Center for Chinese Studies, China Research Monograph, No. 3 (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), p. 16.

establish a memorial to Gu Bo in Xunwu. Behind the statue is a bas-relief commemorating the March 1928 uprising, with panels showing the confident young revolutionaries beside their banner announcing the establishment of a soviet. Another bas-relief shows fierce peasants with primitive weapons in battle. (Two years later, in 1930, these traditional weapons could be put aside, for there were hundreds of pistols and rifles in the hands of revolutionary forces, according to a bar graph on display in the *Report from Xunwu Exhibition*.)

But these representations of the young destroying the old in the style of socialist realism are ironic. The approach to this site is a wide stone avenue graced by a traditional archway (*paifang*) that leads to a fountain in which is set a natural rock tableau with cranes, familiar symbols of long life. (Gu Bo did not enjoy such a life. He was ambushed and killed by a KMT patrol in Longchuan County, Guangdong, in March 1935 at the age of 29.) After viewing the Gu Bo statue in the plaza above the fountain, one can meditate upon all of this at the Gu Bo Pavilion (Gu Bo ting), a traditional-style *ting* from which one can see Xunwu City below, the rich valley just north of Xunwu City, and the imposing Wuyi Mountains at the northern boundary of Xunwu County.

The Gu Bo Memorial was dedicated with great ceremony on 22 October 1986, a little more than two years after the Propaganda Department had ordered it to be built. Viewed four years later, it has an unfinished air--the road leading up to the honorary archway is still unpaved and the archway lacks a calligraphic inscription--and is in disrepair. The Gu Bo Pavilion, in particular, has been the target of vandalism that has stripped it of a stone table and ravaged the lattices gracing the low ledge that circles the floor of the pavilion. The curator of the Martyrs' Memorial and keeper of the memorial, himself of the Gu lineage that produced Gu Bo, attributed the vandalism to young people with nothing to do but make trouble. Authorities have tried to address this problem by posting a watchman who also guards the MIG-15 jet fighter⁵ that was hauled to Xunwu from nearby Mei County up to a small clearing fifty yards west, but not visible from, the Gu Bo Memorial. This military tone--the jet fighter and the local insurrection--is also echoed in the nearby Martyrs' Memorial, which glorifies Xunwu natives killed in service of the revolution as early as the 1920s and as late as the 1979 war with Vietnam.

All of the places I visited were deserted, although guestbooks indicate frequent visits, sometimes by groups numbering in the hundreds. All of the museums were clean and well-kept; the Bousfield home was being repaired when I was there. But the reasons

⁵ I thank my colleague at the University of Maryland at College Park, Dr. Jon Sumida, for identifying the make and model of this jet fighter.

for this attention are clearly national. Xunwu's local history is, if not being written by national authorities, at least serving their purposes. Only a few of these projects would have been conceived and executed by local people. A telling indicator of this can be found in a draft history of the March 1928 uprising written in 1983. In the bibliography to this report there is little indication of any significant research taking place before the early 1980s. It appears that only a local history of a sub-county district compiled in the late 1950s and a work on secret society involvement with revolutionary groups written in the early 1970s were produced prior to 1980. But in the early 1980s research flourished, the fruits of which are on display in the museums discussed above and in a booklet on Gu Bo's life entitled *Gu Bo changqing* (Gu Bo, Forever Young) that was compiled in 1985 under the auspices of the county's Party Committee, the county government, and the Martyrs' Memorial in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of his death.

It has been a hard century for Xunwu. When Mao investigated the county in 1930 natives referred to a "golden age" already three decades in the past.⁶ The revolution wrought by Gu Bo has had a very mixed legacy. Without the symbolic usefulness of Gu Bo and the events of 1928-30 for Deng Xiaoping's reinterpretation of the early Jiangxi soviet period, little of what I have just described would probably exist. The Martyrs' Memorial would be there, as would the plans for reconstructing the Bousfield residence, and maybe a half-finished exhibit highlighting Mao's essay "Oppose Bookism," but there would be little else.

The legacy is a mixed one and a confused one, with the Gu Bo Memorial juxtaposing socialist realism, traditional Chinese symbolic motifs and architecture, and a MIG-15. Perhaps Gu Bo could have made sense of it all. Well-imbued with a classical education but steeped also in a new-style education, not to mention a revolutionary rhetoric, he was able to juxtapose effectively incommensurable points of view. A scion of the most cultured lineage in the county, Gu Bo in youthful earnestness strove to destroy the traditional society that had nurtured him.⁷ The process he began would overwhelm Xunwu and, one suspects, his family and lineage. At the very least, if Gu Bo's first cousin, a middle school teacher in Xunwu City is not exaggerating, the genealogy of the family was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.

But what superb irony there is in the decision to build a traditional-style archway and pavilion for Gu Bo's memorial. And he would know this honor carried on a family

⁶ Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu*, p. 65.

⁷ Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu*, pp. 20-22.

tradition going back at least two centuries. As Gu had told Mao in 1930, his great-great grandfather had received an edict from the Qing emperor permitting the erection of an archway (*paifang*) to honor the deep learning of an area in southern Xunwu that had produced eleven examination degree-holders (*xiucai*).⁸ In the 1980s word again came from Beijing to honor a Gu, but not because he had seen seven generations from which degree-holders had come or would come. Instead, Gu Bo represented countless young people who had sacrificed everything for their ideals and the revolution.

Gu Bo, then, plays a role like his ancestors in Tangbei Village, living a life of sufficient distinction to merit attention from metropolitan authorities in Beijing and providing a means by which this distant and inaccessible county is tied, through symbolic means, to the center of national power. What differs, however, is the nature of the exchange. The Qing emperor recognized a Gu to honor old age, cultural achievement, and family harmony in and of itself; Deng Xiaoping honors Gu as part of a national-level power struggle. Perhaps Gu's actions benefitted Xunwu in the long-run, but that is not part of Deng's calculation. It was Gu's contributions to a revolution that, as written by the victors, transcended locality, that Deng wanted to recognize. Likewise, the sacrifice of Gu and his comrades, linked in the Martyrs' Memorial to the sacrifice of youthful Xunwu lives in Vietnam, exhorts the youth of today to exhibit a loyalty that extends to the center.

⁸ Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu*, pp. 194-95.

Notes on *Tifa* in Party Historiography (Documents)

Collating Party Documents:

Dealing With "Leftism" and Leftist Tendencies*

As far as the question of whether or not to put quotation marks around left and leftist tendency is concerned, there is at present no standard procedure. For this reason, the CCP Central Documentary Research Office on 4 February [1982] submitted a special report with a request for instructions to Comrade Hu Qiaomu. The report states: "After you threw light upon the matter in a footnote to your article 'On Some Current Problems on the Ideological Front,' the problem of how to employ the character--left on its own in a pejorative sense has already been clarified and resolved, i.e. one should put it within quotation marks (as in 'left' is better than right, 'left' guiding policy, 'left' error, 'left' opportunism, etc.). As far as the term leftist tendency is concerned, since it is now commonly used when referring to erroneous tendencies within the Party, it would be permissible not to put it within quotation marks. But if we were to do so, we would encounter some problems when collating historical documents." The report refers to the following three areas where problems would appear:

1. Leftist tendency has two different meanings in historical documents. One meaning is that of a tendency towards being progressive. For example, in the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* (Volume One), it says on page four: "The Communists have always hoped that the rightists would fully grasp the meaning of democracy and gradually come to exhibit a leftist tendency (*zuoqing*), and that loyal members of the Guomindang would all become leftists (*zuopai*)."

Furthermore, in the *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi* (Volume One), it says on page two: "The working class should also encourage leftist tendencies (*zuoqing*) among the petty bourgeoisie and help it overcome its deep-rooted vacillation and conservatism." At the same time, in articles in the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* and *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, the term leftist tendency is also employed repeatedly when critique is directed against overly leftist erroneous tendencies (*guo zuo de cuowu qingxiang*) within the Party.

* This is a translation of "Hu Qiaomu Tongzhi Pishi Tongyi Zuowei Bianyi de 'Zuo' He 'Zuo'-Qing Dou Da Yin hao", *Dangshi Ziliao Tongxun 1982 Nian Hedingben* [Annual volume for 1982 of the Party History Materials Newsletter] (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1983), p.24-5.

If leftist tendency is allowed to appear with different meanings in the same book, and if no distinction is attempted with the help of quotation marks, this may give rise to confusion.

2. If we employ the method of putting left in quotation marks and of not putting leftist tendency in quotation marks (when both are used in their respective pejorative senses), there will be a formal lack of harmony where left and leftist tendency appear in the same article, or even in the same sentence, as, for instance, in the Resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, where in the same passage the two terms left putschism and leftist tendency putschism are used together.

3. The *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, volumes one to five, and the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* (Volume One), all follow the common national standard employed since liberation, i.e. regardless of whether or not the character left is used on its own, or combined to form the term leftist tendency, it is not put in quotation marks when used in a commendatory sense, but put in quotation marks when used in a pejorative sense. If a new method is now employed in the second volume of the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* and in the revised edition of the fifth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, inconsistencies will appear within the same work.

In its report to Comrade Hu Qiaomu, the CCP Central Documentary Research Office suggests: "We feel that the method in common use since the fifties is still to be preferred. A broad readership has already become familiar with it and used to it. In the future, will the Central Documentary Research Office be permitted to employ this method when editing and publishing Party documents?"

On 7 February, Comrade Hu Qiaomu commented on this report as follows:

"Agreed."

Uniformity of Expression:

Putting the Great Cultural Revolution in Quotation Marks*

Not very long ago, while deploying various departments to write commemorative articles on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the People's Republic of China, the Central Propaganda Department laid down uniform regulations governing the writing of words and figures.

Below are some excerpts:

I. Years must at all times be written in full. The year 1978 must not be referred to as 78, the year 1984 must not be referred to as 84.

II. Fractions, centuries and decades should be written with the help of Chinese characters [i.e. not with Roman numerals]

III. All quotes must be checked against the very latest edition of the texts quoted. Notes should indicate source and page number, in order to facilitate cross checking.

1. When quoting the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin or Stalin: A text included in the *Selected Works* should be quoted from the translation in the *Selected Works*. A text not included in the *Selected Works* may be quoted from the *Complete Works*. Notes need only refer to name of book, volume and page number. For instance, *The Complete Works of Marx and Engels* volume 19, page 156, or *The Complete Works of Lenin*, volume 1, page 25.

2. When quoting from the works of Comrade Mao Zedong, the officially and openly distributed editions should be used as a norm. The form of notes should be same as above.

3. All other quotes should conform to points 1 and 2 above, but the name of the publisher and the year of publication should be added.

* This is a translation of an extract from "Zhongxuanbu Dui Wenzi Shuzi Shuxiefade Guiding" [Regulations of the Central Propaganda Department Governing the Writing of Words and Figures], published in *Hunan Chubanshe Gongzuo*, no.8, 1984, p.10.

IV. Examples of other matters in need of standardization:

1. In "leftist" tendency ("*zuo*" *qing*) and in "leftist" error ("*zuo*" *de cuowu*), the word leftist should be in quotation marks, but not so in ultra-leftist (*ji zuo*).
2. [No irregularly simplified characters may be used]
3. References to the Party's congresses, e.g. the Eighth National Congress, the Ninth National Congress, . . . The Twelfth National Congress, should not be in quotation marks.
4. The "Great Cultural Revolution" must be put in quotation marks, and may not be abbreviated to read C.R. (*wenge*).
5. The names of books, articles, periodicals etc. should be in title-marks (*shuminghao*).
6. "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools Contend" should be put in a single set of quotation marks.
7. The full name should be used for the Lin Biao, Jiang Qing Counter-Revolutionary Clique.

(Orig. publ. in *Baozhi dangai* [Newspaper Trends], vol.15, 1984)

A Standard for Reference Works:

How to Speak of Ourselves and the Enemy*

In party history dictionaries, chronicles, chronologies, lists of terms and other reference books published in recent years, we often see the the Chinese Communist Party, the Red Army, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the People's Liberation Army referred to in abbreviated form as "our party" and "our army." Abbreviations like these are carry-overs from our teaching inside the Party, but to employ them in books openly distributed inside and outside China is not advisable.

During different historical periods, the term "our army" incorporates very different things. For instance, during the second revolutionary civil war period it means the "Red Army." During the Anti-Japanese War, it may refer to the "Eighth Route Army," the "New Fourth Army" and various anti-Japanese guerilla units, but when contrasted with the Japanese army, it may also refer to the entire Chinese army engaged in the war against the Japanese. Depending on the context, the terms "our army," "our bases," etc. may refer either to a whole or parts of a whole. For this reason, they are nowhere near as precise as the "Liberation Army," the "North-west Liberation Army" etc.

From now on, in party history reference books compiled and published by academic publishers, and openly distributed to readers of all strata inside and outside China, the formal designations used should be the "CCP Center," the "Red Army," the "Eighth Route Army," the "Liberation Army," etc.

Furthermore, in party history reference books, the habitual use of terms like the "Chiang [Kai-shek] party center," the "Chiang army," the "enemy...," etc. should be discarded in favor of standardized references to the "Guomintang center," the "Guomintang army," etc.

* This is a translation of "Bianxie Dangshishu Shi Ying Zhuyi de Wenti" [To remember when editing Party history books], *Wenzhaibao*, vol.312 (15 May 1986), p.1. It constitutes a summary of an article by Wu Binwen first published in *Dangshi Tongxun*, no.4, 1986.

Soviet Studies: Chinese Communist Movement Bibliography
(published in Russian in 1990)

V.P. Zhuravliova and V.M. Maiorov
Sinological Library
Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences,
USSR/Russian Academy of Sciences

Editor's Note: The *CCP Research Newsletter* is pleased to continue the regular series of bibliographies introducing our readers to new and recent studies on China and the CCP from the former Soviet Union and Russia. In early 1991 Vladimir M. Maiorov, Chief Bibliographer of the Sinological Library at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow kindly offered to prepare these bibliographies for the *Newsletter*. The materials in this bibliography are freely accessible in the Sinological Library in Moscow and INION (the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences). Inquiries as to how to obtain copies of publications or how to contact various authors may be directed to Mr. Maiorov.¹

Many of the following articles appear in two recent publications:

Китай и социализм. Актуальные проблемы изучения экономики, политики, истории и культуры Китая. - М., 1990. - Ч.1,2,3.

China and Socialism: Current Problems in the Study of the Economy, Politics, History, and Culture of China. 3 vols., 1990. Hereafter noted as *China and Socialism*.

Двадцать первая научная конференция "Общество и государство в Китае". - М., 1990. - Ч.1,2,3.

The Twenty-First Scientific Conference on Society and State in China., 3 vols., 1990. Hereafter noted as *Twenty-First Conference*.

Note: The double slashes (//) in the Russian text indicate the separation between an article title and the magazine from which it was taken. "M" stands for Moscow, "C" for page. We have tried to keep all the punctuation in the Russian as close to the original as possible, instead of trying to make the format fit an American standard.

¹Mr. Maiorov is willing to provide photocopies to libraries and research institutions on an exchange basis and for individuals upon payment. For details write:

11728 Moskva
ul. Krasikova 27, IDV AN SSSR
Sinologicheskaya Biblioteka
V.M. Maiorov
RUSSIA

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Анамнез "Великого кормчего": (Гл. из кн. "Больные, которые правят нами" // VIP: Very Important Person. М. - 1991, #2. - С.34-37.
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Vorontsov, V. Mikhail Borodin. Komintern's prominent figure. Sun Yat-sen's adviser stayed in China in 1923-1927.
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Три книги о Цюй Цюбо // Восток =Oriens. М., 1991.- #3 - С. 159-164.
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6. Коровяковский, П.
Китайцы - жертвы сталинских репрессий // Пробл. Дал. Востока. - М., 1991. - #2, - С. 142-145.
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Review of Compilation of Chinese Communist Laws Currently in Force

by
Pitman B. Potter
University of British Columbia

This volume (the "Compilation") was issued to compliment the four volume series, *Chung-kung chung-yao fa-kuei hui-pien* [Compilation of Important Laws and Regulations of the Chinese Communists: 1987-1988] (Taipei: Fa-wu pu tiao-ch'a chu, 1989) (the "Compilation"). Unfettered by the concerns of its companion work over which enactments are "important", the Compilation endeavors to provide a comprehensive survey of enactments issued between the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, through April 1989. The Compilation organizes more than 150 laws and regulations; civil affairs and finance and tax statutes and regulations; economic law; criminal law; litigation law; and administrative law. The Compilation also offers a supplemental section containing ten enactments dating back to 1954, including the four Chinese constitutions, as well as various organizational laws for the Chinese Communist Party. Prefaced by an explanatory note explaining the editors' view that Chinese laws and regulations can be broken into three categories; "laws", "edicts", and "statutes and regulations", the Compilation includes only the laws (*fa*) and supplementary edicts.

Although the Compilation is quite extensive and relatively complete, it suffers from the same problems that plague other efforts to compile Chinese laws and regulations (see the author's review of *Chung kung chung-yao fa-kuei hui-pien (1987-1988)*, in *CCP Research Newsletter*, Nos 6 & 7, p. 20), namely the lack of a consistent scheme for organization and selection. Thus, even though the editors specifically exclude statutes and regulations from the scope of the Compilation, the index entries are categorized almost uniformly by reference to this term. While the editors make an effort to explain their organizational scheme, they do little to explain how the six topical organizational categories were selected, or how the laws and regulations included were selected and organized. For example, the merger of civil law with finance and tax laws is somewhat problematic, because it requires such enactments as the Marriage Law and the Marriage Registration Regulations to be included along with finance and tax regulations. By including, for example, the Economic Contract Law (ECL) within the civil law section rather than the economic law section, the editors perhaps unwittingly adopt a doctrinal interpretation of contracts in China that was subject to intense debate between the time the ECL was adopted in 1981 and 1986, when the General Principles of Civil Law modified this approach and

posited that contracts belong to more autonomous horizontal civil relationships within society. Because this issue continues to be debated in China, the Compilation's adoption of a particular conceptual approach seems inappropriate.

Although the Compilation is quite inclusive, it does omit a number of important measures. These include the decision by the State Council on various measures for encouragement of foreign investment (enacted in late 1986), the so-called "Twenty-Two Articles". This enactment was a critical component of the PRC foreign investment legislative regime, and really should be included in this compilation. Similarly, the Compilation does not include important Supreme Court decisions on the interpretation and implementation of the Economic Contract Law and the Foreign Economic Contract Law. These decisions were extremely important in themselves, and their omission is puzzling in light of the inclusion of Supreme Court interpretative guidelines on other matters such as inheritance law.

On the other hand, the Compilation's sections on criminal law, litigation law, and administrative law, as well as the supplementary materials, are quite comprehensive and useful. The criminal law section contains, for example, the major provisions regarding economic crimes. The litigation section contains the Administrative Litigation Law enacted in early 1989, which was a major development in the Chinese system of judicial review. The administrative law section contains a vast array of State Council regulations regarding such matters as environmental protection, immigration, and internal control matters. The supplementary section contains a number of useful documents concerning the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the four Chinese constitutions.

Thus, although the Compilation does have a number of problems concerning its organizational scheme, as most of these kinds of collections do, it is on the whole an extremely useful contribution, both as a supplement to the "Important Laws and Regulations" series and as a stand-alone volume. What really is needed in the field of compilations on Chinese law materials, however, is a uniform organizational scheme and a rational basis for selecting materials for inclusion within compilations. While this volume falls short of these ideals, it will nonetheless be a useful addition to the researcher's bookshelf.

Communications & Activities

Issue number 9 comes off the press as the editorial board is mobilizing for the upcoming June 1993 Party History conference in Colorado (see below). As readers have been informed in earlier issues, we are working to get back on schedule. We are pleased to have a good set of essays and reviews in this issue and are grateful for our subscribers' continued support. We are particularly grateful to our Institutional Supporters, listed on the inside front cover of each issue, for their continued financial and bibliographic support.

I want to welcome Michael Hunt of the University of North Carolina to the editorial board. Professor Hunt brings his expertise in CCP relations with the world and a deep familiarity with the new primary sources on this and other Party history topics.

The major event for us in 1993 will be the conference on the "Construction of the Party-State and State Socialism in China, 1936-65" to be held at the Colorado College from May 31 - June 5, 1993. As with Tony Saich's Party History conference in Holland in 1990, this will generate additional research and bibliographic studies for the *Newsletter*. An announcement for the conference appears below. The deadline for applications for funded participation has passed, but most of our readers would have seen this announcement in the fall 1992 issues of *The China Quarterly*, *AAS Newsletter*, or *Perspectives*.. However, there are always last minute changes and space may become available. Please feel free to contact me with any questions.

Timothy Cheek

Competition to Participate in N.E.H. Conference on CCP Party History

Two categories of participants are invited to compete for funding to attend a six-day workshop-style conference, "Construction of the Party-State and State Socialism in China, 1936-65," to be held at The Colorado College May 31 through June 5, 1993. Papers will explore the creation and initial operation of the Party-State in China from the first sustainable Party-State in Yan'an in the late 1930s until its great crisis in the mid-1960s -- the Cultural Revolution. The conference, funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, has largely been filled by invitation with senior and mid-career scholars working on the history of the Chinese Communist Party. However, openings have been planned for five paper presenters and ten non-presenting graduate students to attend the conference. Selected paper presenters will receive full funding (travel and per diem); graduate students will receive \$200. Applications: interested scholars should contact the organizers as soon as possible to obtain further information (tentative schedule, list of

papers, etc.). Applications need not be in a set format but should include: (for paper presenters) letter explaining how your work fits in to the conference, abstract of research (which must be original documentary research not yet published and available for distribution by March 1993), and CV; (for graduate students) letter explaining how this conference might help your training, CV, and letter of support from your advisor or senior colleague. Deadline: Applications due by December 15, 1992; awards announced January 5th, 1993. Later applications will be considered, if funds and space remain. Contact: Timothy Cheek, Department of History, The Colorado College, 14 E. Cache La Poudre, Colorado Springs, CO 80903. Telephone: (719) 389-6523; FAX 719/634-4180; E-Mail: TCheek@CCNode.Colorado.edu.

Asian Studies Newsletter Archives

Comparing an extensive collection of academic and cultural newsletters and association bulletins dealing in whole or in part with Asian affairs and Asian Studies, the Archives have been developed and maintained since 1970 with three primary objectives in mind:

- 1) The creation of a centralized collection of newsletter-type materials containing information about the growth and state of Asian Studies and Asia-related organizations and about the activities of various institutions and individuals. Most publications on file are in English, French or German, while a growing number are in Chinese, Japanese, Korean and other Asian languages. Many have experienced very limited circulation. Some have appeared in mimeographed or xeroxed format; others more closely resemble professionally printed magazines in their appearance.
- 2) The preservation of these same materials for long-term scholarly use, especially as libraries and individual recipients of newsletters generally discard them on account of their perceived ephemeral nature.
- 3) The creation of a data base that serves as the basis for the preparation of various bibliographies and reference tools, some of which have already been published.

All work on the Archives has been undertaken by Frank Joseph Shulman on a private voluntary basis, as a long-term service to researchers, students, librarians and the general public.

Well over 1,000 titles from throughout the world are currently on file. These range from *Canada and Hong Kong Update* (Toronto, Ontario), the *Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter* (Canberra, Australia), and bulletins issued by the Tokyo-based Asiatic Society of Japan

and the European Association for Japanese Studies, to *Lettre de l'FRASE* (Association français pour la recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est, Paris), the newsletters of some U.S.-China Peoples' Friendship Associations and Japan-America Societies, and such outreach-oriented bulletins as *South Asia News* and *Korean Studies Newsletter*, both published at the University of Hawaii.

A two-part guide to some of these publications, prepared by Frank Joseph Shulman, appeared in the 1974-75 and 1975-76 volumes of *The Asian Studies Professional Review*. A highly selective list of then currently published academic newsletters focusing on China appeared in the March 1980 issue of the Association for Asian Studies' *Asian Studies Newsletter* and in the June 1980 issue of the *Chinese Librarians Association Newsletter*. A detailed listing of titles relating to Southeast Asia, in turn, has appeared in *Southeast Asian Studies: Options for the Future*, edited by Ronald A. Morse (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984); while *Asian Studies in the Southeast: A Twenty-Five Year Prospect*, edited by Kenneth W. Berger (Columbia, South Carolina, 1987), contains a listing of newsletters on Asia published in the southeastern part of the United States. Shulman is gradually preparing for publication a comprehensive, annotated guide to as many past and current newsletters and association bulletins as possible that relate in whole or in part to Asia: from the Middle East and India to Japan and the Philippines. For more detailed overviews of the Asian Studies Newsletter Archives in general, individuals should consult the articles by Schulman in the February 1985 and June 1991 issues of the Association for Asian Studies' *Committee on East Asian Libraries Bulletin*.

All files in the Asian Studies Newsletter Archives are open by appointment. Requests for a limited number of xerox copies of individual issues of newsletters are filled at cost whenever possible.

The cooperation of newsletter and association bulletin editors, university centers, various organizations and associations, cultural groups, and individuals everywhere will always be appreciated. *We would be grateful to have Asian Studies Newsletter Archives added on a Complementary basis to mailing lists for appropriate newsletters and bulletins no matter how irregularly published or limited in distribution they might be.* Contributions of back files of publications which can help fill in gaps in existing holdings will always be welcome. Please direct all correspondence to:

Frank Joseph Shulman
Asian Studies Newsletter Archives
9225 Limestone Place
College Park, Maryland 20740-3943 U.S.A.
Tel: (301) 935-5614 (evenings and weekends)

FBIS CD-ROM Index

With the advent and rapid expansion in technology the very nature of the work that everyone does is doubtless bound to go through dramatic changes.

For academic researchers one of our dreams (well, mine anyway) is to have the text of books, periodicals and, eventually, materials available on data bases accessible anytime from one's home or office computer.

Well we are not there yet. But, we are inexorably moving in that direction as I discovered recently when I came across, and had the opportunity to use, two new sources of information.

The first labor-saving device is the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) index on CD-ROM. I don't know how far back the index goes but when I recently searched for material from the years 1985-1991 it took me a couple of hours to identify the items I needed rather than the days it would take me looking for it on microfiche or, worst of all, the daily index. One can search through an array of fields narrowing one's choices. Unfortunately, this is only the index and not the text.

The second wonderful innovation is the Lexis/Nexis data base. Lexis is predominantly a data base concerned with legal matters. Nexus contains the texts of major newspapers, news services, journals and more. In addition to *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, etc. there is also the Reuters, Interpress, Agence France Presse and other services.

For those interested in China one can find the Xinhua service from January 1977, the Central News Agency (Taiwan) since April 1984 and the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts from January 1983.

The wonder of this service is not only that one can access the entire text but there are features which allow for the quick scanning of articles or, if one prefers, just a search of the indices.

So while we are still very, very far from the point where we can get texts from archives by simply dialing them up on our computers, these two innovations are marvelous time-saving devices which can only help facilitate our work.

A. Tom Grunfeld
Empire State College

BOOKNOTES

Mao Zedong Sixiang Xuanchuanyuan, ed., *Wuchan jieji Wenhua Dageming Wenjian Huibian (Di Yi Ji)* [Collected Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Volume I]. Beijing: Beijing Huagong Xueyuan, 1967. 122 pages.

The Red Guards who called themselves the Beijing Chemical Engineering College "Mao Zedong Thought Propagandists" took their propaganda and publishing activities seriously, and for this they are fondly remembered by historians working on the Cultural Revolution. This is one of a number of collections of documents they put together "in order to help our Comrades in their study and implementation of the Party Center's instructions". It contains 81 circulars, resolutions, directives and similar documents originally issued by the central and municipal authorities in Beijing between 16 May 1966 and 19 April 1967. Here are most of the standard texts one would expect to find (including the original pre-1967 version of the May 16th Circular, in which Peng Zhen is still called "Comrade"), plus a number of rare and unusual ones, including a wonderful State Council Circular on the importance of satisfying the global demand for free copies of Mao's Little Red Book. (Fairbank Center Library)

Mao Zedong Sixiang Xuanchuanyuan, ed., *Wuchan jieji Wenhua Dageming Wenjian Huibian (Di Er Ji)* [Collected Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Volume II]. Beijing: Beijing Huagong Xueyuan, 1967. 132 pages.

This collection is of greater interest than volume one, reviewed above, mainly because only a fraction of the texts it contains are available elsewhere. The main body consists of 72 circulars, resolutions, etc., issued between 15 April and 24 July 1967. An appendix includes five further texts, including (somewhat unexpectedly) the "First Ten Points" and the "Twenty-three Points". In their preface, the editors apologize to the reader for the unfortunate typo in the version of the May 16th Circular included in volume one.... Highlights include resolutions on the military take-over of various ministries, a number of Military Affairs Commission orders, decrees related to violent clashes in the provinces, letters from Lin Biao, and many other nuggets. Plus, of course, a circular from the Beijing Revolutionary Committee in which printing plants are asked not to print collections like this one. We salute the revolutionary print-workers who disobeyed. (Fairbank Center Library)

Mao Zedong Sixiang Xuanchuanyuan, ed., *Wuchan jieji Wenhua Dageming Cankao Ziliao Xuanbian (Di Wu Ce)* [Selected Reference Materials from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Volume V]. Beijing: Beijing Huagong Xueyuan, 1966. 172 pages.

Before they began putting out collections of Party circulars, Beijing's "Mao Zedong Thought Propagandists" were already in the business of editing and compiling collections of transcripts of central leader's speeches. This large, typed and legible volume contains 44 speeches and other material, mainly from October and November 1966. Much is available elsewhere, but there are a few unusual pieces, including a Red Guard transcript of a meeting with representatives of the Beijing municipal Party Committee. Chen Boda's report to the Central Work Conference is included in the usual short version later declared by Zhou Enlai to have been "corrupt" and not conforming to what Chen really said. Does any reader have volumes one to four? (Included in CCRM *Red Guard Publication Supplement* 1, pp.4040-215) (Fairbank Center Library)

Beijing Shifan Daxue Jinggangshan Gongshe "Honglei", Beijing Huagong Xueyuan "Hong Huohua" Duli Dadui, eds., *Wuchan jieji Wenhua Dageming Ziliao Zhongyang Shouzhang Jianghua (Yiyue Hao)* [Materials from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Central Leaders' Speeches January]. Shanghai, 1967. 242 pages.

This and the following item represent the two basic document collections that no one concerned with development in January and February 1967 can afford to be without. Here are more than a hundred printed transcripts of speeches to every conceivable kind of audience by members of Mao's Proletarian Headquarters. The fall of Tao Zhu, the sinister wind of economism, the January storm, the Xiao Hua-affair, the reorganization of the PLA Cultural Revolution Small Group, Red Guard-attacks on Kang Sheng, the power-seizure at the *People's Daily* and more - it's all extensively covered. Some of the transcripts are by amateurs, and as such a far cry from the slick official records that the CCP itself likes to provide us with. (They have not been gone over and checked for "inaccuracies" by a member of the Central Documentary Research Office!) In other words, unadulterated "thick description": Chen Boda constantly asking his audiences if they understand his heavy accent or not; Zhou Enlai apologizing for having to run off to the phone all the time; and Red Guards invariably intoning the song of the great helmsman when the time to "depart for home" has come. (Fairbank Center Library)

Zhongyang Shouzhang Jianghua 2 [Central leaders' speeches February]. Beijing: Beijing Boli Zongchang Hongweibing Lianluozhan, 1967. 202 pages.

For all practical purposes the sister-compilation of the above item, this fat volume contains 103 speeches by senior CCP figures and texts of circulars issued by the central authorities in February 1967. It is by reading collections like this one from cover to cover, over and over again, that historians develop a true "feel" for the discourse of the time. Information on the personal histories of today's exiled "democratic personages" can be found in these pages. This and much more, including interesting material on the Cultural Revolution in the Ministry of Finance, power-seizures in the provinces, and the PLA. (Fairbank Center Library)

Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Huiji (Guanyu Wuchan jieji Wenhua Dageming)
[Collected documents of the CCP Center concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]. Beijing: Mentougou Qu Hongweibing Lianluozhan, 1967. 174 + 13 pages.

This is a pocket-size collection of 48 Central Committee Circulars, with an appendix containing 6 texts issued by Beijing's municipal authorities. The circulars date from 8 August 1966 to 20 April 1967, and are all available elsewhere. Inferior to the "Mao Zedong Thought Propagandists" collections reviewed above, but possibly of some interest to the student of events in the capital. Appendix contains text of 11 April proclamation by Public Security Bureau PLA Control Commission banning the sale of Mao badges, slogan boards, photographs, tabloids and other materials in public places. (Fairbank Center Library)

Shouzhang Jianghua Huiji [Collected leaders' speeches]. Beijing: Shoudu Dazhuan Yuanxiao Hongweibing Geming Zaofan Zongsilingbu Xuanchuanbu, 1966. 2 vols. 35 + 24 pages.

These volumes by the Third Headquarters include some two dozen leaders' speeches from September and October 1966. They are properly typeset and well printed, but not carefully collated, and some texts occur more than once. But as every student of this period knows, this is not in itself necessarily a bad thing. What one madly scribbling Red Guard missed out in her transcript of a leader's speech, another sometimes managed to get down on paper. So by cross-checking collections like these, we are able to deduce with some

accuracy what Zhou Enlai, Wang Li, Ye Jianying, Zhang Chunqiao et al. probably did say when they met with China's best and brightest. Here's a taste of the good stuff: "Everyone can exploit the Center's words... Comrade Lin Biao said you cannot bombard the proletarian headquarters. Right or wrong? (Students answer in unison: Right!) Comrade Lin Biao was entirely right... But some people now quote him and say 'I am the proletarian headquarters. You may not attack me'." (Fairbank Center Library)

Tianjin Shi Duoquan Lingdao Xiaozu Fuzeren Zai Geming Zhigong Qunzhong Zuzhi Zuotanhui Shang de Fayan [Speeches by leading members of the Tianjin municipal power-seizure leading small group at an informal meeting with revolutionary staff and workers mass organizations]. Tianjin: Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Tianjin Shi Zhujun Zhichi Geming Zuopai Lianluozhan, 1967. 30 pages.

This slim volume documents a ten-day meeting organized by local PLA forces and the "revolutionary left" in Tianjin in June 1967. The speakers are Xiao Siming, Xie Xuegong and Zheng Sansheng. Rather esoteric, but obviously of great interest to anyone interested in the Cultural Revolution in Tianjin. Key topics covered include the establishment of worker's congresses, dealing with conservative mass organizations, and opposing anarchism. (Fairbank Center Library)

Title page missing. Collection of documents on Cleaning the Class Ranks, probably printed Beijing, 1968. 30 pages.

This is a welcome collection of documents from a movement about which pitifully little substantial information is available outside China. Its first half contains a bland selection of relevant Mao-quotes. Its second half, however, reproduces the contents of Central Committee Circulars Zhongfa (67) 96 "Investigation Report on the 61 Traitors"; Zhongfa (67) 173 on access to archives; Zhongfa (67) 200 on arresting traitors; Zhongfa (67) 325 on reversing verdicts; Zhongfa (68) 9 on "external investigations"; Zhongfa (68) 74 on the experience of New China Printing plant; and more. Students of early CCP history will appreciate the fact that it includes the very rare full text, and not just the preamble (but unfortunately still not the appendices!) of the March 1967 investigation into the 61 traitors case by Kang Sheng's Peng Zhen Special Case Small Group Investigation Office. (Fairbank Center Library)

Guanyu Peng, Lu, Luo, Yang Fangeming Xiuzhengzhuyi Jituan Cailiao (Di Si Ji) (Di Ba Ji) [Materials on the Peng, Lu, Luo, Yang counter-revolutionary revisionist clique vols.4 and 8]. Beijing: Shoudu Douzheng Peng, Lu, Luo, Yang Fangeming Xiuzhengzhuyi Jituan Xijiao Choubeichu, 1966/67. 9 + 6 pages.

Surprisingly good collections of bits and pieces of "criminal evidence", some of it probably reliable, some of it most likely not. Volume 4 deals mainly with Peng Zhen, Yang Xianzhen and the Central Party School. Includes biographical information on Peng's "henchmen" at the school, plus a fair amount of information not in the official record of the campaign against Yang Xianzhen. Volume 8 is devoted exclusively to Yang Shangkun. Here the oft-repeated charge of him having "bugged" Mao's offices is again raised. (In his 1968 self-criticism "My Personal Account", Deng Xiaoping eventually took responsibility for having "resolved the matter of the tapping devices installed by Yang Shangkun in a slow and sloppy fashion".) Scholars interested in the biography of the current PRC President should definitely give this the one over. Mentions that Yang had nine brothers and eight sisters, but does not tell us anything about Yang Baibing. Does any reader happen to possess additional volumes in this series? (Fairbank Center Library)

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